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Abstract 
The thesis examines the informal learning of global citizenship in the course of social 
struggle within grassroots movements, through an ethnographic case study of the Save 
the Narmada Movement (NBA). The movment, comprising village communities in 
India, campaigned with the support of international non-governmental organisations to 
prevent the construction of a World Bank (WB) financed dam. The study arises in 
response to a perceived marginalisation of grassroots resistances, especially in 
developing contexts, within empirical accounts of global civil society (GCS), which is 
conceptualised as a space where 'global citizens' seek to resist and transform the 
exigencies of economic globalisation. Interrogating the validity of this exclusion, a 
Gramscian framework is adopted to examine whether, and in what ways grassroots 
actors are global citizens, engaged in the transformative politics of GCS. 
Analysis of data emerging from NBA suggests that contestation with 
political structures at the national (Indian government) and global (WB) level is an 
important source of learning that leads to the construction of a movement's global 
citizenship. Through a Gramscian dialectical process of strategic action and reflection, 
the movement developed a critical awareness of the class character of these institutions, 
leading NBA to connect its local struggle against the dam to wider struggle against 
`destructive development and globalisation. This process encouraged a revalorisation of 
grassroots participants' subjective relationships to the nation-state, leading amongst 
some, to the rejection of national citizenship in favour of global affiliations. Articulation 
of global citizenship was based on a counter-hegemonic identification with struggles of 
the oppressed across the world, rather than a depoliticised 'moral universalism'. 
However, learning to extend global citizenship to challenging oppression embedded 
within movement communities is constrained in a context where unity against external 
oppressors is paramount. By examining the learning processes that led NBA to 
articulate and perform global citizenship in empowering ways, the thesis points to how 
grassroots movements are constructing GCS, and therefore contests their current 
marginalisation within GCS perspectives. 
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We will fight, we will win, we will learn, we will grow! * 
*Slogan of the Save the Narmada Movement 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
RESEARCH FOCUS 
This thesis highlights a perceived paradox in dominant conceptualisations of the 
transformative space of global politics known as global civil society (GCS), within 
which the role of grassroots movements in GCS and the pedagogical processes through 
which this role is realised has not been adequately addressed. This exploration is 
facilitated through an ethnographic case study of a grassroots movement of tribal and 
rural communities in India, called the Save the Narmada Movement (NBA) that 
campaigned with the support of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) 
to prevent the construction of a World Bank-financed dam. 
Theorisation on GCS has arisen in response to concerns over the loss of democratic 
control by national citizens as the globalisation of capitalism challenges the political 
space of the nation-state and intensifies global inequalities. Within these changing 
contours of citizenship and politics, GCS has been positioned as a new empowering 
politics of direct democratic action within which disaffected voices across the world 
may work together as global citizens to resist, challenge and transform the adverse 
affects of globalisation. From the Gramscian framework within which this thesis is 
located, the dynamics of domination, and thus resistance through GCS, are intertwined 
with cultural, educational processes of consciousness and identity formation and 
transformation of the oppressed. Paradoxically however, empirical representations of 
GCS tend to be colonised by accounts of the existence and activities of ING0s, which 
while largely concentrated in the resource rich West, do not directly represent those 
most affected by globalisation. 
As a point of departure therefore this thesis examines, through a case study of NBA, 
changes in the political thoughts and actions of marginalised participants of grassroots 
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movements as they articulate grievances and target institutions beyond the nation-state 
— in this instance, the World Bank (WB). It focuses on understanding whether, and to 
what extent local social movements that engage in contestation against supranational 
institutions perceive themselves to be actors within global civil society, and therefore 
engaged in educational processes of identity and consciousness transformation that are 
integral to the construction of global citizenship. By viewing social struggle itself as a 
site of informal learning, the thesis further seeks to understand if and how movements 
learn to be globally conscious agents of social change in the process of 
transnationalising their local grievances. 
Before elaborating on the perceived neglect of local social movements in GCS literature 
and the manner in which this undermines its normative aims, I feel it is necessary to 
develop a better understanding of the history and nature of the Save the Narmada 
Movement through which the conceptual issues developed in this thesis are grounded. 
THE SAVE THE NARMADA MOVEMENT 
The Save the Narmada Movement or Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) is a 
mobilisation of village communities in the Narmada Valley which arose in the early 
1980s against the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) — a mega-dam planned for construction 
on the Narmada River. For the communities to be displaced by the dam, the project has 
come to represent "ecologically and socially destructive" capitalist-led development; 
and their resistance to this, a search for decentralised, people-centred alternatives. While 
the dam was partially funded by the WB (and later also the Japanese government), the 
movement also became part of a much celebrated transnationalised resistance against 
these forces — igniting the quintessential image of a David and Goliath struggle. 
Construction on SSP started in 1985 after Indian authorities received financial 
assistance from the WB. The dam, with a full height of 138.68 metres, is part of the 
Narmada Valley Project - one of the largest such projects in the world, consisting of 30 
multi-purpose major dams, 135 medium dams and 3000 minor dams. Though SSP, built 
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	at Navgam in Gujarat, has been projected as the lifeline of drought-prone areas of 
Gujarat and Rajasthan, it spells destruction for hundreds of village communities living 
along the river whose livelihoods, lands and homes face submergence. 
The Seeder $.revSr Prefect. Area 
Source: Friends of River Narmada website (www.narmada.org/sardarsarovar.html)  
These villages are spread across 3 states - Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra 
through which the Narmada River travels. While official estimates only recognise 
152,000 people occupying the submergence zone as 'project affected' and thus entitled 
to compensation, this leaves out almost 850,000 people who will face displacement due 
to canal construction, reservoir related tourism, compensatory afforestation and 
`secondary displacement' (i.e. a total of a million people facing displacement). Of the 
total 245 villages in the submergence zone 19 are in Gujarat, 33 in Maharashtra and 193 
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in Madhya Pradesh. Those in Gujarat and Maharashtra are exclusively hill Adivasis —
tribal communities that reside in the undulating terrain of the Vindhya and Satpura hills 
forming part of the Narmada Valley. In Madhya Pradesh flooding will occur in two 
distinct socio-cultural regions — the fertile plains of Nimar, dominated by Hindu 
farming communities of various castes, causing displacement of 100,000 people; and 
the hilly tracts of Vindhyas and Satpuras extending into Madhya Pradesh from where 
approximately 15,500 hill Advasis will be displaced (Baviskar, 2004). 
Displacement for these traditional, place-rooted communities has drastically life-
changing and potentially life-threatening consequences. It is widely known that many 
rural communities affected by other dam projects have been reduced from land-
ownership and self-sufficiency to pauperization and financial uncertainty, suffering the 
humiliation and dehumanization that this involves (Dhagamwar et al, 1993). Yet the 
government's management of resettlement and rehabilitation has been nonchalant at 
best. Indeed many villages were not even officially informed of their impending 
submergence. Apart from social disruption, construction of the dam has entailed 
deforestation and destruction of the River Valley eco-system. 
Deforestation in the Narmada Valley 
From 1985, Medha Patekar, a community worker began mobilising Adivasi and Nimari 
communities across the three affected states. Initially only demanding just 
rehabilitation, the mobilisation became increasingly radical and in 1988 declared 
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complete opposition to the dam with the slogan — We will not move! The dam will not 
be built! (Koi nahin hatega! Baandh nahin banega!). Since then, participants in the 
movement have faced severe police repression despite the non-violent nature of their 
resistance which has involved demonstrations, rallies, public fasts, judicial activism and 
alliance building with movements and support groups in India. 
The movement has simultaneously transnationalised its resistance, challenging the 
international funders of the project, especially the World Bank. Western environmental 
INGOs have been particularly instrumental in this aspect of the struggle, lobbying the 
World Bank and galvanising international public opinion against the dam and the 
Bank's involvement in it. While the local movement has resisted the dam on the ground 
and endured human rights violations, INGOs have relayed this to the Bank and wider 
international community. Indeed this local-global network was so successful that in 
1993 the World Bank buckled to intense international pressure and made an 
unprecedented withdrawal from the project. The role of INGOs in this important victory 
is widely cited as a clear example of the manner in which global civil society can 
empower subaltern' communities. 
However despite this international success and continuing grassroots resistance the 
Indian government has not reconsidered the project. Funds have been gathered from 
private investors through issuing of bonds, and it is believed by some that WB loans for 
wider structural reform of the Indian economy continue to be channelled into the 
project2. Violating human rights and project guidelines for resettlement, dam 
construction has continued. Many have been forcibly evicted from their homes without 
resettlement and studies have reported an increased mortality rate at the various 
The term 'subaltern' is used by Gramsci to refer to people who are not just "oppressed, although that 
may be the case, but lacking autonomy, subjected to the influence or hegemony of another social group, 
[and] not possessing one's own hegemonic position" (Sassoon, 1982). Gramsci primarily uses this term to 
refer to workers or those who are economically exploited. However within the Subaltern Studies Group 
of South Asian scholars this term has been used to refer to culturally and politically marginalised groups 
also. Thus it includes peasants and women, and those of minority sexual orientations, ethnicity, race or 
religion. Here I refer to subalterns as those who are both economically and politically-culturally 
marginalised. 
2 Leaders of the NBA and international activists involved in the campaign believe this to be the case 
though it has not been possible to clearly trace these sources of funding for the project. 
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rehabilitation sites that do exist (Housing and Land Rights Network, 2003; Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, 2003). Though they have effectively lost their battle for 
decommissioning the dam, the Andolan has continued action around a reformulated 
campaign to minimise the height of the dam and thus the displacement and damage 
caused to the hinterland. 
While the movement achieved intermittent success in stalling the project at various 
points, when I went to the Valley in March 2005 however, for the first round of data 
collection, the dam was already at the height of 110m. By this stage the mass base of 
the movement had been severely depleted, with many families preferring to accept 
compensation. However because the monetary compensation they have received cannot 
support relocation many of these families continue to live in their original homes. Some 
Adivasis living in the hills have simply moved to higher ground as the waters gradually 
rise, though they have lost fertile land of the river embankment, making subsistence 
harder. 
The dam has claimed the lands of hill Adivasis first, while the region of Nimar, furthest 
from the dam site has been safe at the dam height of 110m. In March 2006, however, 
the Gujarat government announced it would restart construction raising the height to 
121m — the final elevation of the concrete wal13. 
3 It was with this heart wrenching news that my fieldwork came to an end. 
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On New Years Eve of 2006 the construction was completed. Protests, though more 
muted continue, while many thousands of people remain to be compensated and 
rehabilitated. Though the project has finally been completed by the Indian government, 
the WB's direct involvement in the project for 8 years means that it is also partly 
culpable for this end result as well as the human rights abuses and environmental 
destruction that has accompanied it. 
NBA was not able to stop the dam, but in alliance with INGOs it was successful in 
contesting the supranational institution — the WB. As mentioned earlier, the victory of 
this INGO alliance has become one of the emblems of global civil society's potential to 
empower local communities against unaccountable global forces, and is cited in many 
articles and books concerned with this emerging sphere of trans-border contestation. 
These accounts have tended to focus on the manner in which INGOs provided the local 
movement with global visions and democratic channels to reach unaccountable global 
forces. However the question of what meanings the local movement itself ascribed to 
their transnational contention and the implications this has for their role within global 
civil society has not yet been fully addressed or answered. This gap will be further 
discussed below, where it will become apparent that it reflects deeper currents within 
GCS literature that threaten to undermine the normative aspirations of GCS. 
THE PARADOXICAL CONCEPTUALISATION OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
Conceptually global civil society is understood to be a normative multi-organisational 
field that raises a radical challenge to regressive aspects of globalisation and the nation-
state. As a radical democratic space it is believed to empower those who are 
marginalised and disenfranchised by globalisation. A crucial supposition is that political 
action within this space is anchored in universal values and dynamic global identities. 
`Global' actors such as global social movements (e.g. the anti-globalisation movement 
and women's health movement), but predominantly INGOs (e.g. Greenpeace and 
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Amnesty International) are believed to advance the transformative global visions of 
GCS, while providing a means through which local discontent against trans-border 
institutions can be voiced and heard. Explorations of GCS have therefore tended to 
focus on these actors. As Chandhoke (2002) notes "It is indicative of the power of the 
non-governmental sector that civil society has come to be identified with NGO activism 
both in influential tomes on civil society and in policy prescriptions of international 
institutions today" (p.38). However these actors are predominantly located in the West 
and their membership is relatively affluent. They therefore do not directly represent 
those most marginalised by globalisation. Partly echoing this, Chandhoke therefore 
remarks that "[global] NGOs play a larger-than-life role in global civil society" (p.38). 
Further, numerous studies also highlight the manner in which the relationship between 
powerful INGOs and their weaker constituents is often less than democratic and 
participatory. 
This creates a peculiar paradox — while global civil society is envisioned as a space for 
direct democracy and empowerment, subaltern groups especially in the South (such as 
those of the Narmada Valley), that arguably face the brunt of negative effects of 
globalisation, tend to be excluded as agents of change and meaningful participants of 
GCS. Instead they are reduced to passive victims of globalisation and beneficiaries of 
the efforts of global actors. In a subtle manner, then, the very people for whom GCS is 
meant to be an empowering space are positioned outside of this global political field. 
GCS thus emerges as an elite arena of political action rather than the inclusive, 
empowering space that it is conceived as. 
Though it cannot be denied that local social movements of subaltern groups are 
examples of direct democracy, their marginalisation within GCS perspectives appears to 
be based on an assumption that they are locally-bound in terms of vision, scope, and 
identity (Batliwala, 2002). That is, they do not represent the global visions and identities 
that underlie GCS. Where global discourses are noted within local social movements 
they are often argued to be a result of the 'influence' of INGOs over these movements 
or are viewed as their strategic rhetoric to maintain instrumental alliances with powerful 
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`global' actors (Conklin and Graham, 1995; Bob, 2002). The inference is that 
underneath superficial global discourses local movements remain entrenched in local 
identities and political concerns. The extent to which this assumption is valid however 
needs more in-depth empirical exploration, which has not yet been forthcoming. 
As mentioned above, analytical treatments of NBA's transnational politics have also 
reproduced such characterisations. Though they identify environmentalism as a 
prevalent global discourse in NBA, it is argued that this global discourse is a strategic 
device influenced by INGOs supporting the movement (Randeria, 2003). In these 
accounts the movement is presented as relatively static and analysis draws on what can 
be construed as superficial readings of movement discourses and practices articulated 
by movement leaders. Baviskar (2004) provides a more politicised account of the 
movement as a radical attempt to challenge India's dominant model of development. 
The analysis however remains situated within the national sphere and does not 
sufficiently enunciate the transnational dimensions and significance of NBA's politics. 
This study hopes to provide fresh insights into the role of local movements such as 
NBA in global politics by analysing the strategic or transformative significance of 
global discourses within the NBA through two means. Firstly, it explores the learning 
influences and processes through which NBA's collective identity emerged in order to 
produce a more contextualised and agency-oriented account of the movement. 
Secondly, it accesses a deeper level of the movement through accounts of the 
consciousness, subjective expressions of citizenship and everyday practices of village 
participants of the movement. Both these aspects of the study are not only new with 
respect to research on the NBA but also generally in relation to local social movements 
that have transnationalised their grievances. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Restating the research focus of this thesis succinctly it examines: 
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If and how are local social movements that transnationalise their grievances engaged in 
the construction of global citizenship? 
The Save the Narmada Movement provides a relevant case study to investigate this 
overarching question which will be systematically examined through its five interrelated 
dimensions: 
1) At the level of the movement's practices— how did political engagements with 
the state, international community and other global actors such as the WB 
change through the course of struggle? 
2) What were the movement discourses relating to grievance formation, targets of 
protest and alliance construction that accompanied these movement practices —
were there global dimensions to these? 
3) At the level of the participant local communities — whether and in what manner 
did local participants relate to the movement's practices and discourse of 
resistance? Was their participation connected to a growing awareness and 
critical appraisal of their oppression as well as transformation of subjective 
articulations of identity and citizenship — did this involve a global dimension? 
4) If transformation in consciousness did occur was this related to a dialectical 
transformation of oppressive social structures within the communities? 
5) What were the learning influences, processes and mechanisms through which 
the dimensions referred to above emerged? 
The need to observe the possible emergence of global citizenship at these various levels 
of the movement leadership and local community is based on a conceptualisation of 
global citizenship as a political identity constituted through a dialectical relationship 
between political action and personal transformation. Thus global citizenship relates not 
only to political practices of contestation with the state and global forces (Qs1-2) but 
with political consciousness and action at the local/personal level (Qs3-4). Further while 
the practices, identities and consciousness that constitute global citizenship are viewed 
as developing gradually through the process of transnationalising grievances, it is 
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necessary to identify the particular mechanisms and experiences within the context of 
struggle through which global citizenship is learnt (Q5). 
RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND RESEARCH FOCUS 
The research focus on local social movements in developing contexts and their 
relationship to global civil society emerges from my political concerns which guided 
academic explorations of gaps and inconsistencies in the literature. 
In recent years critical concern regarding the effects of the global expansion of 
capitalism, or economic globalisation has been rising. This is evidenced in the 
burgeoning critical literature on globalisation as well as the rise of movements of those 
marginalised and exploited by globalisation (Castell, 2004; Anheier et al, 2001a). These 
movements have increasingly targeted protest against agents of globalisation —
multinational corporations, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World 
Trade Organisation. It is argued by some that social inequalities caused by globalisation 
are transcending national boundaries and oppressing working classes and marginalised 
social groups world-wide (Castells, 1998). However while national conditions intersect 
with these processes, it is clear that the negative effects of globalisation have most 
intensely been experienced by those marginalised within developing nations (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2001). 
In this context the rise of ultra-fundamentalist movements has been witnessed (Delanty, 
2000), and post-modernists within academia and politics have championed a politics of 
difference and identity in reaction to global forces (Esteva and Prakash, 1998). While 
the former are clearly regressive; I would argue, along with others commonly located 
within a Marxist framework, that postmodernist politics are also problematic. The 
emphasis on difference rather than commonalities in people's oppression has tended to 
fragment and weaken resistance against global capitalism (Kauffman, 1990; Rikowski 
and McLaren, 1999). From a Marxist standpoint resistance and transformation of these 
structures will only be successful if based on a comprehensive understanding of their 
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global nature. Further the radical agents of such transformation can only be those who 
are most affected by these forces (Cox, 1999). 
Based on this analysis I felt it necessary to focus my research (which is fundamentally 
about how people are resisting and transforming globalisation) on those most affected 
by globalisation — invariably people who are already marginalised in developing 
contexts. I wanted to more fully understand the consciousness and identities emerging 
amongst these communities as they contested the effects of globalisation within their 
localities. The question I was interested in examining was whether these people are 
engaged in a postmodern politics of difference or does the process of struggle spur them 
to construct connections upon which global identities and a unified struggle to challenge 
globalisation can develop. 
Most movements of poor communities in developing contexts have been led by activists 
who are outside of the cultural or/and class positions of those they mobilise. This is true 
of the most celebrated local movements, such as the Zapatistas in Mexico (Watson, 
2001, 2002), the Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil (Branford and Rocha, 
2002), the Chipko movement in India as well as the Narmada Bachao Andolan itself 
(Sen, 1999; Guadalupe and Rodrigues, 2004). While studies of these movements have 
focused on discourses and practices of these movements as articulated through their 
leaders, they have not provided a clear understanding of how marginalised communities 
themselves are understanding globalisation and their position within it. This is a serious 
gap which weakens our understanding of how globalisation might be challenged and 
whether these movements are important forces for progressive, democratic 
transformation. 
The need to examine processes of consciousness and identity formation is particularly 
relevant to developing theoretical and empirical accounts of GCS. Though global civil 
society is understood to be a normative political field based on global identities and 
values, empirical research produced on GCS has overwhelmingly consisted of 
quantitative data on the number and extent of INGOs (Katz, 2006), degree of world- 
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wide linkage between civil society organisations and occurrences of GCS events such as 
parallel forums, globally organised protests etc (Pianta and Silva, 2003; Glasius et al, 
2006). Other data has referred to quantitative collations of surveys and questionnaires 
on perceptions, attitudes and values of those participating in these global events 
(Anheier et al, 200lb; Glasius et al, 2002). Some qualitative research has also been 
done but this has largely been limited to presenting discourse analysis and political 
outcomes of INGO campaigns (Padilla, 2003) and global social movements and forums 
(Glasius and Timms, 2006). More in-depth, qualitative research on the meanings that 
people ascribe to trans-border action and the identities that emerge from, and provide 
the basis for such action, is clearly required not only to understand the role and 
relationship of various actors to global civil society but also the very existence of this 
normative field of action itself. 
ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
Chapter 2 delves deeper into theorisations of GCS as well as providing a more detailed 
overview of empirical studies conducted in this field in order to clearly identify a 
continuing empirical gap that this thesis seeks to address. It is argued that the focus on 
global actors such as INGOs and global social movements is concomitant with a neglect 
of local actors such as local social movements as possibly transformative agents of 
global civil society and as sites for the enactment of global citizenship. This neglect 
could threaten to undermine the transformative goals that GCS is perceived to strive 
towards. 
Chapter 3 seeks to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how local social 
movements might be transformative agents within global civil society by introducing 
the notion that social movements evolve through learning and are pedagogical sites for 
the radicalization of consciousness. The contribution of different social movement 
theories to understanding social movements as learning processes is examined. By 
dialectically relating social change to learning and conscientisation it is argued that 
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Gramscian theory provides the most powerful means of understanding social 
movements as potential agents of the transformative sphere of GCS. 
Chapter 4 positions the empirical research of this thesis within the qualitative 
framework of critical ethnography. It describes how issues of sampling, data collection 
and ethics were negotiated and executed within the real life settings of the Narmada 
villages that constitute the movement. 
Chapter 5 examines the research context and NBA's location within this. The big dam-
building industry in India is contextualised within a development model spurred by 
modernization and globalization. NBA is positioned within a wider resistance to such 
development, commonly referred to as the "environmentalism of the poor". A more 
detailed description of the 'poor' who are the protagonists of the NBA is provided. 
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the discourses and practices of INGOs that were part 
of the international campaign to secure the withdrawal of the WB from SSP. Though 
this international campaign is often cited as an important example of GCS in action, I 
show through an analysis of the discourses and practices of INGOs involved in this 
campaign that they were not constructing global citizenship. In fact transnational action 
in support of NBA was galvanized by engaging national identities and politics. This 
problematises the overwhelming reliance of GCS theorists on INGOs as harbingers of a 
global community. 
Chapters 7-9 present findings and analysis of empirical data on Narmada Bachao 
Andolan. Chapter 7 presents the movement as engaging in political action on multiple 
scales — local, national, transnational and global. The learning processes through which 
this multi-scalar politics emerged is examined. It is argued that NBA's politics of 
multiple scales was not simply driven by strategic local goals but reflected the 
movement's emerging counter-hegemonic consciousness against capitalist 
globalization. The implications of this for dialectically relating the local struggle against 
the dam to a wider 'global struggle' are examined. 
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Chapter 8 explores the extent to which the grassroots of the movement have been 
engaged in the movement's multi-scalar politics and the pedagogical implications of 
this on participants' consciousness, sense of identity and citizenship within global civil 
society. 
Chapter 9 explores the extent to which NBA's transformative politics at the national 
and global level was reflected at the local level in efforts to address local forms of 
oppression based on class, caste and gender. That is, it examines the extent to which the 
movement was performing global citizenship at the local level. 
Chapter 10 summarises and integrates analysis of the various levels of the local 
movement as well as INGO campaign. As such it re-examines the emerging nature of 
global civil society and the position of local social movements within this. The original 
contributions of the thesis are identified as well as areas where further research to 
facilitate critical understanding are required. 
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Chapter 2 
Globalisation, Global Civil Society and Global Citizenship 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter locates the thesis within conceptual contradictions in global civil society 
studies and an empirical gap arising from this. While GCS is conceived as a radical 
democratic space for resisting and contesting the oppressive dimensions of 
globalisation, a substantial body of research suggests that the global actors — primarily 
INGOs — that constitute this space are ambiguously related to its transformative aims. 
Thus there appears to be an incongruity between the normative parameters of GCS and 
the actors identified as manifesting these parameters. The chapter therefore argues for a 
need to look beyond INGOs, and points to the potential of local social movements that 
transnationalise their grievances for providing a more dynamic and radical notion of 
GCS. 
The chapter is organised in the following manner. Firstly, key concepts are defined and 
theorised, namely globalisation, global civil society and global citizenship. Secondly, 
the global citizens or actors commonly believed to embody global civil society are 
introduced — notably INGOs. Critical perspectives that raise doubts regarding the 
transformative potential of INGOs are presented. Following this, local social 
movements are identified as possible alternative actors within GCS. The final section 
examines the notion of global citizenship more closely and identifies the forms of 
global citizenship that I suggest correspond to INGO-focused in contrast to movement-
focused forms of GCS. 
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WHAT IS GLOBALISATION? 
Globalisation has become a buzz word prevalently used in politics, media and everyday 
life of our contemporary world. Yet despite the seeming ubiquity of the phenomenon 
not only are its forces, forms and consequences essentially contested but its very 
existence too (Hirst, 1997). Amongst those who concede to its reality, disagreements 
exist on its historical significance and trajectory. Giddens' notion that globalisation 
emerges from the "inherently globalising" effects of modernity (Giddens, 1990) is 
challenged by Albrow's theorisation of an epochal shift from the Modern to 'Global 
Age' (Albrow, 1996). All these debates however can be distilled to one central concern 
from the perspective of this thesis — the extent to which the nation-state has lost its 
position as the main structuring force of politics, economics and culture. Below I 
provide a brief account of the key trends identified by globalists, even though hotly 
contested by those sceptical of globalisation. 
Intellectual deliberation on globalisation emerged from the fields of sociology and 
geopolitics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, the term came into 
usage only recently in the 1960s and 70s (Held and McGrew, 2003). Widely referred to 
as a condition of 'late modernity', its constitutive features are variously identified as: 
"time-space compression" whereby social, political and economic interactions are freed 
from traditional constraints of time and space by instantaneous forms of communication 
such as the internet (Harvey, 1989); "action at a distance" implying the direct 
interaction between global conditions and local/personal lives (Giddens, 1994); 
"accelerating interdependence" where the boundaries between nations are becoming 
increasingly porous (Ohmae, 1990); the "spatial reorganisation of production, the 
interpenetration of industries across borders" and the globalised division of labour 
(Mittelman, 1997); and personal "reflexivity" governed increasingly by a global 
consciousness (Albrow, 1996). 
It is important here to note that though these conditions are often cited as indications of 
the emergence of the novel process of globalisation, they are not inherently new. It is 
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not their occurrence, but the "thickening" of their occurrence, that is, the "growing 
extensity, intensity and velocity" (Held et al, 1999, p 1 6) of the global spread of 
information, people and capital, in relation to earlier times that distinguishes 
contemporary globalisation from preceding periods of international relations (Keohane 
and Nye, 2003). According to Scholte (2003) the analytical and empirical shift that is 
enabled by this, and which is the distinguishing feature of globalisation, is 
`deterritorialization' wherein social geography is no longer confined to territorial 
boundaries of `place '/locality and 'nation'. People instead increasingly reside in "the 
world as a single place — that is a transworld space" (p86). However this is not to 
suggest that deterritorialization is experienced universally. As Held et al (1999) point 
out — "patterns of stratification mediate access to sites of power, while the consequences 
of globalisation are unevenly experienced" (p28). Clearly it is not universality that 
accords globalisation with its global nature but the potential to experience 
deterritorialization. 
Globalisation has been described as a two edged process that is on the one hand, driven 
by regressive forces of capitalism that Falk (1999) describes as "predatory 
globalisation", but on the other hand also creates progressive possibilities for its 
transformation (Kellner, 2002). Amongst others, these progressive aspects take the form 
of global civil society and global citizenship which I will discuss later. Below however I 
examine the dimensions of regressive globalisation. Before I proceed it should be noted 
that unless otherwise qualified, references to `globalisation' from now on refer to 
regressive globalisation. When specified however the term maybe used to refer to the 
more general condition of deterritorialisation. 
Dimensions of Globalisation 
Three dimensions of globalisation are commonly identified — economic, political and 
cultural. While the globalisation of the market is believed to propel the political and 
cultural dimensions of globalisation, debates on the veracity of a globalisation thesis 
have depended heavily on observations and interpretations of economic trends. 
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Amongst neo-liberal supporters of the phenomenon, globalisation is hailed as a utopian 
era of economic interdependence within a "borderless world" (Ohmae, 1990; also see 
Marglin and Schor, 1990). Market competition is championed as a propeller of human 
progress and liberation, and therefore globalising market processes such as the 
withdrawal of trade regulations and opening up of national economies to 'free trade' 
across borders is promoted as an ideal (Held et al, 1999). To this end First world nations 
have established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United 
Nations has formed the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(Lubbers, 1996). For others, however, globalisation signifies a far more sinister process 
where free trade exposes vulnerable national economies to more powerful international 
competitors such as multinational corporations that possess unfair economic advantage. 
Following the logic of the market, globalisation also entails the "subordination" and 
diversion of national social welfare expenditure to finance capital meant for global 
investment (Aguirre, 2001, p3). In developing nations the adoption of neo-liberal 
policies of 'free trade' has led them to produce and export cash crops — a good that they 
have a comparative advantage in, but which suffers from greater price volatility 
compared to manufactured goods. This creates an unstable economic basis for these 
countries. Further the exportation of cash crops has been accompanied by a reduction in 
food production, increasing the risk of famine4. Based on these effects, globalisation is 
thus understood as a shorthand for the transnational expansion of capitalist power and 
exploitation and is, as such regressive. 
Within the camp of those critical of global capitalism, disagreements have emerged 
regarding the perceived role of the nation-state within this process. Globalists seek 
indications of globalisation in the apparent dispersal of finance capital across national 
boundaries in the form of international financial institutions such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund as well as the domination of multinational 
corporations. This perspective is best characterised by Hardt and Negri's theorisation of 
4 
 For example in Niger structural adjustment policies encouraged by the WB were implicated in the 
emergence of a famine in 2005. Though the country was producing agricultural products for export there 
was not enough food in the country and prices rose steeply. In a population of 12 million, 3.6 million 
were unable to afford food and faced starvation (Mousseau and Mittal, 2006). Similar situations have 
arisen in Ethiopia and Somalia. 
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Empire — "a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule", machine-like and driven 
by the logic of global capitalism that is beyond the control of nation-states (2001, pxiii). 
Though powerful nations such as the United States may occupy advantageous positions 
within the 'apparatus" Empire is not reducible to them. Globalisation is thus 
distinguished by a diffusion of North-South divisions, as global capitalism widens the 
gap between haves and have-nots, not only in developing nations, but affluent countries 
too. This globalisation of the economic outcomes of capitalism is apparent in the rise of 
the transnational capitalist class consisting of what Sklair (2000) classifies as owners 
and controllers of transnational corporations (TNCs) and their local affiliates; 
globalising bureaucrats and politicians; globalising professionals; and consumerist elites 
(merchants and media). While the property and shares of these groups become 
increasingly deterritorialised, together they represent a capitalist class that cuts across 
national boundaries and divisions of North and South. Their "economic interests...are 
increasingly globally linked rather than exclusively local and national in origin" (Sklair, 
2000, no page numbers). 
Others however continue to implicate the nation-state in the exploitative processes of 
capitalism. Thus McLaren argues that governments presenting `globalisation' as an 
irresistible force have used it as an "ideological façade" to conceal their agency in the 
"internationalisation of capitalist relations of production" (Aguirre, 2001, p2, p3). 
Associated perspectives reveal `globalisation' to be a deceptively neutral term for "neo-
imperialism", under which subordinate Third World countries are treated as reserves for 
cheap labour or "wage slaves" (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Kellner, 1997). Institutions 
such as the WB and IMF are conceived as agents of neo-imperialist First World 
countries (Lubbers, 1996) that are forcing developing nations to realign their economies 
along neo-liberal lines that intersect with the interests of First World countries. Thus 
loans to developing countries from these financial institutions are made conditional on 
their acceptance of structural adjustments such as privatisation of public services (e.g. 
health and education), reduction of welfare expenditure, and the withdrawal of trade 
barriers. 
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The cultural effects of global economic restructuring are contradictory. On the one 
hand, it is argued that local diversity is swamped by the cultural hegemony of the West 
and replaced with a homogenised global culture and identity (Held et al, 1999). On the 
other hand, cultural imperialism is believed to evoke strong fundamentalist counter-
responses5 (Ali, 2002), and the emergence of hybrid, fractured and localised identities6 
(Appadurai, 2001, Robins, 2003). These two starkly contradictory trends — one towards 
the global and the other towards the local, however, cohere in bifurcating from national 
referents of identity and community and thus suggest the declining significance of the 
nation-state in cultural production (Johnston and Laxer, 2003). Needless to say, sceptics 
are quick to point to the continuing significance of nationhood and patriotism (Green, 
1997). 
These economic and cultural trends clearly have political implications for the nation-
state. As national governments align themselves with global structures of capitalism the 
nature of national sovereignty is changing dramatically if not reducing (Castells, 2000; 
Schirato and Webb, 2003). The increasing influence of international economic 
organisations such as World Trade Organisation, G-7, WB and IMF, that manage and 
facilitate economic globalisation, is seen in the convergence of neo-liberal policy 
formation in countries across the world. Though this may be a sign of the ultimate 
decline of the nation-state, others argue that the state will continue to act as a "magnetic 
field" (Burawoy, 2000, p34) that shapes global processes according to national 
specificities. It is within this context that interest in global civil society as a political 
adjunct (Chesters, 2004) or even alternative to the state has emerged (Lipschutz, 1992). 
DEFINING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
Significant growth of non-governmental activity beyond the national level and the rise 
of international NGOs (INGO) in the 1950s and 1960s, sparked theorisation and 
research on 'global civil society' (GCS) — an interest that has deepened amidst wider 
5 For example Hindu fanaticism in India and Islamic fundamentalism globally (Robins, 2003). 
6 For example assertions of Basque and Scottish identities in Western Europe (Robins, 2003). 
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debates surrounding globalisation. Based on the rise of these organisations, the concept 
of global civil society has emerged to refer to a field of active political engagement of 
"individual and collective citizen initiatives" (Falk, 1998, p100) that are making 
strategic and ideological linkages beyond national boundaries. While this phenomenon 
has given rise to highly polarised academic debates, the conceptualisation of global civil 
society nevertheless remains "fuzzy" (Anheier et al, 2001a, p 11). This is partly due to 
the theoretical genesis of 'civil society' from the nation-state framework, within which 
it is seen as a political counter-check against the exigencies of the state. In the absence 
of a global state, critics argue that the possibility of global civil society (GCS) is highly 
circumscribed (Etizoni, 2004) or even untenable (Bowden, 2006). However, as argued 
above, conditions of globalisation are transnationalising the political sphere as the state 
increasingly loses sovereignty to sub-national and supra-national forces. Further, 
globalising technologies such as the internet are providing unprecedented possibilities 
for social networking across territories. In this context many argue that globalisation 
provides facilitative grounds for the formation of global civil society (Scholte, 2004). 
Indeed, the undemocratic effects of globalisation are also necessitating the emergence 
of GCS. Thus as the state's realignment with global capitalist interests leaves citizens 
vulnerable to unaccountable external forces, GCS is envisioned as a space that can fill 
this 'democratic deficit' by creating transnational linkages between civil society 
organisations and people to hold these forces to account (Risse, 2006; Van Rooy, 2004). 
In this sense GCS is envisioned as a progressive response to the crisis created by 
regressive aspects of globalisation. 
Refining 'GCS' — A departure from international relations and transnational civil 
society perspectives 
Aside from a general consensus regarding GCS's function as a political mechanism for 
bridging the 'democratic deficit', the concept remains rife with conceptual confusion 
and contradictions regarding its actual form, role, transformative significance and the 
actors that constitute it. Acknowledging the "contested" nature of this domain Anheier 
et al (2001a) prefer an 'objective' definition by identifying the structural boundaries of 
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GCS as "...the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and 
individuals located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond 
the confines of national societies, polities, and economies" (p17). The key feature of 
this definition is a recognition of the growth of civil society action beyond the nation-
state. In doing so it suggests a departure from earlier 'international relations' 
perspectives that focused on the nation-state as the primary actor in trans-border 
politics. 
While the above definition shifts the analytical focus of trans-border studies from states 
to civil society, it however remains silent on the normative nature of such civil society 
action. For many theorists of GCS this is an inadequate representation of this domain, 
which they argue is essentially a normative project of "non-governmental networks" 
having "peaceful and 'civil' effects" (Keane, 2001, p23; also see Taylor, 2002; An-
Na'im, 2002). This value-laden sense is also implicit in the application of the concept of 
GCS to actors engaged in social justice issues, for instance those campaigning for 
corporate social responsibility (Oliviero and Simmons, 2002), chemical and biological 
weapons disarmament (Feakes, 2003), and establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (Glasius, 2002). Though Anheier et al (2001a) include religious fundamentalist 
and nationalist movements that might coordinate across national boundaries, these 
authors view such political processes as inimical to the aims of GCS. 
In emphasising the politically and morally-charged nature of global civil society these 
theorists differentiate between GCS and competing 'transnational civil society' 
perspectives (see Tarrow, 2005; Keck and Sikknik, 1998). Though both concur on the 
rise of cross-border civil society action as a departure from the salience of states in 
`international relations', they differ in their interpretations of its transformative 
significance. For advocates of 'transnational' contention trans-border political action are 
instrumental moves to take strategic advantage of 'political opportunity structures' 
arising at the transnational level in order to defend concerns that are essentially local 
and national. While they retain, and are driven by nationally-rooted identities, trans-
border solidarity is transient and contingent upon specific objectives (Johnston and 
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Laxer, 2003; Peterson, 1992). Theorists of an emergent GCS however, suggest that 
globalised political action is expressive of deeper forces of transformation that are based 
on, but also facilitate identities and affiliations transcending the state leading to a global 
consciousness — the creation of an "imagined community" of mankind (Robertson, 
1990, p183). 
Features of the Normative Project of GCS 
The emphasis of GCS theorists on the nonnative nature of GCS alludes to the potential 
role it is argued to have in facilitating social transformation, as is evidenced in claims 
that GCS strives towards "the creation of a better world" (Taylor, 2002, p346) or 
"alternative world order" (Cox, 1999, p11). There are three particular aspects of the 
dominant system that GCS theorists commonly believe need to be challenged through 
the politics of GCS. Firstly, while the creation of a global community is aspired 
towards, the underlying assumption is that the state is an undesirable form of social and 
political organisation. It is argued that the nation-state system is based on realist 
assumptions according to which "relations between states are governed solely by power 
and that morality plays no part in them" (Can quoted in Turner, 1998, p27). The role of 
violence in the formation and perpetuation of states is believed to be closely associated 
with this (Kaldor, 2003). Of course it is true that, since the origins of the nation-state 
system, the mechanisms of state power and inter-state relations has extended beyond 
violence and includes more subtle forms of control such as diplomacy and economic 
sanctions. GCS theorists however maintain that violence, war and conflict are still 
integral to the existence of national boundaries. This is apparent from the definition of 
the state itself as a "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber quoted in Turner, 
1998, p28). Given the centrality of war and conflict to the nation-state, GCS theorists 
therefore do not view the nation-state system as an ideal form of social organisation. 
The centralisation of power and violence in the nation-state is linked to its need to 
manufacture and reinforce exclusionary identities that are docile, uncritical, and loyal to 
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the state's interests. From a global civil society perspective these identities are 
problematic not only because they perpetuate the state's oppressive potential, but also 
because they obscure consciousness of global power structures. National identities 
therefore fragment resistance against common oppressors of people across the world 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000). 
Secondly, market forces of `globalisation-from-above' are understood as undemocratic, 
and oppressive. Within GCS perspectives therefore a need is felt not only to resist these 
forces, but also to "directly challenge the undemocratic and debilitating practices of 
neoliberal globalization" (Taylor, 2004, p2). Since these hegemonic forces are 
organised globally it is argued that effective resistance, and indeed transformation of 
these will also have to be organised at this level (Cox, 1999). A globally unified civil 
society is therefore a transformative form of globalisation, or a "globalisation-from-
below" that is guided by "world order values" such as the reduction of violence, 
protection of human rights, environment and social justice (Falk, 1995). 
Thirdly, GCS theorists reject representative democracy associated with the nation-state 
as a form of politics that is not sufficiently empowering and which fashions 'docile 
bodies' domesticated within the totalitarian project of the state. This form of 
democracy is thus also an inadequate tool through which citizens can challenge the 
processes of globalisation that are increasingly enmeshing the state (Scholte, 2004). 
In opposition, radical democracy is championed as implicitly and instrumentally 
connected to the normative dimensions of GCS — active, democratic participation is a 
value in itself but also a means to achieving the transformative values that represent 
GCS. It is to reflect this convergence of universal ideals and active participation that 
Delanty refers to GCS as a form of 'political cosmopolitanism' (Delanty, 2000). Thus 
the democratic ideals of GCS are "prefigured in its own practice" (Taylor and Naidoo, 
2004, p187) and are evident in its organisation as a 'multi-dimensional field' of 
7 Even workers' movements and anti-colonial struggles, transformed by state structures into political 
parties, and authoritarian, status quoist regimes have been "tamed" (Kaldor, 2003, p86). For similar 
reasons Hardt and Negri have referred to sovereignty as a "poisoned gift" (Hardt and Negri, 2001, p133). 
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`autonomous', 'flat hierarchies' "allowing all who want to participate to do so" (Jordan, 
2002, p69). 
As a form of radical democracy, global civil society is believed to empower citizens to 
politicise and connect issues beyond the confines of the national and to actively 
participate in the process. It is therefore viewed as a necessary political alternative to 
the state and its structures of government (Lipschutz, 1992). While global civil society 
provides a space for trans-border action, those acting within this field may be viewed as 
global citizens. It is to a brief examination of this concept to which I now turn. 
DEFINING GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP 
Paralleling wider debates between global and state-centric perspectives, the validity of 
the notion of global citizenship is contested in relation to national citizenship. Global 
citizenship departs from traditional usage of the term in two interlinked ways. Firstly, 
`citizenship' is dislodged from the nation-state as a term which ordinarily describes an 
individual's social contract with the state. Secondly, given that there is no global state to 
replace the position of the nation-state, global citizenship diverges from citizenship as a 
formal legal relationship. From this perspective sceptics that reject the concept of global 
citizenship by pointing to the absence of a global government raise a moot point 
(Axtmann, 2002; Zolo, 1997). Institutional cosmopolitans, however validate global 
citizenship by pointing to 'soft' legal structures such the United Nations and Universal 
Human Rights Declaration (UHRD) 8 as formalising structures of citizenship on a 
world scale (Beitz, 1999). Yet others point to the increasing impact of various 
dimensions of globalisation on national sovereignty and the space and relevance for 
global forms of citizenship within this context (Falk, 2002; Held, 2002). 
Different bases for global citizenship give rise to either passive or active forms of this 
citizenship that respectively relate to whether "we are all world citizens" or only some 
These supranational frameworks are 'soft' because they lack force of sanction and continue to rely on 
nation-states for their validation. 
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are "who by their actions or attitudes or self-description have the status of world 
citizens" (Dower, 2002, p37-38). Passive forms of citizenship emerge from 
formulations that emphasise everyone's legitimate claim to universal human rights, as 
the key to global citizenship (Follesdal, 2002). Their passive nature arises from the fact 
that they do not require us to be anything more than human in order to be global 
citizens. 
More active forms of global citizenship, resonating with republican formulations, are 
prevalent amongst those who describe it not as a legal status, but as a process of 
emergent political engagement with a potential world community, or at least as self-
identification with it. Through their actions or attitudes global citizens are involved in 
creating this community. In this sense global citizenship is a "performative citizenship". 
As Albrow (1996) writes "The performative citizen is not acting out of some duty 
imposed by a statutory body but acts out of conscience and free commitment" (p178). 
For those 'performing' global citizenship this involves acting upon "a wider recognition 
of their role as individuals living on a single globe" (O'Byrne, 2003, p130) - a 
conscience that O'Byrne refers to as `globality'. 
This active or performative sense of global citizenship is apparent in its strongest sense 
within the context of global civil society, where actors not only identify themselves as 
global citizens but are engaged in political action to transform globalisation. As Falk 
(1994) asserts, global citizens in this context are engaged in creating "a 'country' to be 
established in the future in accordance with more idealistic and normatively rich 
conceptions of political community" (038-139). Global citizenship as an active 
identification with the globe has also been explored in other, largely Western spaces 
such as in 'global cities' (Albrow, 1997), diasporas and migrating communities 
(Delanty, 2000; Appiah, 1998), within the 'network society' (Hayden, 2004), and 
amongst 'global elite' who travel across the world (Ong, 1998). The bias towards 
Western contexts in the search for globality is significant since it is a trend that we will 
later see repeated in global civil society scholarship also. 
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So far I have suggested that global civil society and global citizens acting within it are 
viewed as progressive forces, seeking to challenge regressive aspects of globalisation. 
However, while GCS is envisioned as a counter-hegemonic project committed to radical 
democracy on a global scale, below I suggest that the actors commonly identified as 
global citizens are problematically related to these political ideals. This suggests a 
disjuncture between the normative dimensions and descriptive parameters of GCS — a 
disjuncture that threatens to undermine the progressive potential of GCS. 
DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS OF GCS 
Descriptive parameters of GCS here refers to the practices of those actors and processes 
that appear to, or are conceived as manifesting, or bringing to life the conceptualisations 
and aspirations of GCS. After highlighting the global actors that are commonly 
identified as constituting GCS's descriptive parameters, the next section critically 
questions the extent to which they effectively meet the normative aspirations of GCS. 
The Actors who Perform Global Citizenship 
Apart from some exceptions most references within the literature are made to 'global' 
actors such as the following: international non-governmental organisations (INGOS), 
transnational/global advocacy networks, transnational/global coalitions, 
transnational/global social movements, and parallel summits. INGOs refer to voluntary, 
non-profit groups that operate at the transnational level and have an international 
perspective (Anheier et al 2001a). These may be NGOs established in a particular 
country, such as Survival International — a UK based NGO working on indigenous 
rights all over the world, or NGOs with voting members in several countries such as 
Friends of the Earth and Amnesty International. Transnational advocacy networks 
represent a "set of actors linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared 
values...and common discourses" that exchange knowledge and information through 
the internet (Khagram et al, 2002, p'7). An example of this is the human rights advocacy 
40 
networks of international and domestic NGOs that emerged in reaction to human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the Chilean military after the coup in 1973. Though the network 
did not co-ordinate strategies and engage in specific campaigns, it facilitated the flow of 
news from the ground and relayed it across the world. It also provided information on 
human rights laws to domestic activists fighting against the regime (Hawkins, 2002). 
Closer interaction between international actors is involved in transnational coalitions 
that galvanise around a specific issue and coordinate tactics to form transnational 
campaigns (ibid). This kind of coalition formation was seen amongst NGOs mobilising 
for violence against women prior to the Vienna Human Rights conference in 1993. It 
transnationally coordinated tactics such as an international petition drive and a sixteen 
day campaign of coordinated protests in various countries (Thompson, 2002). 
Both these forms of trans-border political action when linked to issues and demands 
raised by weaker domestic actors such as grassroots movements may form part of the 
phenomenon which Keck and Sikknik (1998) refer to as the 'boomerang effect'. This 
describes a type of international activism in which "non-state actors, faced with 
repression and blockage at home, seek out state and non-state allies in the international 
arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to bear from above on their 
government to carry out domestic political change." (Sikknik, 2005, p154). 
A higher level of personal commitment, active participation, and transnational linkage 
is involved in transnational/global social movements that engage in protest and 
disruption. These are thus the rarest form of political action and are defined by Tarrow 
(2001) as "socially mobilised groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in 
sustained contentious interaction with power holders in at least one state other than their 
own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor" (p 11). 
Examples of these are ATTAC, (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction 
for the Aid of Citizens) that mobilised activists from several European countries 
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demanding the introduction of the Tobin Tax9 (Kolb, 2005), and the international 
women's movement that has been pushing for the gendering of human rights discourse, 
drawing strength from coalitions of women's NGOs like the one described above 
(Friedman, 1995). 
Parallel summits are yet another form of GCS activity, referring to "gatherings of 
INGOs, other groups, and individuals that generally but not always take place in 
parallel to important inter-governmental meetings" (Anheier et al, 2001a, p4). They 
develop critical perspectives on government and corporate policies emerging at inter-
governmental summits such as those of the EU, WTO and G7/G8. Perhaps the most 
celebrated of these is the large activist protests involving 60,000 people belonging to 
700 organisations that occurred in Seattle in December 1999 against the WTO. Since 
then global civil society events are increasingly occurring independently of 'official 
summits', "no longer (only) parallel" to them, for e.g. the worldwide demonstration 
against the Iraq war in 2003 and World Social Forums, first occurring in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil in 2001 (Pianta and Silva, 2003). 
Clearly the political activity of international actors organising across borders — such as 
INGOs and global social movements tend to dominate conceptualisations of GCS 
(Keane, 2003). As Taylor (2004) writes: "In general, the ever-increasing number of 
international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and global social movements...is 
emphasised to signify the advent of a global civil society" (p1-2). While they act on a 
global scale they are believed to be primary institutions for the promotion and spread of 
cosmopolitan identities and values and thus the bastions of GCS (Wapner, 1995; Boli 
and Thomas, 1997, 1999; Sassen, 2002; Muetzelfeldt and Smith, 2002). Empirical 
research in this field has overwhelmingly concentrated on the capacity of INGOs, 
parallel summits and global social movements to connect with the marginalised and 
9 Tobin Tax has been proposed as a small tax on currency transactions to discourage volatile short-term 
trading that destabilises country currencies. Though this tax is argued to have positive impacts such as 
stabilising world financial markets and raising funds for international and domestic development the 
Tobin Tax has not been implemented by governments. 
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amplify and channel their voices to exert pressure on centres of power (Pianta and 
Silva, 2003; Katz, 2006; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001). 
Global Actors — Agents of Transformation? 
A growing body of critical research, however, is challenging the transformative 
potential of these global actors. These insights are based on a theoretical rearticulation 
of GCS as a "contested space of class relations and production" (Johnston and Laxer, 
2003, p45), rather than a unitary oppositional "third force" against the excesses of the 
state and global forces of capitalism suggested by the normative conceptualisations so 
far discussed. Following a Gramscian perspective on civil society, GCS is the site 
where resistance to hegemonic forces emerge and coalesce into a 'war of position', but 
it is also a space where hegemony is exercised and normalised (Mayo, 1999; Munck, 
2002). Thus global civil society contains within it possibilities for transformation but 
also domestication. While INGOs and other global actors are often the focus of 
examinations of the transformative dimensions of GCS, here I argue that their 
transformative potential is made ambiguous by the position of power that they occupy 
in relation to the victims of globalisation, often located in the South, who they provide 
support to. While these asymmetries of power are the products of economic 
globalisation, they are further reinstated through the nature of the trans-border activities 
of these actors (Keane, 2001). As elaborated on below, this is apparent in the way in 
which they are 1) concentrated in the West 2) engaged in depoliticising development 
activities, and 3) focused on rights as tools of emancipation. 
Western concentration 
Firstly, reflecting global inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth, INGOs 
and parallel summits are predominantly situated in the West (Anheier et al, 2001a). This 
has led many to raise doubts as to the validity of a global civil society that is based on 
these actors and processes, given that their existence is hardly global. Further it is 
powerful NGOs in the West, with large resources that seem to have easier access and 
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larger consultative roles in NGO forums linked to international governmental 
organisations such as the UN (Desforges, 2004). While the economic resources required 
to travel and participate in NGO meetings, global social movements, parallel summits 
and World Social Forums excludes the majority of those affected by globalisation in the 
South, these individuals and organisations are also culturally marginalised not least 
because the English language tends to dominate communications at such events 
(McCully, 2001). The asymmetries of power inherent in these processes prevent full 
participation and thus raise serious questions about the legitimacy of GCS as a project 
of transformative democracy. Such concerns are further heightened given that INGOs 
that claim to represent local communities generally do not have internal mechanisms in 
place for accountability to their local constituencies (Chandhoke, 2002). In fact rather 
than INGOs projecting the grievances of localities, the imbalance in power between 
these two actors often leads to the opposite process. In their attempts to gain the support 
of influential 1NGOs, local NGOs and movements are often compelled to modify their 
position in alignment with the perspectives of international organisations (Bob, 2002; de 
Volo, 2000). Marginalised groups are reduced to resources used by INGOs to provide 
political legitimacy to their organisation. 
Based on these concerns some theorists suggest the need to look away from 
"centralised" NGO-centred networks (Bennett, 2005) and towards global level social 
movements that are spaces for more active forms of democratic participation such as the 
global justice movement (della Porta et al, 2006; Chesters, 2004). However these are 
also problematic. Involving close-knit social and personal networks across geographical 
expanses, they are rare. When they do occur their participation is largely derived from 
Western members that have the resources to travel globally. By default such movements 
also therefore exclude and avoid serious dialogue with subaltern voices, often in the 
South (Chandler, 2004)10 . 
to Partly for this reason, Chandler seems to advocate a return to state-based politics "which force the 
individual to engage with and account for the views of other members of society". While the politics of 
GCS is able to avoid such engagement it is seen to be a symptom of the "unwillingness to engage in 
political contestation." (Chandler, 2004, p313). 
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Development activities and depoliticisation 
The second manner in which the transformative potential of INGOs is brought into 
question relates to their development activities which are implicated in facilitating the 
process of economic globalisation. As the state loses its capacity to provide welfare 
services to its citizens, laissez-faire visions of civil society, propounded by institutions 
such as the WB, view INGOs as mechanisms for delivering social welfare — a trend 
evident in the growth of non-governmental development activities (Galsius et al, 2006; 
Lipschutz, 2005). These organisations take on the protective functions of the state and 
attempt to fill the democratic deficit by acting as a wedge between the government and 
its citizens. However this fails not only to tackle the state's non-accountability to its 
citizens, but also legitimises and increases the state's non-accountability. In a 
paradoxical manner INGOs are therefore engaged in perpetuating rather than 
overcoming the democratic deficit. Further, while INGOs provide short-term respite 
from the economic destabilisation and marginalisation created in the wake of neo-
liberal policies, they diffuse discontent arising from these policies and thus "smooth the 
path of economic globalisation" (Anheier et al, 2001a, p11). Thus, INGOs involved in 
development activities depoliticise those adversely impacted by globalisation rather 
than encourage their critical democratic engagement in questioning global capitalism. 
Focus on `rights' as tools for emancipation 
Thirdly, the role of global actors in achieving the "transformative democratic purpose" 
(Taylor and Naidoo, 2004, p 1 87) of GCS is limited by the modality through which they 
seek to achieve this. Here I refer to the tendency amongst advocates of GCS to view the 
"globalisation of rights and responsibilities" (Pianta, 2001, p170), or the entrenchment 
of human rights (HRs) in "treaties" and other formalised structures of governance as the 
epitome of GCS (Kaldor et al, 2003)11. Though rights are viewed by many as a means 
11 This emphasis on a formalised human rights framework within GCS literature is reminiscent of 
cosmopolitan democratic traditions that espouse a form of legal cosmopolitanism where a world polity is 
constructed through formalised mechanisms for developing and administering a 'cosmopolitan 
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of protecting the individual against oppression and therefore as a "force for change" 
(Klug, 2000, p10), I suggest that the emphasis of INGOs on rights is problematic for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, though rights may sometimes represent the product of a 
process of public dialogue and social struggle, once they are formalised in legal 
structures they represent what Baker (2002) refers to as a "crystallised configuration of 
ethical learning" (p939). Political struggle surrounding legalised rights might seek 
better enforcement of these rights but this action only operates within the parameters 
already set by the system and does not represent "critical practice" to "challenge 
existing ethical patterning" (ibid, p939). It is therefore not rights by themselves but the 
dialogue, political contestation and emergent critical awareness involved in arriving at 
the formulation and enforcement of these rights that reveal radical potential. While the 
rights-advocacy of INGOs does not adequately involve the participation of the public 
(as indicated above), a rights-based approach that is reliant on INGOs is unlikely to 
support critical learning and practice implied in GCS's aspirations for radical 
democracy. 
Secondly, rights and human rights are by their nature formal entitlements that are 
primarily legitimised and enforced by states. An emphasis on rights advocacy by 
INGOs thus reins the 'alternative' political space of GCS back into structures of 
government that are traditionally based on representative democracy (Baker, 2002). 
While formal rights are by definition ratified by states and international agencies, 
rights-advocacy is well suited to INGOs that often have access to the decision-making 
fora of these structures of government. However these processes can happen without the 
active participation of the public. A rights-framework may thus easily circumvent the 
need for radical democratic processes. Even those who view the "Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as the most important and revolutionary document of the last 
millennium" (Klug, 2000, pxv) nevertheless acknowledge that "few individuals will 
know that public (and some private) authorities have been rendered accountable for 
their actions where once they were immune to questioning" (ibid, p189). This failure of 
democratic law'. Within this citizens at all levels — locally, nationally and globally are involved in 
enacting and upholding the cosmopolitan democratic law (Held, 1995; McGrew, 2000). 
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the rights-framework to engage the public itself represents the limitations of its radical 
potential. Especially for those who are economically and socially marginalised the 
formal entrenchment of rights has little meaning in and of itself. Such people are likely 
not to have the resources to claim these rights or even know what their rights are. As 
Radcliffe et al (2002), quoting an Ecuadorian indigenous leader remark "'you can't live 
on rights alone', especially when many rights remain on paper" (p3). 
The above limitations of 'global' entities in achieving the aims of GCS arise largely 
from their relative position of power in relation to communities adversely impacted by 
globalisation — often people in the South. This power inequality is implicated in the lack 
of active, democratic involvement of these people in the 'progressive' activities of 
global actors. Indeed as I have argued above, the actions of these actors can even 
reinstate processes of globalisation. This raises doubts as to whether these actors really 
are radical global citizens and whether the normative project of global civil society can 
be based solely on them. Given this, below I introduce local social movements as 
possible alternative actors in global civil society. 
ALTERNATIVE ACTORS OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
As a number of studies that I will elaborate on later suggest local movements are not 
only a means to achieving fixed political entitlements, but can also be important spaces 
for agency, critical reflection and radical identities that connect and challenge global 
and local structures of oppression from 'below'. Walker (1988) thus sees grassroots 
movements as potentially "critical social movements [that] are able to engage not only 
in struggles around specific problems but also in struggles that recognize the 
emancipatory potential inherent in certain kinds of connections and solidarities" (p3). 
The strength of local social movements is in their ability to engender the active 
participation of local communities and thus provide sites for radical democracy. 
Mobilising place-bound communities, they are also more likely to be accessible to those 
most marginalised and are thus in a better position to respond to GCS's normative 
vision for participatory democracy. 
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Yet GCS literature seems not to have taken the radical potential of these actors 
seriously. As Batliwala (2002) notes grassroots movements have tended to be 
`stereotyped' as "narrowly focused on local issues" (p393). Falk dismisses the efforts of 
groups fighting against the loss of traditional livelihoods caused by the construction of 
dams or nuclear reactors as "localism", and juxtaposes this against the "more 
relevant...attempts of elements of global civil society" such as INGOs like Greenpeace 
(Falk, 1998, p104). Delanty (2000) similarly suggests that the radical democratic 
processes of grassroots movements are based on concerns that "have mostly been 
subnational, or `meso', rather than cosmopolitan" (p51) and hence differentiates such 
political actors from INGOs manifesting GCS. INGOs with transformative visions are 
contrasted against parochial local communities who passively receive the support of 
GCS in the form of INGOs. Thus Shaw (1994) proclaims — "The activities of self-
conscious globalist organisations, such as human rights, humanitarian and development 
agencies, make a reality of global civil society by bringing the most exposed victims 
amongst the world's population into contact with more resourceful groups in the West" 
(p655). On occasions where an incipient GCS is conceived in terms of locally-rooted 
processes, its operationalisation, however, remains tied to INGOs. Thus in the 
concluding chapter of the Global Civil Society Yearbook, Anheier (2001) states — "The 
data presented here focus on registered INGOs and miss perhaps the most dynamic part 
of emerging global civil society: locally based yet internationally connected networks of 
people and activists... [referring to]. „social movements, grass roots groups, and loose 
networks" (p228). 
Thus though grassroots processes provide channels for the inclusive and empowering 
politics that GCS is in search of, they have generally been marginalised by theorists of 
GCS on the assumption that they reflect reified identities and goals that contradict the 
globally-expansive politics of GCS. This exclusion however may seriously undermine 
attempts to mount an effective project of resistance and transformation against the 
exclusionary processes of globalisation. As Gramsci-inspired academics such as Cox 
(1999) stress, an effective counter-hegemonic struggle against globalisation can only 
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succeed if it is based on unified alliances linking local to the global. Local action is thus 
of central concern for a transformative GCS. I therefore suggest that this exclusion is a 
descriptive and strategic lacuna that potentially threatens the normative dimensions of a 
radical global politics. Furthermore it is based on an assumption that has not been 
sufficiently verified through primary research — an empirical gap that has only served to 
reinforce this exclusion. 
Connecting to this problematic some theorists do refer to grassroots struggles opposing 
economic globalisation as 'global citizens' (Mayo, 2005)12. However these depictions 
are largely theoretical impositions of the academic's own globalist framework rather 
than empirically derived self-representations of local participants, and thus fail to 
effectively challenge the putative localism of grassroots processes (for e.g. Mayo, 2005; 
Kingsnorth, 2003). While Taylor (2002) views GCS as a domain "in which the intrinsic 
meaning of what is experienced by the actors within this field forms a central part of 
analysis" (p344), the question of whether local processes are elements of GCS must 
depend on an empirical investigation of consciousness and identity at this level. Such 
investigation is especially relevant given the contentious nature of the field of GCS, 
where counter-perspectives from 'transnational civil society' deny the emergence of 
globalised identities. 
A small body of empirically-based literature on local social movements however does 
explore emergent global consciousness and identities within these movements. However 
as it will become apparent below, the bias towards attributing globality to the West also 
tends to be repeated here. 
12 Thus the Landless People's Movement in Brazil, farmers protesting GM crops in developing countries, 
and anti-neo-liberalisation struggles in South African shanty towns are all part of a global resistance 
movement. 
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Local Social Movements in Trans-border Politics 
In Western contexts 
A few qualitative studies conducted in Western contexts provide some indication of the 
emergence of global processes at the local level. Conducting an ethnographic study, 
Cunningham (2000) documents the "development of a globalized identity that eschewed 
nationalist affiliations in favour of more universal, humanistic ones" amongst activists 
of the Sanctuary movement in the USA, who have been helping illegal Mexican 
immigrants cross the US border (p584). While the efforts of these American activists 
were initially spurred by a moral responsibility to help the impoverished border-
crossers, it soon developed into a broader ideological critique of the unjust political and 
economic policies of the US. Emergence of inclusive identities was associated with this 
politicisation (Cunningham, 2000; 2001). 
A similar radicalisation of identity was noted amongst female activists involved in the 
Women's Peace Camp in Greenham Common from the early 1980s. Protesting against 
the establishment of a US nuclear base there, the camp was formed by women activists 
from around Britain aligned with the wider disarmament movement, but also those 
whose immediate concerns were for the safety of their children and family. In these 
cases women who initially had "fairly narrow British or western European orientation" 
developed a global consciousness through the interactions facilitated by the camp with 
visiting activists from around the world (Roseneil, 1997, p69). 
Though these two studies do provide accounts of an evolution from local to globalised 
identities they are not strictly based on local movements occupied with issues of 
immediate concern to a place-specific, bounded local community. In a sense the 
political action described here already involved some level of reflexivity and abstraction 
from the start. Providing an account of an even more locally-based mobilisation Drury 
et al (2003) describe the participation of local residents of Wanstead against the 
construction of the Mll Link Road close to their locality — a development that would 
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diminish their quality of life. Here again a growing sense of injustice amongst residents 
underlay the rejection of a previously exclusionary Wanstead identity and the adoption 
of global affiliations with world-wide struggles against injustice. It is interesting to note 
that though the studies mentioned all refer to emerging global connections, only 
Cunningham's studies are explicitly located within GCS. The other two research papers 
associate with social movement scholarship. Nevertheless what they all commonly 
indicate is the formation of global civil society processes (globalised identities and 
consciousness) from within localised contexts of social struggle. 
In developing contexts 
The research described above provides positive accounts of a dialectical relationship 
between local and global. However they are all located in the West. In contrast studies 
following local movements in the Third World have tended to narrate disempowering 
experiences of local interaction with the global. These depictions have thus failed to 
challenge common assumptions of a dichotomy between local and global, and in 
particular, reinforced stereotypes of the localism of Southern movements. These studies 
can be located within two different frameworks of trans-border politics, described 
below. 
Transnational civil society 
A number of studies drawing on Keck and Sikknik's (1998) boomerang model focus on 
instances when local movements use "political opportunity structures" provided by 
INGOs to catapult local issues into the international arena in order to pressurise their 
government. In that these studies emphasise the instrumentality of such alliances for 
achieving the local goals of these movements, they interpret the trans-border politics of 
local movements within a transnational civil society perspective. The focus on the 
instrumental nature of mobilisations tends to depict political demands and interests as 
natural and pre-given without any sense of transformation of local consciousness in the 
course of struggle. The global level at the same time is depicted as "double-edged" in 
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that the power it has over local actors often leads to certain negative consequences for 
grassroots constituents (Conklin and Graham, 1995, p705). For instance, reliance of the 
Ogoni movement in Nigeria on support at the global level ruptured their engagement 
with the state, leading to severe repression nationally (Bob, 2002; Padilla, 2003). The 
fight of Amazonian Indians against deforestation, while essentially a livelihood issue, 
was reframed by INGOs as an environmental struggle — a refraining that essentially 
contradicted Indian economic interests (Conklin and Graham, 1995). 
While engagement with the global level has double-edged consequences for local 
political outcomes, it is believed to produce negative consequences for subjective 
processes of local identity construction too. Thus de Volo (2000) examining identity 
construction during the transnationalisation of the struggle of Mothers of Heroes and 
Martyrs of Matagalpa, Nicaragua during the Contra War, emerges with the familiar 
narrative of local disempowerment. She finds that mothers of sons, who were killed 
fighting against US-funded Contras, spurred the international community to take action 
against the war by emphasising their "helplessness" as "grieving mothers". Such 
identity constructions emphasised dependency on the power of the global and 
reinforced traditional maternal images that prevented the emergence of politicised 
female voices. These are no doubt important commentaries on the effects of power 
asymmetries between local and global actors, and suggest caution to those who hail the 
empowering potential of GCS networks (for e.g. Shaw, 1994; Perreault, 2003). 
Nevertheless such research, while thin on accounts of local agency to affect change, 
tend to feed into and reproduce existing assumptions of the static localism of grassroots 
movements, especially in the South. As we will see in chapter 7, studies on the Save the 
Narmada Movement have also tended to recreate this narrative. 
Postmodern perspectives on transnational networks and the 'defence of place'  
While transnational civil society perspectives present a dichotomy of global-
powerful/local-powerless, postmodern perspectives on trans-border politics of local 
movements in developing contexts tend to invert this dichotomy, presenting the local as 
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the more empowered site of resistance over global organisation (Esteva and Prakash, 
1998). To counter global universalising forces local movements are theorised as 
engaging in locally-based struggle where "place-based cultural, ecological and 
economic practices are important sources of alternative visions and strategies for 
reconstructing local and regional worlds..."(Escobar, 2001, p165). These movements 
are therefore not trying to transform global structures of oppression but to create spaces 
where alternative visions can be articulated in a "pluriverse" (Esteva and Prakash, 1998, 
p116). Indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon (Perreault, 2003) and black 
communities of the Pacific rainforest region of Columbia (Escobar, 2001) for instance, 
engage in an ideological resistance to globalisation through the "defence of place", 
culture and identity. Though they may form transnational networks with international 
organisations or movements in other parts of the world these are efforts to strengthen a 
"politics of difference". As Perreault (2003) argues it is the "reification of place" and 
the particularisation of identities that provides local movements with legitimacy and 
thus power within national and transnational networks (p83). 
Though social movements are analysed as a defence of locality, it is also argued that 
they have a global dimension and construct "glocalized" identities and communities. 
However when closely examined these studies fail to provide robust accounts of such 
glocalisation. The existence of these processes is simply asserted on the basis that 
movements use transnational networks for the defence of place. Simply engaging in 
transnational networks, however, does not imply an automatic formation of glocal 
identities. Forming a "global sense of place" is necessarily a conscious deliberate 
process that involves critical engagement with the global (Massey quoted in Escobar, 
2001, p147). Yet no examples of this process are provided. To the contrary only 
strategic transient interaction with the global is highlighted. Thus Escobar (2001) states 
"Even when social movements originate transnational networks these might be 
operational strategies for the defense of place" (italics added, p148) and further that 
"social actors do not so much seek inclusion into the global network society but its 
reconfiguration in such a way that their vision of the world may find minimum 
conditions for their existence" (p168). The concern of these scholars with protecting 
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cultural diversity is certainly worthy — indeed theorists need to be careful that GCS does 
not turn in to a homogenising project. However while the engagement of social 
movements with the global level is presented only as instrumental for defending 
locality, these studies present a relatively circumscribed relationship of the local with 
the global — leaving a weaker impression of glocalisation and a stronger one of the local 
as distinct from the global. 
Thus so far I have suggested that while some studies have indicated the formation of 
global identities and consciousness amongst local movements these tend to be located in 
Western contexts. In contrast explorations of the trans-border politics of local 
movements in developing countries appear to reify local communities and isolate their 
struggle from a wider global struggle. 
Local-global dialectic 
A few studies however, break from the tendency to dichotomise local and global 
struggle. They describe processes of transformation and solidarity formation emanating 
from local communities in developing contexts that are part of a strategic as well as 
ideological challenge to forces of global capitalism. Watson (2001, 2002) describes the 
formation of a "critical social movement" amongst the Chiapas in Mexico built on 
inclusive identities and democratic forms of participation that encourage global 
solidarity formation. Unlike studies of Third World movements described above, the 
local is engaged in an empowered dialectical relationship with the global. While the 
exclusionary forces of neo-liberalism mount a global onslaught, inclusive identities at 
the local level stand as an ideological critique of these forces but also provide the basis 
for the formation of a global resistance. Similar processes of enmeshment between the 
local and global are evident in Parajuli's (1996) explorations of the emergence of 
dynamic "ecological ethnicities" amongst Jharkhandi tribals in India who are resisting 
capitalist driven forest logging, and development projects that are destroying their 
environment. These accounts of fluid, inclusive identities at the local level provide a 
useful basis for viewing grassroots processes as a dynamic form of GCS. However they 
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still do not go far enough. Both are based on an analysis of collective identities and 
movement discourse as constructed by movement leadership. More substantive 
narrations of GCS at the local level will need to address the extent to which 
transformative processes are occurring more deeply within grassroots communities and 
whether these actors view themselves as global citizens that are part of a wider global 
struggle. 
Having examined the problematic relationship of 'global' actors to the radical 
democratic aims of GCS, and argued for the need for alternative actors such as local 
social movements, below I suggest that this might also have implications for the form of 
global citizenship that action within global civil society might be based on. 
MORAL AND POLTICAL FORMS OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP IN GCS 
As discussed above, global civil society provides a space for performative as opposed to 
passive, legalistic notions of citizenship. Two different forms of performative global 
citizenship can be identified that either emphasise moral or political foundations for 
such an identity. Here I argue that these forms of global citizenship are likely to be 
enacted by different actors, with important implications for the transformative potential 
of GCS itself 
Moral Universalism and Global Citizenship 
Drawing on the cosmopolitan traditions of Socrates and the Stoics some contemporary 
thinkers appeal to the "moral responsibility" of humans towards each other as the basis 
for global citizenship (Kung, 2002; Carter 2001; Dower, 2002; Heater, 2002). Global 
citizens are those who act out of a "commitment to a global ethic" to help those less 
fortunate (Dower, 2003, p20). Because the basis of such moral action is a belief in the 
inherent oneness of humanity and thus in the "idea that human beings matter anywhere" 
(ibid, p20), O'Byrne (2003) refers to this as a moral universalist conception of world 
citizenship. Such a notion of global citizenship is based on a depoliticised sense of 
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compassion and humanitarian concern that can inform and coexist alongside national 
citizenship but does not necessarily supersede it. Thus Immanuel Kant sees moral 
universalism as providing a moral direction to state and international law but not as 
superseding these (Kant, c1932). 
This notion of global citizenship is prone to elitism, given that only those who have the 
financial resources and power to help others can be global citizens. Amongst the actors 
of global civil society, we have seen that INGOs are in such a position of power, and 
are thus treated as global citizens. In opposition, local communities in the South that do 
not have resources to help others tend to be viewed as parochial. A moral basis for 
global citizenship thus tends to emerge from positions of power. Indeed studies suggest 
that INGOs are especially prone to making appeals to the "moral duty" of affluent 
people in the West to 'donate' to needy people in the South (Smith, 2004; Desforges, 
2004). While promoting the view that the world can be transformed if people get better 
at performing their global duties, INGOs that base their global citizenship on moral 
universalism tend to obfuscate structural critique of global power and oppression and 
the need to transform these structures. An INGO-driven global civil society is therefore 
less likely to be a field for transformative action. 
Political Conditions of Globalisation and Global Citizenship 
Conditions of globalisation however support a movement away from moral 
universalism towards a more political basis for global citizenship (O'Byrne, 2003; 
Waterman, 1998). Globalisation creates material conditions that connect people in real 
and practical ways to others across national boundaries. O'Byrne refers to global 
citizenship arising from this recognition as "pragmatic" (p18) in that it is not simply a 
moral ideal but a response to real conditions. While political reality is now globalised, 
citizens acting on the basis of this awareness are acting politically — whether through 
local or global action. 
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This form of global citizenship is more inclusive and radical. It is more inclusive in the 
sense that it can include the actions of local communities whose political actions are 
based on an awareness of global conditions. It is also more radical because it challenges 
the notion that the national level is the only legitimate form of political organisation and 
identification. Based on the view that individuals need to respond to forces increasingly 
beyond the national, a pragmatic global citizenship expresses affiliation to a 
deterritorialised political class or group that are affected by globalisation in similar 
ways. For those who are adversely impacted by globalisation this global solidarity can 
provide the basis for launching combined efforts to transform globalisation. While 
within the moral camp, global citizenship can be an expression of the transnational duty 
of national citizens, in the political camp it is the expression of global connections 
between deterritorialised global citizens. This raises the question of whether those 
acting on the basis of moral universalism might better be conceived as transnational 
rather than global citizens — i.e. those whose trans-border actions remain rooted in 
national affiliations. 
While globalisation provides a political basis for global citizenship this is not to suggest 
that such a concept is simultaneously drained of ethical content. As entities (individuals, 
organisations, collectivities) acting within the normative dimensions of GCS, global 
citizens are undoubtedly acting in defence of certain values that are under attack from 
various aspects of the economic and political dimensions of globalisation (Falk, 1994). 
Thus while Falk's (2002) "citizen pilgrims" emerge from changes caused by 
globalisation they are "committed to transformation that is spiritual as well as material, 
that is premised on the wholeness and equality of the human family..." (p27). 
In that political forms of global citizenship involve identification with others commonly 
affected by globalisation this may provide a more radical, empowering and inclusive 
form of GCS constructed through joint action to challenge globalisation's regressive 
dimensions. This would be in contrast to a GCS that is reliant on a few actors who have 
the power and resources to exercise their moral duty to help others, in a manner that 
does not in itself necessitate critical enquiry into the structural causes of such 
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asymmetries of power. What remains to be explored, however, is the extent to which 
local movements that are adversely impacted by globalisation provide sites for 
politicised global citizenship. By exploring this question the thesis also raises questions 
about whether local social movements need to become more prominent within 
conceptualisations of global civil society. 
CONCLUSION 
If global civil society is to be understood as a potential space for radical democracy that 
challenges the exclusions created by globalisation-from-above it will need to address 
the exclusions inherent within its own conceptualisation. While global actors such as 
INGOs and global social movements are concentrated in the West, the privileging of 
these actors within GCS literature becomes an immediately problematic basis for 
constructing an inclusive and empowering GCS. Within this framework local grassroots 
movements especially in developing countries are reduced to a position of dependency 
on more powerful global actors who advocate for them. 'Global' actors are viewed as 
the true global citizens who exercise their moral responsibility to protect those who are 
vulnerable. This reveals a dichotomisation of the West as global-transformative and the 
South as local-parochial. Perhaps in reaction to this, postmodern perspectives invert this 
dichotomy and argue for the local as the paramount and most empowered site of 
resistance. However, their focus on local politicisation and resistance, though valuable, 
tends to leave unexplored the empowering dialectic between local empowerment and 
global struggle that is suggested by thinkers such as Cox (whose Gramscian approach 
will be further elaborated on in the next chapter). 
I have argued that a more robust, dynamic and politicised version of GCS will depend 
on exploring the transformative processes emanating from local movements of those 
most affected by the negative consequences of globalisation. This is because such 
movements are more likely to involve the radical democratic participation of affected 
people. Exploring how local movements might be important actors of GCS entails 
moving away from a focus on the institutionalised language of rights advocacy and 
implementation that is prevalent within INGO-centred models of GCS, and towards an 
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exploration of critical consciousness and identities of people affected by globalisation. 
More specifically, it suggests the need for exploring the ways in which marginalised 
people are involved in constructing more politicised forms of global citizenship based 
on globally-cognisant action against common forces of oppression. 
The current exclusion of locally-based movements in GCS potentially compromises the 
radical democratic aims of GCS. However whether local movements can rightfully be 
included within the processes of GCS depends on whether they transcend locally-bound 
frameworks of contention and construct global, dynamic identities. In the next chapter I 
examine social movement scholarship and develop an argument to suggest how this 
might happen through a process of learning in social struggle. 
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Chapter 3 
Social movements, Counter-hegemonic Resistance and 
Learning 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I examine theories from social movement scholarship to develop a 
framework for analysing the role of local social movements within global civil society. 
Central to establishing whether local movements are part of GCS is the question of 
whether they are engaged in learning that leads to the politicisation of consciousness 
and identities articulated by them. This chapter therefore examines social movement 
theories — which in contrast to GCS literature that presents local movements as static 
and parochial — provide, to varying degrees, a conceptual basis for understanding how 
local movements are engaged in political learning in the course of social struggle. The 
analytical tools developed here will be used later in the thesis to conceptualise and map 
the extent to which the NBA is an actor within the field of GCS. 
This chapter proceeds firstly by defining social movements and identifying the 
processual nature of their collective identities. Secondly, three theoretical approaches to 
social movements are discussed — resource mobilisation, new social movement and 
Gramscian theory, which adopt different positions on the role of social movements on a 
continuum of social change, from reformism to transformation. It is argued that 
Gramscian theory, which positions social movements at the radical end of social 
transformation, most clearly coheres with the aims of GCS. Based on this the next 
section examines the contributions of Gramscian perspectives to understanding the 
processes and outcomes of learning in social struggle, while critiquing resource 
mobilisation and new social movement perspectives in this regard. Finally a Gramscian 
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framework for analysing social movements as learning processes within global civil 
society is developed. 
DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Prior to the 1960s social movements were often conceived as anomalies or by-products 
of tensions in the social order. While American functionalists viewed movements as 
"crowd behaviour", causing irrational disruptions to the social equilibrium (Cohen, 
1985), Marxists in Europe viewed them as natural, inevitable and unmeditated 
symptoms of class conflict (Canel, 1992). Viewing movements as mechanical, reactive 
processes, these sociological positions failed to understand social movements as 
complex, creative entities that needed to be studied in their own right. However the 
1960s witnessed a massive upsurge in social movements, the occurrence of which not 
only defied depictions of social movements as aberrations but also departed from the 
organisational and functional characteristics of labour struggles. Resource Mobilisation 
and New Social Movement theories emerged to identify these movements as products 
of post-industrial societies and sought to identify the complex factors which mediated 
"transition from social conditions to collective action" (Melucci, 1989, p21). Departing 
from previous conceptualisations, these theories thus position social movements as 
active, conscious and deliberate agents of contention. 
Contemporary definitions of social movements reflect this new understanding. Della 
Porta and Diani (1999) refer to them as types of collective action forming "informal 
networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about conflictual 
issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest" (p16). Far from being 
`irrational', movements construct "common purpose" and "social solidarities" (Tarrow, 
1998, p177) and are therefore separate from "loosely structured", one-off protest events, 
political coalitions and interest groups that are largely instrumental, fleeting forms of 
collective action. However though this imparts an enduring, integrated character to 
movements, as informal networks, they are also processual. Collective actors are 
continually engaged in defining and redefining "shared beliefs". Their fluidity thus 
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distinguishes them from more rigid, bureaucratised formations such as political parties, 
religious sects, NGOs and other forms of single-issue organisations (though interactions 
and alliances between these and social movements may occur (see Schwartz, 2002). As 
stable and moving at the same time, social movements can metaphorically be 
understood as flows, within which the various moments constituting it are connected to 
both previous and future collective action. Social movements are therefore evolving 
processes of collective action that are at the same time internally integrated and 
relatively coherent. This suggests that social movements have collective identities. 
Collective Identity 
Collective identity is conceptualised as a relatively stable, unifying characteristic of 
social movements which expresses the symbolic parameters that organise and orient 
collective action. Thus Taylor and Whittier (1992) refer to it as "the shared definition of 
a group that derives from its members' common interests, experiences and solidarity" 
(005). Whereas social movements themselves are not readily amenable to empirical 
study, since they are a relatively amorphous social formation of individuals; the notion 
of collective identity suggests that this amorphous formation can be distilled and 
articulated through a self-definition that identifies the essence of the movement. 
Collective identity in this sense refers to the ideological dimensions of a movement, 
which according to Melucci (1995) are both manifested in and shaped by such factors as 
the movements models of leadership and communication and discourses. As the 
movement's self-representation, collective identities are composed of two basic 
processes: the construction of group boundaries between the movement community, 
"us" and opposition, "them"; and consciousness of group grievances and structural 
causes of these (apparent in movement discourse) (Taylor and Whittier, 1995). 
It must be noted that the concept of 'collective identity' is distinct from the social 
psychological notion of identity as the 'self-definition' of an individual which is 
expressed through one's personal attitudes and multiple identifications with various 
groups (Weigert et al, 1986; Skevington, 1989). Thus one's identity may arise from 
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his/her identification with Indian people, teachers and music lovers for instance. While 
it is clear that all identities are collective or socially derived and legitimised, 'collective 
identity' as opposed to 'identity' refers here specifically to identities that are 
"constructed, activated, and sustained only through interaction in social movement 
communities" (Taylor and Whittier, 1995, p172). It is true of course that many referents 
of identity in our everyday lives have origins in social movements such as the feminist 
identity or the 'Afro-American' identity which emerged from the 1960s civil rights 
movements in America. When these identities become dislodged from the context of 
social struggle, however, and are used to define the self in a less politicised manner, 
they constitute identities in the psycho-social sense. 
In that collective identities are representations of movements, they reflect the evolving 
nature of movements and are therefore also "processual" constructs, which emerge and 
change through internal dialogue amongst collective actors and interactions with the 
political environment (Melucci, 1995). Having conceptualised social movements as 
social processes with evolving collective identities, below I engage in a more detailed 
examination of various approaches to social movements and collective identity. 
APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
In this section I begin to explore the different ways in which resource mobilisation, new 
social movement, and Gramscian theory conceptualise social movements and collective 
identity, and the implications these different approaches have for viewing social 
movements as agents of social change. 
If social change can be understood as a continuum of radicalism from reformism as a 
weaker form of social change, resistance occupying an intermediary position, and 
transformation as a stronger form of change, I will show that the various theories 
referred to above occupy different positions on this continuum. Since GCS perspectives 
locate themselves on the transformative end of the continuum (see pages 36-38), the 
focus of this discussion, and of the thesis more generally is on Gramscian theory, which 
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I argue provides the strongest basis for transformative action. I start however with the 
less radical end of the continuum. 
Resource Mobilisation Theory 
Resource mobilisation theories formulate a "purposive model" of social movements and 
challenge the assumption that social movements are irrational responses to deprivation 
(Tilly, 1985). Movements are instead rational agents that engage in maximising their 
benefits or securing the "common interests" of collective participants defined in terms 
of political or economic goals. Within this model movements do not seek to challenge 
or alter dominant codes, and thus to seek social change, but rather to either secure their 
share within the polity or to access and influence centres of decision-making (Canel, 
1992). The state as the centre of power is seen to hold the key to protestors' common 
interests, and mobilisation is therefore viewed as a process of negotiation and 
contestation primarily with the state (Crossley, 2002). 
The focus of analysis hence is not on why movements emerge but how they achieve 
their goals efficiently and effectively. Here the concept of political opportunity 
structures, that is central to Tilly's political process theory, is especially relevant. These 
are macro-structural factors that enable mobilisation. Thus Tilly (1978) emphasises the 
political opportunity structures in democratic societies that encourage political 
contention as opposed to the constraining effects of authoritarian regimes. Zald and 
McCarthy (1979; 1987) also identify micro-level variables that facilitate mobilisation 
such as leadership characteristics, organisational structure and resource management. 
Social movements are thus rational organisations that strategically navigate constraints, 
maximise political opportunities and mobilise organisational resources to secure 
"common interests" (Carroll, 1997). Individuals decide to join collective action based 
on instrumental calculations of the cost and benefits of participation (Ferree, 1992). 
Striving for efficiency, it is believed that social movements seek centralisation and 
bureaucratisation of their organisational structure and operations to mimic businesses 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1973). In this form, movements are thus part of a 'social 
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movement industry' within which 'movement organisations' led by 'movement 
entrepreneurs' compete' for 'resources', 'package' grievances and gain 'selective 
advantage' (Perrow, 1979). The self-definition of the movement or its collective 
identity is itself constructed from strategic considerations of what identities and 
discourses have the most currency or 'demand' at any one time. They are thus viewed 
only as resources or "selective incentives motivating participation" (Friedman and 
McAdam, 1992, p157). 
Resource mobilisation theory: Social movements and reform 
Though social movements are presented as rational agents, consciously navigating 
political opportunity structures, these theories do not go far enough in explicating the 
full complexity and self-reflexive nature of social movements. They present a highly 
circumscribed form of rationality based on short-term cost and benefit analysis. 
Movements are reduced to a collection of individuals acting together only if they 
"expect the private benefits to exceed the costs" (Friedman and McAdam, 1992, p159). 
Not only does this negate the possibility for rational action to be based on referents 
other than economic self-interest, such as identity-affirmation (see Ferree, 1992), it also 
presents movements as fragmented, ad-hoc and opportunistic rather than as collective, 
deep-rooted efforts for social transformation. Thus, as Carroll (1997) suggests RM 
theory simply "reflects" rather than challenges "the dominant, technocratic and 
consumerist consciousness of capitalist society" (p12). While social movements engage 
with the state to secure short-term, specific gains, they are "reduced to political protest" 
and regarded as extensions of state-centred mainstream politics (Melucci, 1989, p23). 
This fails to make the distinction emphasised by della Porta and Diani (1999), between 
social movements and instrumental interest groups. Resource mobilisation theory thus 
presents a very weak notion of social change as reformism within which social 
movements engage in efforts to make the present system more efficient at dispensing 
resources in a manner that does not attempt to uncover and challenge the asymmetries 
of power that underlie the system and disempower sections of society in the first place. 
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New Social Movement Theory 
Reacting to the 'political reductionism' of resource mobilisation and the 'economic 
reductionism' of Marxism, new social movement theories have emerged to celebrate the 
`life-style' struggles of the 'new' movements of the 1960s (Melucci, 1989). The 
students', women's, environmental and peace movements articulate a multiplicity of 
identities beyond traditional class issues and do so through non-institutionalised forms 
of political expression (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
Rejecting the centrality of capital and the state within the political economy approach, 
these theorists follow a Foucauldian conception of power as decentred and constituted 
at multiple sites. The new conflicts mentioned above are thus explained as emerging 
from structural transformations characterising post-industrial societies where 
"'material' goods are produced and consumed with the mediation of huge informational 
and symbolic systems" (Melucci, 1985, p795). As such, the struggle, as Touraine puts 
it, is for control over historicity i.e. is for "social control of the main cultural patterns" 
which give meaning to social practice (Touraine, 1985, p785). For Habermas (1984-7) 
new social movements emerge as defensive reactions against the 'colonization of the 
lifeworld' by the system — that is, the intrusion of the market and state (system) into the 
civil society sphere of "relations and communications between members of a societal 
community" (lifeworld) (Hewitt quoted in Caroll, 1997, p20). In a similar manner to 
Touraine's struggle over historicity, Habermas (1981) sees social movements resisting 
colonization by seeking to gain control over the "grammar of forms of life" (p33). Thus 
unlike RM theories which view social movements as echoing capitalist, state-centred 
systems, new social movements are 'symbolic challenges' (Melucci, 1985) or critiques 
of the dominant system. 
As power seeps into culture, culture is seen as a legitimate site of resistance. The 
collective identities of movements therefore are not simply instrumental to mobilisation 
as within resource mobilisation perspectives but are the movement's resistance. As 
Melucci suggests the very "form of the movement is a message" which in providing an 
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alternative to dominant codes poses a symbolic challenge to the system (Melucci, 1985, 
p670). Thus in contrast to the hierarchical organisation of state and trade unions, the 
collective identity of NSMs are characterised by decentred networks that encourage 
democratic participation (Melucci, 1992; 1994). As such the collective identity of 
movements is visible not only through their discourses but their practices as well. The 
notion of collective identity within NSM theory is similar to what Eyerman and Jamison 
(1991) refer to as cognitive praxis, consisting of the body of knowledge, organisational 
forms and technologies of protest developed by movements to symbolically resist 
dominant forces. Just as collective identity represents the movement, a "social 
movement is its cognitive praxis" (ibid, original emphasis, p54). 
Reflecting the cultural-ideological nature of social movements, collective identities or 
cognitive praxis is not confined to the movement space but also mediates the 
politicisation of personal identities and 'everyday life' (Meyer and Whittier, 1994; 
Whittier, 1995; Martin and McCormack, 1999; Johnston et al, 1994). NSM theory thus 
presents an expanded notion of politics as culturally articulated. An example of this 
politicisation of culture could be seen amongst activists and supporters of the Black 
Power movement in the 1960s who rejected the supremacy of White people by 
(amongst other things) adopting 'afro' hairstyles to affirm their distinct 'African-
American' identity. 
Within some strands of new social movement theory the politicisation of the private 
sphere is accompanied by a disengagement from politics in the overt sense of direct 
confrontation with the state and proletarian seizure of state power (Epstein, 1990). 
Collective action instead takes the form of self-help strategies in 'social movement 
networks' (Melucci, 1985). "Contemporary social movements" as Melucci (1989) 
explains "have shifted towards a non-political terrain: the need for self-realization in 
everyday life. In this respect social movements have a conflictual and antagonistic, but 
not a political orientation, because they challenge the logic of complex systems on 
cultural grounds." (p23). NSM-influenced theories in developing contexts also suggest a 
similar retreat from political contestation (Brass, 1991; 2000). Thus Scott (1985; 1990) 
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propounds a theory of 'weapons of the weak' as 'everyday forms of peasant resistance'. 
Replacing revolutionary action, this consists of individual daily self-help strategies such 
as "foot-dragging...false compliance, feigned ignorance...smuggling..." that allow the 
poor to surreptitiously manoeuvre around the oppressive power of rural elite without 
direct confrontation (Scott, 1989, p11). The political action of social movements is thus 
located in the sphere of civil society rather than of the state (Holst, 2002), or in 
Habermas's words (1981) in the "seam between system and life-world" (p36). 
New social movement theory: Social Movements and resistance 
Conceiving of social movements as symbolic resistance to the hegemony, NSM 
theorists are more attuned to viewing social movements as social change agents than 
resource mobilisation perspectives are. However social change remains limited within 
the realm of civil society. Movements engage in resisting the dominant cultural forms 
by creating "autonomous spaces" within civil society in which alternative cultural 
practices can be performed (Boggs, 1989, p12). The notion of autonomous spaces in 
civil society suggests that it is possible to free social spaces from the cultural influence 
of dominant political forces and thus to initiate cultural change without transforming 
social structures. Thus the radicalisation of consciousness is not converted into political 
action to transform structures of oppression. This suggests that NSMs are engaged in a 
"self-limiting radicalism" that is only culturally contested and articulated (Cohen, 1985, 
p60). NSMs engage in a politics of cultural diversity of lifestyles and identity that 
symbolically resist their marginalisation by dominant cultural codes. However, without 
paying attention to the political and economic structures that sustain marginalisation, 
the focus of NSM proponents such as Melucci, on the symbolic production of 
marginalisation leads to a 'cultural reductionism' (Bartholomew and Mayer, 1992). 
Indeed contrary to the assertions of NSM theory, many observe that movements "do 
address the state and are profoundly shaped by its actions" in developed (Adams, 1997, 
p50) and developing countries (Escobar, 1992). 
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Further, the focus on 'autonomous spaces' and cultural identity detracts from an 
understanding of the coherent political and economic forces that structure and connect 
various autonomous spaces. This makes NSMs vulnerable to degenerating into an "anti-
politics of identity" and difference (Kauffman, 1990). Solidarity and resistance to social 
oppression is thus fragmented in a manner that prevents a coherent strategy for social 
transformation (Wapner, 1989). Below I turn to Gramscian theory, which explicitly 
intends to provide a theory of social transformation based on cultural and political 
contestation 
Gramscian Perspectives 
In contrast to new social movement theory which positions Marxism as the conceptual 
`other', Gramscian perspectives build on Marxist analysis of capitalism and its 
economic structures of oppression, but articulate with this an understanding of the 
cultural and political processes that are implicated in economic oppression. Social 
struggle is thus directed towards overthrowing structures of oppression through action 
on the political, economic but also cultural plain. Gramsci talks of these cultural 
processes in terms of hegemony, consent and consciousness. Before elaborating on 
these concepts it is necessary to understand the intellectual context within which his 
theoretical orientation developed. 
Antecedents of Gramsci 
Gramsci's philosophy of the intimate interactions between the economy, politics and 
culture are contained in a compilation of texts, known as the Prison Notebooks that he 
wrote while in Mussolini's prison between 1929 and 1935 (Gramsci, 1971). This 
exposition was a reaction against what he believed to be a misreading of Marx that he 
referred to as economism. It was also a reaction against purist forms of idealism 
(Mouffe, 1979). 
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Economism was the ideology that was prevalent amongst Marxists such as those of the 
Second International who gained clout in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. This ideology provides a highly mechanistic account of the forces of 
domination and transformation as solely determined by the economic relations of 
production that constitute the foundations, or structure of society in Marx's terminology 
(Simon, 1982). Economism maintains that contradictions inherent within capitalism are 
manifested in a conflict between the interests of the capitalist class and the exploited 
working class. When the oppression of the working class becomes unbearable they will 
automatically rise to overthrow capitalism. However, by failing to acknowledge the 
superstructral factors of consciousness, politics and culture that interact with the 
economic structure of society, this approach leads to a passive reliance on the economic 
contradictions within capitalism to result in its own downfall. It therefore suggests no 
need for active engagement of the oppressed in their own transformation. 
Idealism, the other position that Gramsci argued against, represents the diametric 
opposite of economism. This can be defined as a "position which emphasizes the role of 
ideas and moral values in the understanding and explanation of major historical 
changes" (Bocock, 1986, p48). Ironically, though this position locates the determinant 
of 'reality' in people and their consciousness, it provides an inadequate basis for agency 
in that structural forces that act on people are not acknowledged. People are therefore 
unable to direct action towards social change. 
By rejecting economism and idealism, Gramsci embraces Marx's dialectical materialist 
conception of social reality. According to Marx the economic structures constituted by 
relations of production represent our material reality. This material reality provides us 
with experiences that act upon and construct our consciousness. Importantly, however, 
material reality and consciousness are not in a unidirectional but dialectical, mutually 
constitutive relationship, and consciousness therefore, also has the potential to reflect 
and act on social reality. Gramsci seeks to extend the implications of this basic 
proposition. Though Marx is not unaware of the ideological processes of consciousness, 
he concentrates, in his critique of political economy, on how capitalist relations of 
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production are exploitative and explores the manner in which these economic relations 
themselves condition workers to accept their exploitation (Marx, 1961). Gramsci, on the 
other hand, examines the complex manner in which workers' or subaltern consciousness 
is domesticated under capitalist political structures and cultural processes, as well as 
how it can be transformed to initiate revolutionary action towards transformation of 
economic structures (Hoffman, 1984). Gramsci's exploration of ideological processes at 
the superstructural level has been interpreted by some as an abandonment of Marxist 
politics of class transformation and a move towards cultural resistance in the sense 
apparent in new social movement theory (Anderson, 1976). Such interpretations 
however have been hotly contested (Sassoon, 1978; Texier, 1979), and a more in-depth 
exploration of Gramscian theory below will show its continuance with Marx's 
dialectical materialism. 
Concept of hegemony and consent 
Gramsci views the state as playing an important role in maintaining and legitimising 
capitalist structures. Not only does it reinforce the power of the capitalist class through 
the force of the army, police and, legal system but it also manufactures popular consent 
for the dominance of this class. This is done through the creation of hegemony - a set of 
ideas, values and beliefs that serve the interests of the state and capitalist powers by 
making the ruling order appear as if it is in the best interests of everyone — that is, as a 
neutral order of commanding and engaging leadership. As Gamsci states: 
"It is true that the State is seen as the organ of one particular 
group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter's 
maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the 
particular group are conceived of, and presented as the motor 
force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the 
`national' energies." (1971, p182) 
By representing the interests of capital as the interests of all, hegemonic ideology 
functions as the "glue" which holds the capitalist society together, and lessens 
possibility of revolt amongst the oppressed (Sassoon, 1982, p14). However for the 
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hegemony to be convincing, and thus effective, the state must appear to be constantly 
arbitrating between the interests of all social groups. This requires that the state concede 
to certain interests of the subordinate group from time to time in order to maintain a 
"compromise equilibrium" (Gramsci, 1971 p161). Importantly however, Gramsci 
maintains that the state only grants such economic concessions to the extent that they do 
not seriously destabilise the power of capital. Thus: 
"...though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be 
economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function 
exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of 
economic activity." (ibid, p161) 
It is therefore clear that though Gramsci analyses the manner in which the state 
manufactures ideas that preserve power and legitimacy of a social order, he does not 
abandon the Marxist view that it is economic structures that "in the last instance" (ibid, 
p160) determine the power of a social class. 
When hegemony is established the constructed alignment of interests of all groups that 
results from this is referred to as a 'historic bloc' (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982). The notion 
of historic bloc is suggestive of the important role of political and ideological structures 
in actively seeking to interlock with economic structures of capitalism in order to 
support the dominance of the capitalist class. This differs from mechanistic accounts of 
Marxism that view political, cultural processes merely as passive reflections of the 
economic structure of society. 
The articulation and dissemination of hegemonic ideology is achieved through 
institutions of civil society such as the church, school and media. Within Gramsci's 
formulation the space of civil society is therefore intertwined with the processes of 
domination, unlike in NSM theory where it is seen as an autonomous political space 
(Holst, 2002). Oppressed groups internalise this ideology as their 'common-sense' or 
world-view (Youngman, 1986), and thus hegemonic ideas also inform popular culture 
(Cirese, 1982). This suggests that the dominance of a hegemonic bloc is deeply 
embedded in the: 
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"...spontaneous consent of the masses who must 'live' those 
directives13. Modifying their own habits, their own will, their 
own convictions to conform with those directives and the 
objectives that they propose to achieve." (ibid, p266) 
The characterisation of people's consent as 'spontaneous' can be understood as a 
reference to the manner in which hegemonic ideas legitimise the social system in such a 
manner as to make it appear inevitable and natural and thus a 'way of life' that must be 
accepted. Consent for the system therefore generates a fatalistic attitude towards one's 
social existence that subverts agency. 
Though Gramsci specifically refers to ideas as constituents of the hegemony, it is clear, 
given his dialectical materialism and acknowledgment of the manner in which 
hegemony influences culture, that he would also see hegemony articulated through 
practices (Allman, 1988). This interpretation is supported by Gramsci's approach to 
`philosophy' which is explicated in the rhetorical question: "...since all action is 
political, can one not say that the real philosophy of each man is contained in its entirety 
in his political action?" (Gramsci, 1971, p326). Althusser is more explicit than Gramsci 
in referring to practices, though he returns to a Gramscian acknowledgement of ideas 
and ideology as informing practice. Thus "practices exist in the material actions of a 
subject acting in all consciousness according to his beliefs" (Althusser, 1971, p159). So 
far it appears that hegemony stifles any possibility for agency while it determines 
consciousness and the actions and practices informed by it. Below however I turn to 
how agency emerges. 
Agency in Gramsci 
Though the political and ideological structures of the state seek to domesticate 
consciousness, the state cannot fully conceal the lived reality of economic exploitation. 
Thus Gramsci conceives of the 'common-sense' of the oppressed as consisting of a 
13 This refers to the "norm of conduct" laid down by 'legislators', the most powerful of whom Gramsci 
identifies as being the State (p266). 
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contradictory amalgam on the one hand, of hegemonic ideas that legitimise the system, 
and on the other of everyday, direct experiences of oppression that militate against 
hegemonic consent and provide the basis for 'good-sense' (a state of consciousness 
involving critical awareness of the nature of one's oppression). Agency emerges from 
within these points of disjuncture in the consciousness of the oppressed (Allman, 1988). 
In suggesting that subaltern consciousness is contradictory Gramsci alludes to how 
consciousness is not simply determined by social structures but is reflexive in nature. It 
is thus not just contingent upon social structures but is itself a "creative transforming 
agent" spurring political action (Boggs, 1976, p30). This reflexivity of consciousness 
holds the potential to lead towards a more coherent understanding of the nature of the 
oppressive relations that the subaltern are subjected to, but only if this is developed 
alongside social action to transform oppressive structures. As we shall see, the role of 
social movements in strengthening the dialectical interaction between consciousness 
and radical action is crucial. 
Gramscian theory: Social movements and transformation 
A theory of hegemony suggests that the overthrow of the capitalist system cannot be 
achieved simply through revolutionary seizure of apparatuses of state coercion. Social 
change instead must involve the transformation of consciousness alongside structural 
change. As such Gramsci advocates for a protracted struggle preceding revolution 
within the realm of civil society during which movements of the oppressed challenge 
the ideological processes sustaining their subjugation and articulate a revolutionary 
counter-hegemonic14 consciousness. Gramsci refers to this ideological struggle as the 
war of position. Involving the active and full engagement of all the oppressed, this 
presents a more radically democratic process of change than revolution led by a few, as 
in Leninism (Boggs, 1976). 
14 The term counter-hegemony is used widely by Gramsci-inspired academics but is not articulated by 
Gramsci himself. Gramsci instead employs the term proletarian hegemony. However, because this 
implies one very specific actor of social transformation (i.e. the working class), the more encompassing 
terminology of counter-hegemony is employed throughout the thesis. 
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Within the war of position, the development of a counter-hegemonic consciousness 
must move towards the creation of alliances between not just workers, but other 
"popular-democratic groupings" (Carroll, 1997, p24). This represents a revolutionary 
`historic bloc' that ruptures the dominant bloc. These alliances are not only strategically 
valuable in enhancing the strength of the offensive, but also have an important 
ideological function. Interaction within alliances allows groups to transcend their own 
immediate oppression, by developing linkages between themselves and the oppression 
of others. Uncovering the systemic nature of power is integral to understanding the true 
nature of domination itself and thus to liberating consciousness to raise structural 
challenge. 
Though Gramsci devotes attention to the development of a radical consciousness 
through an ideological war of position, he maintains that this cannot be fully achieved 
unless the war of position is accompanied by political contestation as well. It is within 
this assertion that Gramsci's commitment to Marx's dialectical materialism is clearest. 
While consciousness is intrinsically connected to material reality, it cannot be fully 
transformed in isolation of "ongoing political activity" (Boggs, 1976, p30) or what 
Hoist (2002) refers to as political praxis to achieve structural change. Consciousness 
can only be fully transformed if the material structures that condition it are also 
transformed. The war of position must therefore necessarily be accompanied by 
political action. 
Dialectical materialism implies a very different notion of social change than that 
provided by NSM theorists who focus on individual and cultural transformation as end-
goals of resistance. Within a Gramscian perspective the transformation of consciousness 
is necessary in order to achieve structural change at the economic and political level, 
but further, the radicalisation of consciousness is in itself incomplete without structural 
transformation of the forces that shape consciousness. The corollary of this is that 
structural transformation can only be complete if it is accompanied by the 
transformation of oneself also. The "unity of thought and action" (Allman, 2001, p 1 67) 
that this theory implies leads Gramsci to refer to it as a "philosophy of praxis", active 
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within the process of social struggle. Rather than the NSM focus on cultural resistance 
within the realm of civil society, Gramsci thus moves towards transformation through a 
dialectic between political and cultural action. 
Though Gramsci does not use the concept of collective identity, in his discussion of 
social movements, his treatment of consciousness is akin to this. Thus like collective 
identity, which encompasses the ideological dimensions that define a movement, 
consciousness in the Gramscian sense is not simply an individual construct but a social 
construct that identifies the integral "experiences of a particular 'collective organism' (a 
social stratum or class)" (Boggs, 1976, p63). Further this consciousness is not just 
present but is operative as a "concrete political force" because action is directly related 
to consciousness (ibid, p63). Thus consciousness is not only deduced from the things 
that movements say but from the things that they do within the sphere of political 
contestation. From a Gramscian perspective collective identity is therefore not just the 
movement's cognitive praxis, as within NSM theory, but is its cognitive and political 
praxis together. While this is implicit within Gramsci's writing, it is especially evident 
within an Althussarian conception of consciousness as suggested above. 
One final point needs to be made with regard to the revolutionary actors identified by 
Gramsci. Though Gramsci argues for a broadening of the war of position to include 
popular groupings such as peasants, women, and other democratic forces, these are 
largely viewed as strategic alliances, that workers as the true revolutionary actors have 
to form, in order to strengthen their movement against capitalism. This has invited 
accusations of class essentialism by post-modern theorists. Addressing this, 
contemporary interpretations of Gramsci are recognising other revolutionary subjects 
organised around race, gender, ethnicity whose oppression, though intersected by class, 
is not wholly reducible to this (Allman, 1999; Mayo, 1994). Unlike NSM advocates 
however, these theorists still see all oppressive processes as intrinsically related and 
thus while establishing "unity-in-diversity around a shared vision" continue to provide a 
theory of social transformation (Carroll, 1992, p12). 
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In summary, Gramsci is not merely concerned with economic and political reform as in 
RM theory, or cultural resistance as in NSM theory, but rather in social transformation 
to overthrow underlying structures of oppression. This involves dialectically combining 
NSM's focus on the politicisation of cultural processes with RM theory's emphasis on 
political engagement. By conceptualising transformation not as abrupt revolution, but as 
involving a prolonged period of alliance formation, interaction, and cultural reflection, 
alongside political action, Gramsci provides a stronger basis for democratic, engaged 
participation, and thus the promise of a deeper form of change itself. 
The goal of transformation is also critical to the project of GCS, and thus Gramsci 
provides useful conceptual tools for analysing the social processes involved in the 
formation of a transformative GCS. Gramsci is particularly pertinent to GCS 
perspectives because he argues against economic determinism, and instead provides 
space for the role of political intervention towards social change initiated in (though not 
limited to) the sphere of civil society. 
However, while I suggest that RM, NSM and Gramscian theory relate to reformism, 
resistance and transformation respectively, this is not to suggest that these are discreet 
or mutually exclusive categories of social change. Though analytically useful, these 
categories seep into each other since they represent positions on a continuum. As such it 
is not possible to establish concrete rules for their application to empirical processes and 
phenomena. The application of these terms to empirical analysis is therefore based on 
carefully contextualising the empirical data to understand its relative position on the 
social change continuum which in the last instance is based on my analytical discretion. 
Having explored the three dominant approaches to social movements and collective 
identity, below I turn to drawing out the implications of these theories for understanding 
how and what learning processes might be involved in social movements as they engage 
in social change. 
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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: LEARNING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 
Recognition of the learning processes that social movements engage in has slowly been 
developing amongst scholars of progressive adult education (Foley, 1999). Foley argues 
that "learning in such situations is largely informal and often incidental — it is tacit, 
embedded in action and is often not recognised as learning." (ibid, p3). For greater 
conceptual clarity regarding what informal learning is it is necessary to elaborate on its 
constitutive elements i.e. 'learning' and 'informal'. Following Arthur and Davison 
(2002) "Learning, the development of knowledge, understandings and beliefs is a 
synthesis of experiences" (p33). Informal forms of learning refer to a specific context 
and process through which educative experiences are encountered and 'reflectively' 
synthesised by a person (Schugurensky, 2006). Thus informal learning can be 
distinguished firstly, from formal education which refers to the process of learning 
within the highly institutionalised structures of official schooling, and secondly, from 
informal education or training which involves a directive process of learning from a 
mentor or teacher in non-official contexts such as community centres or even in social 
movements where such learning can take place in organised training courses (see 
Novelli, 2004; Parajuli, 1986). In contrast, informal learning "is any activity involving 
the pursuit of understanding, knowledge, or skill that occurs without the presence of 
externally-imposed curricular criteria" (Livingstone, 2006, p206) As such it is self-
directed. However this does not mean that informal learning is always intentionally 
pursued. As Foley's quote above suggests informal learning can also be incidental in 
that it occurs without the learner previously expecting or deciding to learn something 
from an experience. Most of the learning referred to in the thesis is of this kind. 
While discussing learning in informal contexts it is also necessary to examine the notion 
of pedagogy. Pedagogy is commonly used in the context of formal education, to refer to 
"any conscious activity by one person designed to enhance learning in another" 
(Watkins and Mortimore, 1999, p3). However, arising from the very definition of 
informal learning as self-directed, pedagogy in relation to such learning cannot be 
understood as a process of intentional, focused instruction by a teacher to the taught. 
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Instead, pedagogy must be conceived more broadly as experience; or the events, social 
environments, relationships and interactions that are catalysts for learning. Yet as 
Arthur and Davison (2002) note, not all experience is necessarily pedagogical or 
educative — it is reflective engagement with experience that leads to learning. Thus, 
though one may observe that particular experiences possess pedagogical possibilities, 
the extent to which they are actually pedagogical can only be determined by whether 
they cause learning. The more amorphous quality of pedagogy in the context of 
informal learning is apparent in the use of 'pedagogy as activism' by McLaren and 
Jaramillo (2007) who view the process of activism itself as providing an important 
means of 'teaching' for social change. This approach to pedagogy is also seen within 
media studies where everyday exposure to media is viewed as a pedagogical medium 
that shapes the socialisation of people, and is therefore termed 'media pedagogy' 
(Kellner, 1995). 
In the context of social movements, educators commonly identify informal learning in 
the form of two types of cognitive or behavioural change as an outcome of collective 
action — 1) the acquisition of knowledge and skills relating to technologies of protest 
(Foley, 1991), and 2) more politicised forms of learning embedded in the radicalisation 
of consciousness and identities that challenge the dominant social order (Allman, 2001; 
Gorman, 2007). In this thesis the focus of analysis is on this second form of learning —
i.e. the radicalisation of consciousness and identity, which I refer to explicitly as 
political learning (from now onwards, however, this may simply be referred to as 
learning). To further clarify the meaning of political learning, it can be understood as 
referring to a process of gradual formation of new ideas and understandings of the 
social world embodied in one's consciousness and identity that provide the basis for 
action to change the world. The first form of learning, i.e. the acquisition of strategic 
knowledge and skills, on the other hand, is seen as incidental, though facilitative of this 
wider learning. 
The foundations for exploring political learning in social movements are laid by social 
movement theories themselves. In particular the recognition within new social 
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movement and Gramscian theory of the importance of self or consciousness 
transformation in social change suggests that political learning is a central process 
occurring in social movements that are agents of change. Resource mobilisation theory, 
on the other hand, has been less useful in providing insights into this form of learning, 
since its focus has largely been on how movements accomplish immediate political-
economic goals, without acknowledging their reflexivity regarding systemic conditions 
and the politicisation of identity and consciousness that is connected to this. As such 
literature on learning in social struggle tends to be based either on NSM or Gramscian 
theory (Walter, 2007). As we shall see however, these perspectives differ with regard to 
the extent to which they connect political learning and self-transformation to political 
action. 
Broadly, two levels of learning in social movements are commonly discussed. Firstly, at 
the collective level, movements are viewed as emerging and developing through 
learning (Kilgore, 1999; Holford, 1995). Thus the movement's "collective identity is a 
learning process" (Melucci, 1995, p49) and movements are therefore "carriers of new 
learning potentials" (Ray, 1993, p81). In this sense, scholars refer to the learning of 
social movements. Secondly, social movements are argued to be "learning sites" or 
educative spaces where the consciousness and identities of participating individuals is 
politicised (Welton, 1993; Finger, 1989; Spencer, 1995). Here the learning in social 
movements is discussed. At both these levels — the collective and individual — learning 
is understood as occurring informally. 
While NSM and Gramscian theory on social movements have spawned literature on 
learning in social action, they hold slightly different implications for understanding the 
nature and processes of this learning15 . Below I go into greater detail regarding these 
differences. I start by examining NSM inspired perspectives. 
15 Processes and outcomes pertaining to political learning are occasionally referred to as 'educational' 
within the thesis to signify that learning is involved in these. 
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New Social Movement Theory 
Within a NSM framework, the collective learning constitutive of social movements is 
embodied in the development of their symbolic resistance to the hegemony (cognitive 
praxis), visible in the way in which movements' discourses, models of leadership, 
organisation and cultural practices evolve. This in turn provides a facilitative 
environment within which individual collective actors also learn how their everyday 
lives and identities are embedded within relations of power and how they are thus also 
sites of resistance (Kilgore, 1999; Holford, 1995; Welton, 1993; Klatch, 2002). 
While NSM theorists appear to limit their concept of movements to culturally 
articulated politics within the sphere of civil society, the facilitating forces and 
dynamics for the informal learning that movements engage in is also largely viewed to 
emerge from civil society interactions. Thus Eyerman and Jamison (1991) suggest that 
movements "learn by doing" (p57). However this "doing" is generally limited to 
"interaction between different groups and organisations" within civil society. 
Recognition of the learning that can emerge from political contestation with hegemonic 
structures, and thus of the pedagogical value of such contestation is largely missing. 
Therefore strategic action or political activity are largely treated as by-products of a 
movement's collective identity rather than learning opportunities that feed into and alter 
it, and are hence constitutive of such movements (Reger, 2002, p 1 72-173). Where 
political struggle is suggested as a learning force this "cognitive praxis is often more 
strategic than communicative", i.e. leading to the "innovation" of tactics and 
organisational forms rather than the deeper counter-hegemonic consciousness of the 
movement (ibid, p58). 
From a Gramscian perspective, a focus on interactions within civil society to the 
exclusion of political struggle does not provide an adequate basis for facilitating a truly 
transformative learning. For Gramscian thinkers, the radicalisation of identities and 
consciousness represents transformative learning only if it leads to political praxis to 
challenge oppressive structures. This is because of the dialectically related nature of 
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material reality, consciousness and culture, meaning that consciousness cannot 
completely escape domestication from structural oppression if that reality itself is not 
transformed. The containment of radicalisation within the sphere of civil society is thus 
criticised by Gramscian educators as a stunted form of political learning (Hoist, 2002). 
Indeed the fragmented politics of identity that NSM theorists provide a basis for 
practicing suggests that these movements have not been fully able to identify 
connections of oppression between various struggles. This emerges from, and only adds 
to their lack of political action against oppressive structures. The Gramscian critique of 
NSM perspectives on learning in social movements, and the differences between these 
approaches will become clearer as I turn to a deeper examination of the work of 
Gramscian adult educators in this field. 
Gramscian Theory 
Gramsci has inspired the work of many adult educators striving to understand the 
connections between learning in social movements and social transformation. Most 
notable amongst these is Paulo Freire, the Brazilian radical adult educationalist, who 
theorises and puts into practice the educational implications of Gramsci's work. Freire 
(1985; 1993) refers to the Gramscian process of the transformation of consciousness as 
conscientisation which he sees essentially as a form of radical learning initiated and 
cultivated within social movements. The process of conscientisation involves the 
development of critical awareness amongst people of the historical context which 
conditions their consciousness of the world and themselves, and which makes visible 
the manner in which the social structures that oppress them are legitimised and 
maintained through their everyday practices and 'domesticated' consciousness. The 
transition from domesticated to an agentic, conscientised consciousness necessarily 
demands a greater understanding of the connections between one's own oppression and 
that of others, and thus the interconnections between structures of domination. It is this 
pervasive character of oppression that Freire (1993) wishes to warn against when he 
states "...authentic resolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction does not lie in a 
mere reversal of position, in moving from one pole to the other. Nor does it lie in the 
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replacement of the former oppressor with new ones who continue to subjugate" (p39). 
However, while the notion of conscientisation as a comprehensive awareness of the 
dimensions and dynamics of oppression is important to social transformation, one 
should be careful not to view it as a transcendental quality akin to spiritual 
enlightenment that is irreversible and infallible. Instead, as Foley (2001) points out, the 
"struggle between domination and liberation" is "continually contested, complex, 
ambiguous and contradictory" (p77). 
Unlike NSM-based theorisations which treat the radicalisation of consciousness as the 
end goal of learning in social movements, Freire views conscientisation as emergent 
and intrinsically connected to social action. Thus McLaren and da Silva (1993) note: 
"While it is true that Freire's work is concerned with self-transformation...it is equally 
true, if not more so, that it concerns itself with social transformation, assuming as a 
central referent the reconstruction and reconstitution of the structural arrangements of 
the existing social order" (p55). Following Gramsci, Freire thus views the educational 
process of consciousness transformation as dialectically related to social change, such 
that radical learning is incomplete unless it leads to social action, and social change 
itself is not achieved unless it involves critical learning to resist the forces that 
domesticate consciousness (Hoist, 2002). 
According to Gramscian educators the development of conscientisation within social 
movements can only be achieved through political contestation in addition to civil 
society action. Thus Freire refers to the manner in which "dialectically education is not 
the key to transformation, although transformation is in itself educational" (Torres and 
Freire, 1994, p104, italics added). The process of political action is pedagogical because 
it involves directly encountering, acting on, and altering the social reality that 
conditions consciousness and thus leads to a more empowered understanding of this 
reality and the structures of power it consists of (McLaren, 1994; Allman and Wallis, 
1990). The counter-hegemonic consciousness of movements that ultimately informs 
political praxis, is itself, therefore learnt through reflection on experiences emerging 
from political praxis. 
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According to Allman (2001) the struggle for transformation is educative not only in that 
it creates encounters with structures of oppression but also because it provides 
movement participants with "abbreviated" or "prefigurative experience of the type of 
social relations that would lie at the heart of a transformed society" (p170). While 
critical social movements nurture egalitarian, inclusive relationships amongst 
participants, and form alliances, they provide an alternative experience to the oppressive 
social relations of capitalism. The pedagogical value of this is especially clear within a 
Gramscian conceptualisation of consciousness as dialectically related to material reality. 
From such a perspective, the opportunity to actively — "sensually and subjectively" —
experience liberated social relations, provides the most fecund basis for "deep 
transformation" of consciousness because it emerges from changes in our objective 
reality also (ibid, p170). 
An emphasis on the dialectic between reflection and action or learning and social 
struggle lies at the heart of Gramscian theorisations on social transformation. While 
critical learning and social transformation are mutually constitutive processes, social 
movements that engage in learning in social struggle are potentially transformative 
collective actors. In contrast, social movements within resource mobilisation and new 
social movement theory might be described as engaged in what Freire refers to as 
"activism" and "verbalism" respectively. Though an admittedly reductive 
representation, resource mobilisation proposes activism or action without reflection 
leading to reformism. While on the other hand, new social movement theory provides 
the basis for verbalism or "blah-blah" without action, leading to cultural resistance 
within the sphere of civil society (Freire, 1993, p68-69). In the absence of the action-
reflection dialectic present within Gramscian theory, both these perspectives fail to 
provide a coherent theory of social change and learning in social struggle. For this 
reason the next section hones in on a Gramscian framework for analysing global civil 
society and radical learning and action involved in it. 
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A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE THESIS: GRAMSCIAN 
THEORY, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, AND LEARNING 
While adopting a Gramscian lens, this section draws together conceptual issues related 
to learning in social movements so far developed, and connects them to the project of 
GCS discussed in chapter 2. Though connections between Gramsci and GCS 
theorisation have already been indicated at various points so far, here these connections 
are made explicit. GCS is thus reinterpreted as a counter-hegemonic initiative of radical 
learning and action against the global hegemony. In addition, the manner in which this 
provides a conceptual basis for understanding how local social movements might learn 
to be global citizens within GCS is developed, while also providing a theoretical 
rationale for the organisation of the thesis. 
The Global Hegemony 
A Gramscian framework is already being widely used to analyse the hegemony of 
global capitalism as well as resistance to this in the form of global civil society (Cox, 
1993; Gill, 1990; Robinson, 1996). This is often identified as a neo-Gramscian 
approach to international relations (Budd, 2007). While Gramsci specifically pays 
attention to the nation-state as the site where capitalism is promoted, managed and 
entrenched, the neo-Gramscian approach, prominently articulated by Cox (1999), 
extends the implications of Gramsci's theoretical contributions in the present context of 
globalisation where the "territorial distinctness of national economies and societies is 
penetrated by global and transnational forces" (Cox, 1999, p12). Some however argue 
that the translation of Gramscian notions of hegemony and civil society to the global 
level is a misuse of terms that are traditionally conceptualised as organically linked to 
the nation-state (Germain and Kenny, 1998). Nevertheless, within a neo-Gramscian 
approach, the aim is to show the concrete ideological and coercive global forces, which 
though not concentrated in a single political state at the global level, are operative 
through institutions such as the WB, IMF and G-7 that interact with nation-states to 
maintain the global hegemony of capitalism. Cox (1987) refers to this as the 
`internationalisation of the state'. Indeed even while arguing for the need to understand 
the "originality and uniqueness" of the development of capitalism in different countries, 
Gramsci is also aware that the "perspective is international and cannot be otherwise" if 
capitalism is to be challenged fully (Gramsci, 1971, p240). In relation to the present 
study this is made apparent in chapter 5 where I show that the hegemony of global 
capitalism characterises India's development trajectory and that the big dam industry, 
which has been ideologically and materially driven by the WB is an aspect of this 
development. 
Global Civil Society and Global Citizenship 
If a global hegemony is developing, global civil society is the site where this hegemony 
is legitimised as well as resisted. As a site of resistance, global civil society may be 
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conceived of as constituting a Gramscian 'war of position' involving the formation of a 
globally-conscious and united alliance of subaltern movements that seek to uncover 
their domestication by hegemonic forces and engage in action to transform these 
structures. The actors within this counter-hegemonic resistance can be viewed as global 
citizens, who in Gramsci's terms, are constructing global civil society through this war 
of position. In that the war of position is a gradual process, as I have indicated earlier, 
global citizens within global civil society must be involved in critical learning about the 
transnational processes of domination implicated in their oppression. Global citizens, in 
other words, are those who actively identify themselves with a global struggle in 
alliance with other oppressed groups and are occupied in the pedagogical and political 
processes of transforming the global hegemony. As argued previously, INGOs and 
`global social movements' have tended to be viewed as the transformative global 
citizens of this counter-hegemonic struggle, while movements of local, subaltern 
communities are sidelined. This is problematic from a Gramscian perspective, within 
which counter-hegemonic struggle can only be led by the subaltern. In chapter 6 
therefore I critically examine the extent to which the affluent Western INGOs involved 
in the international campaign to support NBA enacted radical global citizenship. 
Local movements, Trans-border Action and Learning 
Having established that global citizenship requires critical learning for global action, 
here I argue that Gramsci's framework of dialectical materialism provides a basis for 
understanding how local movements of subaltern communities can learn to be global 
citizens through the process of social struggle. In that consciousness is itself 
conditioned by political structures an emergent understanding of how people are part of 
a system of global structural oppression necessitates engagement with these structures. 
For critical learning to occur movements must therefore act beyond the cultural plane of 
civil society and engage in political praxis. The development of counter-hegemonic 
consciousness is therefore jeopardised by theorists who inhibit the possibility of 
forming coherent targets of protest, by rendering these obscure in characterisations of 
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the global hegemony as a "nebuleuse" (Cox, 1992, p27) sphere of decentred and 
amorphous power (Budd, 2007). 
However, while experiences emerging from political praxis can alter understandings of 
political structures, this might only give rise to revolutionary GCS action, if it is 
accompanied by dialogue and critical reflection. This involves moving beyond an 
understanding of institutions merely as political structures of opportunity or 
constraint that enable or inhibit the fulfilment of immediate, instrumental goals, as in 
resource mobilisation theory. It requires a gradual shift towards realising the 
hegemonic, class character of institutions, such that the need for their transformation 
becomes apparent. Borrowing from new social movement theory, a movement's critical 
reflections can be understood as its cognitive praxis. To reiterate, this refers to the 
discourses and cultural practices enacted within the sphere of civil society that identify 
and challenge the oppressive nature of the hegemony. This is connected to another 
aspect of cognitive praxis — interaction and solidarity formation between subaltern 
movements across the world. Together these processes constitute the formation of the 
ideological aspects of the 'war of position' involved in GCS. Amongst transformative 
movements critical learning is achieved through a constant dialogue between these civil 
society processes and political action, with each leading to the development of the 
other. In other words, this dialectic between political and cognitive praxis provides the 
basis for suggesting that local movements have the potential to learn to be globally-
conscious citizens in the process of targeting transnational political institutions. 
A Gramscian framework has unique implications for conceptualising the collective 
identity or consciousness of movements. Within new social movement theory 
collective identity is simply the cognitive praxis of a movement, i.e., its cultural 
resistance within civil society. For Gramsci however, cultural resistance in a 
transformative movement must also be dialectically related to political action. This 
suggests that the study of collective identity must take into account the movement's 
cognitive and political praxis. In order to examine the extent to which NBA represents a 
local struggle that is also dialectically connected to global transformation, chapter 7 
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therefore examines if and how NBA's collective identity reflects this in its concrete 
political and cognitive practices, as well as how this collective identity develops 
through the interaction between learning and political action. 
A Gramscian approach to global civil society also stresses that global transformation is 
not merely about collectively challenging oppressive structures, but just as importantly 
about politicising and transforming the consciousness of people in their everyday lives. 
Actors of global civil society therefore must be engaged in this joint process. This 
suggests the need to explore the extent to which NBA provides the site for the 
development of critical consciousness amongst village participants of the movement 
and whether this leads to their self-identification as global citizens (chapter 8). 
Related to this, a Gramscian framework also suggests the need to view the 
transformative processes of global civil society in terms of the extent to which critical 
consciousness and action on global structures of oppression are dialectically related to 
action on local forms of oppression too. This provides the basis for chapter 9, where I 
reflect on whether NBA's wider struggle against the dam is accompanied by changes in 
caste, class and gender relations within the Narmada communities. 
CONCLUSION 
Through an exploration of social movement theories that emphasise the processual and 
self-reflexive nature of social movements, this chapter has sought to develop the 
conceptual foundations for understanding how these entities have the potential to learn 
for and through social change in order to be radical actors in GCS. Firstly it has been 
argued that these theories can be located on a continuum of positions in relation to 
conceptualising the forms of social change that movements are engaged in, which from 
least to most radicalism are represented by — reform at the political level suggested by 
resource mobilisation theory, to resistance at the cultural level emphasised by new 
social movement theory, and finally social transformation encompassing political and 
cultural levels argued by Gramscian perspectives. In turn, these positions on social 
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change have different implications for the nature and processes of political learning that 
social movements engage in. Given that social transformation is the ultimate aim of 
GCS, this chapter has argued for the need to apply a Gramscian framework to 
conceptualising the pedagogical processes through which social movements participate 
in GCS. 
The dialectic between consciousness and material reality that lies at the centre of 
Gramscian perspectives suggests firstly that social transformation through global civil 
society must involve the transformation of subjective processes of consciousness and 
identity, which can be conceived of in terms of the formation of global citizenship, but 
also that this must be connected to efforts to overturn objective structures of the global 
hegemony that influence consciousness. Social movements that are part of GCS must 
therefore be engaged in learning global citizenship to affect structural change. 
Secondly, a Gramscian dialectical analysis would suggest that acting upon political 
structures creates possibilities for critical transformation of consciousness. Social 
movements involved in political action against global structures are thus possible sites 
for learning global citizenship. Based on this framework the thesis proceeds to explore 
whether, and in what ways, the Save the Narmada Movement has engaged in this 
dialectic between learning and social change, and whether this provides a conceptual 
basis for viewing local movements like it as active citizens in global civil society. 
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Chapter 4 
Bringing Research to Life: The Methodology and Methods of 
Fieldwork 
INTRODUCTION 
As indicated so far, most research on global civil society has focused on the activity of 
international NGOs. Rarely does the literature delve deeply into an analysis of the local 
level of global civil society. My research attempts to address this gap by focusing on the 
lived world of the tribal as well as peasant communities that have been a part of this 
global network through the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). As such my research 
combines the case study method with an ethnographic approach. The integration of 
various methodologies that this represents is a bricolage that is characteristic of much 
qualitative enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 2003). 
This chapter provides a description of my intellectual, political and social journey as a 
researcher into the heart of the field. It illustrates not only how I conducted my research 
but also how I lived it. The chapter begins with an outline of research aims and 
questions. Drawing from this I discuss my choice of research methodology. Next I 
provide a detailed account of the ethnographic process, the data collection strategies 
used and my role as a researcher within this. I end with an outline of the data analysis 
process 
RESEARCH AIMS AND QUESTIONS 
The overarching aim of the research is to explore: 
If and how are local social movements that transnationalise their grievances engaged in 
the construction of global citizenship? 
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Drawing on Gramsci's dialectical formulation of social transformation described in 
chapter 3, an analysis of the construction of a transformative global citizenship can be 
viewed as comprising dialectically related dimensions, addressed in the 5 questions 
below. Firstly, global citizenship consists of a dialectic between collective practices and 
discourses (Qs 1 and 2), secondly, it involves a dialectical interaction between 
collective action and perceived identity and citizenship at the individual level (Q3), 
thirdly, it is constituted through a dialectic between global and local transformative 
action (Q4), and lastly given the centrality of the dialectic between consciousness and 
action within Gramscian approaches to social transformation, it is necessary to uncover 
the learning processes involved in the construction of global citizenship (Q5). The NBA 
provided a relevant case study to investigate these dimensions: 
1) At the level of the movement's practices— how did political engagements with 
the state, international community and other global actors such as the WB 
change through the course of struggle? 
2) What were the movement discourses relating to grievance formation, targets of 
protest and alliance construction that accompanied these movement practices —
were there global dimensions to these? 
3) At the level of the participant local communities — whether and in what manner 
did local participants relate to the movement's practices and discourse of 
resistance? Was their participation connected to a growing awareness and 
critical appraisal of their oppression as well as transformation of subjective 
articulations of identity and citizenship — did this involve a global dimension? 
4) If transformation in consciousness did occur was this related to a dialectical 
transformation of oppressive social structures within the communities? 
5) What were the learning influences, processes and mechanisms through which 
the dimensions referred to above emerged? 
These research questions relate to issues of community and movement processes that 
require a depth of analysis that, it was felt, would best be addressed through a case 
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study integrated with an ethnographic approach. Such depth would not have been 
achievable through contrived situations of data collection such as formal interviews or 
questionnaires that tend to be devoid of a lived context. This was especially true 
considering the lack of literacy amongst the research subjects. Below I turn to 
identifying and justifying a qualitative ethnographic approach for the empirical study. 
A QUALITTIVE LENS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The positivist tradition emerging from the modernist goal of discovering the truth, 
placed emphasis on quantification and standardisation of the processes of knowledge 
generation. This gave birth to the methodology of experimentation (Hesse-Giber and 
Leavy, 2006). From the 1920s and 1930s positivism has been increasingly criticised by 
social scientists that view its essentialising nature as antithetical to the complexities and 
socially constructed nature of people's behaviour. I share this concern and hence my 
pursuit for "processes and meanings" has led to a qualitative frame of analysis (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2003, p13). 
However despite growing scepticism of positivism, qualitative research itself emerges 
from the Chicago school's preoccupation with naturalism - a view which suggests that 
"the aim of social research is to capture the character of naturally occurring human 
behaviour" (Graddol et al, 1994, p5). The underlying assumption here is a modernist 
one- that there are truths of human behaviour, and 'laws', albeit socially and culturally 
embedded ones that can be discovered. Denzin and Lincoln's (1994) definition of 
qualitative research provides an example of this. They write: 
"Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an 
interpretive, naturalist approach to its subject matter. This means 
that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of 
meanings people bring to them." (p2) 
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While naturalism seems to depart from positivism in the methodology that it considers 
appropriate for social research, it presents no radical epistemological departure- "They 
are both committed to the attempt to understand social phenomena as objects existing 
independently of the researcher" (Hammersley, 1995a, p10). Most qualitative 
researchers now are influenced by post-structuralist notions of the inextricable 
relationship between knowledge and power and thus emphasise the "socially 
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what 
is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry." (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2003, p13, also see Flick, 1998, Henn et al, 2006). Resonating with this perspective, in 
conducting my research, and forming my analysis, I have been constantly conscious of 
my specific relationship to the research and the manner in which this has shaped the end 
result. 
Indeed the debate between positivism and qualitative approaches in academia resonates 
directly with the lives of my research participants. A qualitative approach has allowed 
the people of the Narmada Valley to voice their understanding of their victimisation and 
what they have learnt from it, in resistance to the positivist ideological framework that 
underlies the hegemonic discourse of the 'greater common good' (Roy, 1999) which 
has been used by the government to literally drown out their voices. 
My aim, to do an in-depth exploration of the local manifestations of global civil society, 
led me to adopt a case study approach. The case, according to Flood (quoted in Stake, 
2003) is a "bounded system" (p135). In relation to my study this bounded system is the 
Save the Narmada Movement and the international NGOs that supported it. This 
approach allows me to make a holistic, contextualised study of a local social 
movement's engagement with the global. Following from Stake's categorisation of case 
studies I would suggest that my study is an instrumental one that seeks to "provide 
insights into an issue" rather than simply of intrinsic value for which getting a "better 
understanding of the case" is fundamental (ibid, p135). Here the issues relate to social 
movements and global civil society. The Save the Narmada Movement is chosen for 
this purpose because within literature relating to this field it is highly celebrated and 
repeatedly cited. 
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While in general the research is a case study of a movement that goes global, my 
specific research questions relating to the impact the movement has on local 
communities led me to spend most of my field time in two villages, instead of in the 
offices of the NBA or those of the international NGOs. All data collected at these other 
levels was gathered specifically to shed light on the processes occurring at the 
grassroots level. My overarching interest is not in the concrete exchanges between the 
local and global level but in the local perceptions of these relationships and actions, 
particularly as they give rise to emergent ambiguities between these different layers of 
lived reality. 
One of the characteristics of the case study approach is that it adopts multiple methods 
of data collection. While theoretically I could simply have collected data through formal 
interviews, documents, and random observations within the "bounded system", I 
wanted a more in-depth and holistic understanding of the social movement and its mass 
base. I wanted to observe social processes and practices in order to get closer to an emic 
understanding of the movement participants. Further, sole reliance on interviews would 
have seriously limited the extent to which valid data could be gathered, especially since 
participants were largely illiterate and had difficulty articulating themselves within the 
`unnatural' confines of the formal interview. 
An ethnographic approach which engages with subjects in their own settings allowed 
me to address the above concerns and achieve the desired level of depth. According to 
Hesse-Piber and Leavy (2006) "ethnographic research aims to get an in-depth 
understanding of how individuals in different cultures and subcultures make sense of 
their lived reality" (p230). This is achieved through long periods of immersion in the 
social context of interest. In that this particular ethnographic enquiry is focused on 
uncovering the global dimensions of local existence, it responds to Burawoy et al's 
(2000) call for 'global ethnography' which allows an exploration of the everyday 
processes that the nebulous 'global' is manifested in. 
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Ethnography, however, owing to its direct roots in the naturalist challenge to positivism, 
is shot through with the same tensions between realism and subjectivism which are 
apparent in the qualitative approach (Hammersley, 1992; Travers, 2001). In realist 
terms the 'superiority' of ethnography lies in the fact that the researcher can observe 
social life in its natural setting. This eliminates the distorting effects of the research 
process because "it is able to get closer to social reality than other methods" 
(Hammersley, 1992, p44). Such a perspective is based on the assumption that the 
researcher can be value-neutral and 'objective'. Stephen Ball (1990) provides a more 
subjectivist account of the business of ethnography, describing it as an "art form rather 
than the product of technical science" (p169). He goes on to write: 
"Data are a social construct of the research process itself, not 
just of the 'natives' under study. Here the researcher has a 
pivotal role to play. Data are a product of the skills and 
imagination of the researcher and of the interface between the 
researcher and the researched...Indeed what is seen and 
unnoticed, what is and is not recorded, will depend on the 
interests, questions, and relationships that are brought to bear in 
a particular scene". (p170). 
Here the researcher is pivotal to the data generated. It must be noted, however, that 
while this perspective does highlight the situatedness of research, it does not amount to 
relativism, which deconstructs 'reality' to the extent of declaring that there are "no facts 
other than the actor's subjective experience" (Cameron et al, 1992, p9). A relativist 
view would suggest that the world 'created' by the ethnographer may be "no more nor 
less true than others; for instance than the perceptions and interpretations of the people 
studied" (Hammersley, 1992, p45). My epistemological standpoint has tried to escape 
the trap of dichotomies produced by the realism-relativism debate. Thus I do not purport 
to have achieved an 'ideal reproduction' of reality through my study, instead my 
account, just as any other piece of research is at best a 'selective representation' of 
social reality. This is where the importance of reflexivity is highlighted by Ball. The 
practice of reflexivity allows researchers to assess the impact their assumptions, choices 
and social roles have not only on the research context, but also on their selective 
representations of that context. I believe that, to the extent possible, this reflexive 
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process also needs to be communicated to the audience as I have attempted to do at 
various points in the thesis (for e.g. p23-25, 117-119, 120-121). 
I started my research in the valley with an interest in looking at the extent, and ways in 
which the people might be a part of 'global civil society'- an arena of transnational 
action that derives its legitimacy from the local people it claims to give voice to. My 
conviction was that only bottom-up change will lead to the kind of transformation that 
global civil society claims to be a harbinger of. I was driven by the hope of fmding 
these indicators of social change. Of course the reality that I found was a lot more 
conflictual, complex and ambiguous. Nevertheless my research is committed to the 
view that power, oppression and resistance are real. This view departs from relativism, 
which in its denial of a social reality also negates the existence of structural forces and 
is thus complicit in maintaining the status quo (Habermas, 1987). Following Foucault, 
however, I believe that power is not operative simply through class as Marx would 
assert, but multiple axis such as class, race, gender, and in the Indian context, caste as 
well. 
In my commitment to understanding how oppression is resisted, my research falls 
within the framework of 'critical ethnography'. Critical ethnographers, inspired by the 
Frankfurt school seek to "generate knowledge that aims to challenge and transform 
unequal power relationships" (Henn et al, 2006, p28). From such a stance research is a 
political activity — one which either legitimises or resists the hegemony (Hammersley, 
1995b; Hammersley 1993; Griffiths, 1998). As such no social scientist can take comfort 
in the belief that knowledge generation is value-neutral. Paulo Freire brings this vividly 
to light when he remarks: "Washing one's hands of the conflict between the powerful 
and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral" (Freire, 1985, 
p 122) My acknowledgement and enactment of this responsibility does not suggest a 
misguided attempt at manipulation of findings towards achieving social change. Rather 
it has meant that my selective representation of the Narmada struggle is guided by a 
reflexive and critical concern for issues of social justice. However, though I argue that 
all research is biased to some degree by the researchers own epistemological prism, I 
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have prevented this selective representation from turning into a dogmatic representation 
by staying sensitive to inconsistencies, ruptures and subtleties in the narratives of 
research participants. Having laid down a critical ethnographic framework for the study, 
below I provide greater detail regarding the process of collecting data within this 
framework. 
RESEARCH PROCESS 
Before venturing out into the field I read extensively about the movement — its national 
and international campaigns, the academic debates surrounding it, as well as the social, 
cultural and historical context of its grassroots participants. This gave me some 
indication of what to expect, but also in some instances led me to untenable pre-
figurations as I learnt later in the field. Nevertheless these readings helped me identify 
key campaigners and NBA activists of interest to my work. The bulk of the fieldwork 
consisting of an ethnographic study of the movement was conducted in two stages. A 
third much shorter phase involved collecting qualitative data relating to INGOs 
involved in the Narmada campaign. Below I describe the kinds of data collected and the 
process of collecting this data in each of the phases. 
Phase 1— Movement Leaders and Offices 
The first stage, starting in March 2005 was carried out over a month and a half. This 
initial visit to the Narmada Valley provided a chance to assess the feasibility of my 
research and to introduce myself to the difficult rural terrain in which I would have to 
work, and which I must admit had been causing me significant anxiety. During this time 
I visited two NBA offices, one in Madhya Pradesh and the other in Gujarat, to share my 
research ideas and get feedback, establish contacts with key gatekeepers, and to begin 
my initiation into the discourse of the movement. These visits helped me to establish 
that the office in Madhya Pradesh in the small town of Barwani would be my main 
support base while carrying out my research. This was because of its relative proximity 
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to villages in comparison to the Gujarat office and also because there were more 
activists here to assist me. 
It was in this office that I met my main gatekeeper — Asit, an urban activist of the 
movement, who more than any other activist seemed to be curious and interested in my 
study. Indeed his keenness greatly facilitated my work as he energetically accompanied 
me to the various villages under the threat of submergence, introducing me to village 
leaders and securing their cooperation for my research. During this period I took stock 
of the breadth of the movement by doing interviews with movement participants at two 
levels — the level of top leadership — this consisted mainly of urban activists who were 
working full-time with the movement (5 recorded interviews); and local village leaders 
— who were entrusted with the task of organising and mobilising their village. At the 
local level I recorded interviews with male and female leaders in both Nimar in Madhya 
Pradesh (4 men and 2 women) and the tribal tracts16 of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra 
and Gujarat (5 men and 2 women). These interviews were aimed at developing an 
Adivasis live in the hills through which the Narmada river flows but also in the Nimar Plains where 
they either possess small bits of agricultural land or do wage labour. Due to their proximity to the 
mainstream Hindu culture they have been increasingly integrated into the Hindu caste hierarchy through a 
process of `sanskritisation', and have thus lost their unique Adivasi identity and culture. Hill Adivasis, 
however, as Baviskar (2004) argues have been able to maintain their cultural distinctness because of the 
isolation that the hills have provided from the 'modern state and caste system'. Please note that when I 
refer to Adivasis in the thesis I am talking only of hill Adivasis. 
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PICTURE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
understanding of the history of the movement; the demands of the people; participation 
in the movement and decision making processes; what they had learnt through their 
struggle about the nature of their oppression; and their understanding and perception of 
the international support they had received. Asit set up interviews for me which took 
place at the homes of the interviewees. He was also present during them. 
While I would not have gained access to these people without Asit's mediation, his 
presence posed certain questions regarding the distorting effects this might have on 
interviewees who may have felt greater pressure to present a positive picture of the 
movement in front of an activist. In saying this I do not mean that villagers were being 
coerced into saying things, but rather that they felt less free to present a conflictual 
picture. Indeed, on one occasion when the interview had finished, the villager turned to 
Asit and asked him if he had 'done well'. This genuinely dismayed Asit, who replied 
`you should say whatever you feel, there is no right or wrong'. Having said this though, 
villagers may not have chosen to discuss negative aspects that might be damaging for 
the movement with me —an outsider regardless of Asit's presence. 
Arising from my heavy dependence on Asit's guidance, was a concern that this might 
lead to a one-sided, self-affirming representation of the NBA. Asit was in the position to 
introduce me to people known to have a positive perception of the NBA and to ignore 
or conceal those who didn't — in effect he was in the position to steer my research (see 
Ellen, 1984; and Lockwood, 1992, for discussion of gatekeeper issues). My reservations 
regarding this were dispelled to a degree however, through the course of my 
conversations with him, which-suggested that he was still self-reflexive about his work 
despite natural loyalties to the movement. He was open to receiving critical questions 
and observations — something which I found other activists were less tolerant of. To me 
he represented an intellectual engaged in praxis (Freire, 1973)17. Indeed he drew me 
into debates regarding the NBA, pointing me towards tensions and contradictions in the 
movement's discourse and strategies. His constructive criticality reassured me that I 
17 Freire defines praxis as a process of "reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it". 
(Freire, 1993, p33). 
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was not being lured into adopting an idealised image of the movement (I never became 
complacent of this though). 
Despite Asit's critical objectivity, it was necessary to take certain measures to mitigate 
any unitended distorting effects of his involvement as gatekeeper on the data collected 
and analysed. This was done by triangulating data obtained in his presence and absence 
to discern consistencies and incoherences as well as encountering and following 
people's views, attitudes and beliefs across a prolonged span of time. Opportunities for 
this were afforded in phase 2 of the research described later, when after familiarising 
myself with the place and people during phase 1, I was able to go back unaccompanied 
and stay with them. 
During phase 1 began making contact with the leader of the movement — Medha 
Patekar, to interview her. I had also emailed my research proposal to her from London 
and was keen to discuss any suggestions or reservations she may have regarding the 
research. As a busy public figure nationally and internationally Medha is compelled to 
travel widely and frequently. Hence, while she appeared willing to meet me, getting an 
interview with her was more like chasing a mirage. On a few occasions I made long 
train journeys to meet her, after being promised an interview, only to return empty 
handed because she was unable to take time off from genuinely critical matters. This 
was frustrating and also took time away from other research work that I needed to do. 
Nevertheless even these occasions provided unplanned sources of data. On one 
particular occasion I was invited by Medha to Bombay. There she was involved in 
mobilising a slum-dwellers' rally against the demolition of slums which was part of a 
larger World Bank funded urban development project. I was told that if I stayed with 
her for two days she would be able to find time to give me an interview. This hope 
disintegrated however, when I saw the frenzy with which she and others were preparing 
for the rally and meetings with government officials. In such a context it would have 
been inappropriate of me to push for an interview. Instead I busied myself with 
observing interactions between Medha and other activists and listening to conversations 
they were having on campaign strategy, or media management for the protest the next 
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day. I also found myself doing odd jobs around the office — typing up press releases, or 
letters to government officials, sorting out letters Medha had received and making flags. 
This participation provided a direct source of data on how these movements operate. 
The slum-dwellers' organisation had often taken, as well as received support from the 
NBA, and on this occasion also, villagers from the Narmada Valley travelled to 
Bombay to support them. This was an opportunity to see alliance building in action and 
the extent to which cross-fertilisation of ideas had taken place between the two 
campaigns. I made recordings of speeches by slum-dwellers and Narmada Valley 
villagers. After 3 days in Bombay I had gathered rich and insightful data on movement 
dynamics but, returned to the Narmada Valley without a full interview from Medha 
Patekar. I finally completed the interview with Medha over 5 separate sessions 
conducted over a span of a year in 4 separate places across India as well as once in 
London18. 
During my time in Bombay, I was surprised to be given access to quite confidential 
information. This gave me an indication of the researcher-activist role that Medha 
expected me to play — in terms of helping the NBA with office work, but also by 
extending the NBA's agenda through my research. Indeed in later conversations with 
her, she was more explicit about these expectations. This made me somewhat 
uncomfortable. While as a researcher I had a commitment to supporting the interests of 
the oppressed, this would also require me to be critical. I explained this to her and was 
able to gain her full cooperation. 
Asit's assistance in taking me to villages and introducing me to people during this initial 
visit made it possible to travel around the valley alone on my next fieldtrip. This gave 
me more independence from the NBA and also meant that I was not diverting crucial 
human resources away from the movement's work. 
18 
 Medha came to London in the beginning of October 2005 to attend an awareness-raising event that a 
group of supporters had organised here — I was also part of this group. 
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Phase 2 — Grassroots Communities 
The initial phase had helped me get a feel of the expanse of the movement, as well as 
movement discourse at the top and intermediary level through participant observation 
and interviews. The second, longer phase was aimed at developing a more nuanced 
picture of the grassroots level. To achieve this depth I adopted an ethnographic 
approach, choosing two villages mobilised by the movement to live in for a period of 
three and a half months each, starting from October 2005. 
Sampling 
A unique and interesting feature of the movement is the two distinct social groups that it 
has brought together and galvanised — the Nimaris and the Adivasis (tribals). As earlier 
mentioned these two groups are ethnically, culturally and religiously different. They 
also represent opposing class interests — Nimaris regularly employ Adivasis to work on 
their fields for below minimum wages (Baviskar, 2004). The Adivasi-Nimari 
constituency of the movement is an important dimension and I felt that my study should 
represent this. I therefore selected one Nimari and one Adivasi village to study. This 
would give me an opportunity to explore differences in movement discourse between 
these two communities and possible changing relationships and perceptions of each 
other. 
I consulted the NBA office in choosing a tribal village suitable for my study. Given that 
I was now acquainted with the valley through my previous trip, I could actively engage 
with the activists in this process rather than naively depend on them. I was keen to study 
a tribal village that had been strongly involved with the Andolan. Most of these villages 
had already been affected by submergence, and social life in them had been disturbed 
by partial displacement. This made it difficult to do research there because people were 
preoccupied with vital matters of building a new life, and were too unsettled to host an 
outsider. Further I would not be able to get a real sense of village life or social 
structures because of the depleting population. My search was finally narrowed down to 
two villages in the state of Madhya Pradesh which were active in the movement but had 
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not yet been affected by the rising waters. In this sense they were both 'pristine' as one 
activist put it. I had visited both villages on my previous trip and interviewed village 
leaders and was confident that there was strong collective participation here. However, 
one of these villages — Kakrana 19 was electrified, and many of its residents possessed 
televisions and motorbikes. This was not representative of the rest of the hill villages 
that were still not initiated into these aspects of modernisation. The other issue with 
Kakrana was that it had also been part of another tribal rights organisation (Khedut 
Mazdoor Chetna Sangath - Peasant and Workers Consciousness Union (KMCS)). This 
would have led to an enmeshment of experiences and discourses from two different 
organisations, creating complications in my analysis. The other village — Bhadal was 
across the river from Kakrana and required a 30-45 minute boat journey. Though it was 
not too far from the modernisation that I had tried to escape from Kakrana, the river 
seemed to effectively cut it off from the 'luxuries' of civilisation as we know it. It had 
also not been mobilised by the KMCS. Bhadal thus became my home for the next three 
and a half months. 
Bhadal is a village of around 30 households. My endeavour was to visit all of these 
families and to talk to men, women and children. Some of these houses were not 
accessible however, and so finally I reached only 20. Since Adivasi villages are 
relatively homogenous, with no caste stratifications and with resources almost equally 
distributed amongst members, hierarchical stratification was not a consideration in my 
sampling strategy. I spoke to men and women of all ages but it was considerably more 
difficult to speak to women, especially younger women who were quite shy. I also 
spoke to some children but again they were coy and so the conversations were limited. 
The Nimari village was also picked after consultation with NBA activists. As 
mentioned earlier, most Nimari villages have taken compensation and thus are not 
actively involved now. In other villages support for the NBA is fractured — here 
tensions between the two factions are so high that some supporters and non-supporters 
19 This was the most accessible of the hill villages in the valley and was normally the embarkation point 
for travelling down stream by boat to other villages in Maharashtra and Gujarat. Travel to these villages 
involved boat journeys of upto 10 hours. 
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have broken all social ties, refusing even to speak to each other. I feared that living in 
such tenuous conditions and possibly having to face uncooperative participants could 
jeopardise my research, and so decided to avoid such villages. It may be argued that this 
compromised a representative sample of the fractured nature of the present support 
base. However, as I have already explained, my interest is not in the intrinsic nature of 
the movement — if it had been it would have been imperative that I get a representative 
sample of the movement's past as well as present condition20. However I was using the 
NBA as a context for understanding learning of people in social struggle. Following 
from this logic it was more important that I study a village that was committed to 
struggle. Thus I settled on a village called Pipri which has given undivided and strong 
support to the movement from the outset. This village consists largely of Yadays (25 
households) — a caste of medium status, as well as one Rajput family (of higher status 
than Yadays) and one Brahmin family (a caste at the pinnacle of the caste hierarchy), 
and a number of Adivasi and Harijan labourers. My aim again was to speak to everyone 
in the village — men, women and children of all castes. Because I spoke the same 
language as these people and had a similar cultural background, gaining access to 
everyone was less difficult than in the tribal village. 
I also felt that the study of a village that was under submergence but had not joined the 
movement would enhance my understanding of the pedagogic impact of the movement 
on villages mobilised by it. It would allow me to discern differences between movement 
and non-movement villages in terms of discourse about the government, development 
and perceptions of identity and citizenship. To do this I had planned to spend two weeks 
each in a tribal and Nimari village that had never been active with movement. However, 
after a while it became clear that the tribal villages I was interested in were utterly 
inaccessible — physically as well as socially (an outsider would not be welcome). So this 
part of the study had to be dropped. With regard to the Nimari villages, I was able to 
make arrangements with some Andolan villagers who had personal connections with 
non-movement villages to make day trips with them to these places. In this way I 
20 While a representative sample of the condition of the NBA now would highlight division in the mass 
base, this would not have been a representative sample 7-10 years ago when practically the whole valley 
was united under the NBA. 
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managed to get interviews and make some observations at 4 villages that were under 
submergence but were not involved in the movement. 
Research conditions 
As I have mentioned earlier, the physical environment and the facilities available 
differed between the tribal and Nimari villages I stayed in. I also had to negotiate with 
cultural and linguistic differences. 
Bhadal — The Adivasi village 
Just like most other Adivasi villages settled in the hills Bhadal has been largely 
neglected by the government's basic development projects — no roads to connect it, no 
electricity, phone lines, running water, ration shops, schools or health clinics etc. 
Because of the absence of schools for miles around people are largely illiterate. Six 
years ago NBA opened a school in Bhadal in which the first generation of children are 
now beginning to read and write. 
Asit arranged for me to stay with a family in Bhadal which has led the village's support 
of the movement. The large extended family lives in a but on the edge of a cliff 
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overlooking the Narmada River. The rest of the village stretches out southwards from 
this house away from the river. The but housed around 15 adults and children. There 
were no separate rooms so I was constantly surrounded by people. 
Kishore, the younger son of my host family, aged around 22 years, was put in charge of 
introducing me to people in the village and translating during interviews. The Adivasis 
here speak Bhilali, but Kishore was also fluent in my mother tongue, Hindi, which he 
had learnt in the course of his involvement with the movement. Because Bhilali shares 
some similarities with Hindi, within 2 weeks I had begun to understand well enough not 
to have to ask for translations during interviews. However still not being able to speak 
Bhilali fluently, Kishore carried on translating my Hindi questions. This arrangement 
seemed to work very well and I do not feel the process of translation greatly hindered 
the interview. 
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Kishore's house in Bhadal 
Bhadal consists of small hamlets spread across vast hilly terrain. Each hamlet, 
consisting of 3-4 households is built on a plateau on which agricultural land can be 
ploughed. Since there is no electricity the village wakes and sleeps with the rising and 
setting of the sun. These conditions defined my days in Bhadal and the way in which 
my fieldwork was shaped. 
I would set out into the village with Kishore by around eight in the morning. To get to 
the next hamlet to meet and talk to people we would often have to make long treks 
down and over hills. Because it would take over two hours to get to some houses and 
walking back in the night over the hilly terrain was dangerous, we would stay overnight 
there, heading for another hamlet the next day. The immense scatter of the village made 
it difficult to get a sense of village life. But it was obvious that despite the distance 
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separating people they were a closely knit community — I was always amazed at how 
people would have up-to-date information about each other's whereabouts or 
knowledge of a sick villager living miles across, behind a number of hills. 
Since there was no electricity to charge batteries and no shops to get new ones from, I 
had to buy batteries in bulk before going in to the village and conserve them while 
there. This meant that I used the tape recorder only for the vital task of recording. 
Unable to play back tapes (not just because of the scarcity of batteries but also the lack 
of privacy to do so) prevented me from transcribing or analysing the interviews in the 
field. To facilitate some analysis I wrote notes of important issues during interviews. 
Pipri — The Nimari village 
Living conditions in Pipri were closer to what I am familiar with — running water, 
electricity, mobile phone networks. Shops were also available within a distance of 8km. 
This made it a physically and emotionally less taxing environment for me to live and 
work in. 
The spatial parameters contrasted sharply against that of Bhadal. The village was 
organised around two main lanes along which a total of 30 houses were lined. The 
village square provided an easily identifiable focal point for village life. In this village it 
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was easy to see a community. In the evenings the square would be alive with men 
gathering around to chat and women going to the temple to sing and offer prayers. 
The matriarch of the family I stayed with here — Shanta bai, was strongly involved in 
the activities of the Andolan. This family was relatively well-off and had only recently 
constructed a new concrete house. However, here too I did not get a separate room. 
Again this hindered my ability to analyse interviews while at the village. 
Nimari people traditionally speak a dialect of Hindi called Nimari. While men are fluent 
in Hindi, women mostly tend to speak in Nimari. The language posed a slight problem 
initially, but I quickly got used to it. A translator was not required. 
Executing the ethnographic approach 
Collecting data was not just about the methods I employed, but crucially, about the 
relationships between me and the people that mediated and defined the data collection 
techniques. 
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On arriving at Bhadal, for the first few days I tried to orient myself and establish some 
kind of a relationship with my hosts. This proved to be more difficult than I had 
anticipated. At the house I was given a charpai (a traditional wooden bed widely used in 
Indian villages). This became my space and although the house was just one big hall 
with no divisions I felt an impenetrable wall between the bed and the hub of activity 
which was going on around me in complete oblivion to my presence21. While 
researchers express concerns about the "reactivity" of subjects to the researcher and the 
distorting effects of this (Henn et al, 2006; Spradley, 1980), my concern was just the 
opposite. I was being completely ignored. I am not a sympathiser of the 'fly on the wall 
approach' and I felt the only way I could obtain rich data was through interaction and 
participation with these people. Not speaking their language, I felt shy about trying to 
establish contact. Indeed attempts at communicating in Hindi not only failed but would 
prove counterproductive, when my stuttering, stumbling attempts to say something 
degenerated into an awkward silence and confusion between us. This only reinforced 
the fact that I was an outsider. I finally gave up on talking, trying instead to gain eye 
contact and then flashing the warmest, friendliest smile I could muster despite the 
desperate loneliness that was increasingly engulfing me. While I had gained entry to the 
village I had not gained access (Ball, 1990). In my bid to gain this access I decided to 
work on establishing rapport with the children — maybe my friendship with them would 
provide a bridge through which I could reach out to the adults. So I smiled and tried to 
play with them. But again language got in the way and they would shyly run away. The 
youngest — a 2yr old toddler was the final nail in the coffin of my attempts to strike up a 
relationship. She would shriek and start crying the minute I approached her. Her 
mother would then whisk her away and I would make my embarrassed retreat. This 
toddler, unlike others bound by norms of social politeness, made the definitive 
statement that I was not just an outsider but indeed an alien from another planet (I 
noticed during the time that I spent there that the little girl did not react with such 
panicked frenzy to people who came to the house from surrounding villages even 
though for her they were perfect strangers). After this I decided to go with the flow of 
21 The house consisted of 6 adults and an uncountable number of children. It took me more than a week 
to get a grip of how everyone was related to each other. 
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things and gradually after a week I found myself naturally sliding into social exchanges 
with people. I learnt a few phrases in their own language and this gave us a means 
through which we could not only communicate but also engage in the most universal 
indicators of goodwill — laughter. 
While this was the beginning of my relationship with the Adivasis of Bhadal it by no 
means suggested a smooth sailing data collection process from then onwards. 
Sensitivity and reflexivity were constantly required. 
Whenever I went to a house, I was told to sit on the bed. My host would sit on the 
ground. This established my role as not only the outsider, but the outsider 'superior'-
which was of course the reality of the power dynamics within which we were 
historically situated. I tried to demonstrate my desire to be their friend rather than 
superior, by insisting that I sit on the floor with them. They would be alarmed by this 
violation of norms, and appear uncomfortable. I negotiated this by sitting on the bed 
initially but once we had started talking I would slowly slide on to the floor. Aside from 
some initial protest to this, my host would soon relax and resume conversation. 
Breaking the social practice of sitting on higher ground that represented the divide 
between us went some way towards establishing a closer relationship that facilitated 
freer narration during interviews and informal conversations. 
In Pipri while the power divide was still present, it was not as stark as it had been in 
Bhadal and thus establishing social exchange was not as complicated. Indeed people in 
Pipri demanded to know more about my personal life than those in Bhadal had ventured 
to ask. 
Reducing the power asymmetry of my relationship with the village communities was 
important not just to facilitate the research but also as a matter of common courtesy — it 
was important to me that I reciprocate their kindness in letting me into their lives with a 
basic effort to make them feel comfortable with me. I did this by being attentive, 
undemanding and trying to blend in with my mannerisms and clothes. However I also 
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had to balance this effort to blend in with my own sense of comfort — a full imitation of 
them would have been unnecessary, ingenuine, and ironically, out of place. For example 
in the tribal village women bathe topless at the bank of the river, regardless of the 
presence of men. Born as I am into a culture of privacy that gives rise to the closed 
bathroom, this was wholly unacceptable to me. I preferred to compromise my efforts at 
assimilation for my own ease of mind. In this case, this also meant leaving all standards 
of hygiene by the wayside. Every two weeks I would make a day long journey to the 
nearest town — the town in which the NBA office was situated. Here I would take a long 
bath. In the meantime, however, not only would I have to endure my sticky, sweaty self, 
but those around me had to as well. My eccentricity in this respect obviously set me 
apart from the people, but I explained my behaviour to them and they were 
accommodating. It is also true however that their lower social status in relation to me 
meant that they were not in the position to complain. This is in contrast to my 
experience in the Nimari village where I was explicitly instructed as soon as I arrived to 
take a bath and wash my clothes everyday. I obediently complied with this. Taking a 
bath here posed no dilemma however, because Nimari houses have private bathrooms 
and toilets. 
Both in the tribal and Nimari context the concept of interviewing was strange for 
people22. I tried to make the process more natural, more like a conversation by not 
forcing the interview to conform rigidly to my interview schedule. This was important 
to put people at ease and consequently to encourage them to talk more freely. 
Sometimes they would start talking without a cue from me. I would let them until it 
became repetitive and then try to connect what they had said with my specific 
questions. This meant that the sequence of questions changed dramatically from 
interview to interview. While there were basic themes that I always tried to touch on, 
the evolution of the interview questions was largely organic and responsive to emerging 
issues. During the interview I strove for a 'joint construction of meaning' with my 
interviewee (Mishler, 1986). I would follow on from what was being said, using their 
22 Interviews were mostly recorded. People in Pipri were well exposed to the media through the Andolan 
and were quite familiar with tape recorders. However some people in Bhadal and in the non-movement 
villages found the tape recorder intimidating. In such cases I made notes instead of a recording. 
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own language to talk about things. This helped the process of moving from my outsider, 
etic concepts and assumptions to a native, emic understanding. For example during the 
first interview in the tribal village I realised that my interviewee did not seem to share 
the same understanding of desh (country) that I did, further she did not know about the 
existence of the country India, that legally she is a part of. This fascinated me and I 
spent longer talking to people about this. I also discussed it with Kishore, my translator, 
which convinced me that the issue wasn't just semantic but conceptual. This revelation 
rendered some of my pre-planned questions meaningless — for example whether people 
felt greater affiliation to national over international social movements. It also made me 
question what they understood by sarkar (government). To shed some light on these 
issues I ended up asking questions that would seem ridiculous to people socialised 
within the Westphalian system of nation-states, and perhaps bizarre to Adivasis — for 
example — is the government part of your country? While these interviews were helpful 
in developing my understanding, I also felt that my questions, constrained as they were 
by language, did not fully bridge the gap between our different cosmologies. Thus I 
became more interested in drawing out myths and stories they had about their 
environment. This shed light on their conception of space and geography through their 
own idioms, helping me get closer to an emic understanding. 
In both Pipri and Bhadal I was subject to what Robben (1995) calls 'rhetorical 
seduction'. People were constantly building the picture of their victimisation and the 
morality of their stand, making any attempt on my part to ask critical questions seem 
unsupportive and callous. In Pipri this made it difficult to broach the sensitive subject of 
labour exploitation by farmers. However, one day an interview with a farmer gave me a 
good foothold in to the subject. He happened to talk of Medha's attempts to cajole 
farmers into improving labour wages23. After the interview, when talking to other 
people I would say that I had heard of Medha's efforts to persuade farmers to give 
better labour wages and would ask them why this was so and what they felt about it. 
23 I also spoke to labourers in the village about their relationship with farmers, something that farmers, 
understandably, were not very keen on me doing. 
114 
Because I brought the subject up through Medha — a trusted and respected figure — my 
otherwise controversial questions were not perceived as a betrayal. 
Apart from interviews, observations were also noted. I did not do systematic 
observation, i.e. observation at a specific place during a specific time. Rather events, 
interactions, conversations were noted whenever they seemed of interest to the research 
questions. This might be when overhearing a conversation while in the bathroom, eating 
dinner or waking in the morning or in the dead of night. In this way I was constantly on 
call for the imperatives of research. Apart from keeping notes of observations I also 
kept a dairy in which I charted my daily routine and the emotional and intellectual 
journey of making the strange familiar. In Pipri however, which is part of the same 
Hindu culture that I have been socialised in, the opposite process was also required —
that of making the familiar strange. 
Apart from the planned strategy of observations and interviews, data were also gathered 
opportunistically. During the fieldtrip the NBA organised a rally in Delhi and 
celebrated women's day. While these events had not been in my schedule, I took time 
off from the villages to follow this. It provided the prospect of witnessing the movement 
in movement. These events also attracted foreign supporters of the movement and so I 
took this chance to ask them about their perceptions of the movement and the reasons 
for their support of it. This helped me further develop a picture of the international 
community's relationship with, and understanding of the movement. Another moment 
of international support occurred in London, before the second fieldtrip, when a group 
of young people organised an awareness-raising event for the Narmada struggle. I was 
also part of the group, but not its initiator. Being involved in the event was a way of 
giving back to the movement, but also of course an important source of data. Medha 
accepted an invitation to speak at the event and this provided a rare and precious 
opportunity to see her operating at the international level. I paid attention to any 
changes in framing of issues by Medha, descriptions of the situation in the valley and 
the kind of international support sought by her. When in India I took whatever 
opportunity I could to speak to concerned journalists, researchers and activists from 
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other organisations. This enhanced my understanding of the wider landscape of counter-
hegemonic resistance in India and NBA's relationship to it. 
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Protestors at the Ministry of Water Resources in Delhi 
Role as researcher 
While the positivist tradition makes the researcher invisible through standardisation of 
procedures and measurements, the qualitative school strives to make the researcher's 
social and ideological presence as visible as possible. Both approaches emerge from 
awareness that emergent knowledge is susceptible to the researcher's bias, and thus 
both see the researcher as a necessary evil. In my research however, I found that my 
very entrance as an outsider into the field provided a source of live data. My 
experiences of the cultural, political and social process of being assimilated in the 
communities I was studying immediately provided critical insights into the questions of 
identity and citizenship I was exploring. It was evident that the researcher's relationship 
with subjects is not merely a prism through which data gets inflected but is also an 
important source of data per se. Indeed my experiences as an 'outsider' revealed certain 
issues that may not have emerged merely through interviews or observations of village 
dynamics. Often I would incorporate these new insights into interview questions. 
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This awareness that my relationship with research participants was not only a channel 
for collecting data, but presented data in itself, made a process of reflexivity even more 
pertinent to my research approach. I thus needed to stay constantly and dynamically 
perceptive of the relationships I developed with research participants and the changing 
and often unforeseen terms on which they were based. I had entered Bhadal with the 
notion that I occupied a position of power, based not only on my status as a member of 
the dominant Hindu society, but further as a member of the Brahmin caste — i.e. the 
highest caste within that society. Soon, however I realised that the villagers did not 
position me on this axis. To them the more relevant role was of my being a bazaaria — a 
city dweller. This is where the seat of power lay, everything else was secondary. The 
experience of being assigned an unexpected identity was a direct gateway into their 
worldview. Another revelation was that I was not perceived as an Indian. Indeed the 
very concept of India did not exist (as already mentioned). Thus my comfort in the 
knowledge that there was at least one identity plane on which we could stand together 
was also taken away. I was flung further out — as much an outsider as a white foreigner. 
My only saving grace in this situation, according to Kishore was that at least I could 
understand the villagers' language — something that white people couldn't do. 
In Pipri a similar reassessment of my social role and relationship took place, as I was 
positioned and repositioned in contradictory and confusing ways by different people 
throughout my stay there. It was exasperating and exhausting to keep up with and 
understand these processes. Without doubt though, this was all a reflection of the 
political and social context I had entered. Thus while I anticipated my 'superior' status 
as a Brahmin to be the most significant point of social reference, in reality, I was 
assigned myriad roles as a possible government agent, an activist, or 'young girl alone'. 
Of course the implications of these roles for conducting my research also varied and 
conflicted with each other accordingly. Those who wondered whether I was a spy for 
the government were obviously nervous around me although they cooperated in talking 
and giving me an interview. In one interview I was told in a jocular manner, but with 
undoubtedly earnest intent, that I will be beaten up and thrown out of the village if I am 
found to be a government agent. Others would be more subtle and ask me whether I 
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knew why a certain group of official surveyors had come to the village that day. Those 
who respected my NBA connections and thus positioned me as an activist (despite 
explaining my research) were very keen to talk about the movement. 
While I had expected to be in a position of dominance in relation to the villagers, there 
were many times in Pipri when I felt like the vulnerable and powerless one. As a 'young 
girl alone' I was forced to lie that I was engaged. This gave me a more respectable 
social status. But I was also often mocked for wearing slippers in the village or speaking 
my pure Hindi. I was seen as the weakling who couldn't eat as much or stand in the heat 
as long as them. As a young girl I was viewed with disdain for not wearing jewellery24. 
This was in contrast to other representations of me being an activist who had sacrificed 
worldly pleasures — like wearing jewellery, to work for the good of the people. In this 
sense I was viewed with pity and respect. 
Phase 3 — International NGOs 
I focused on the international aspect of the Narmada campaign after returning from 
India. Through interviews in India as well as examination of literature on the Narmada 
movement I had identified a few international activists that had played an influential 
role in the international campaign. While the contribution of American activists seemed 
to dominate in accounts of the campaign, they were by no means the only players. 
International NGOs from Japan, UK and across Europe were also heavily involved. 
However due to constraints of time and money I decided to do in-depth interviews with 
the American activists, who had been named most frequently in interviews with Indian 
activists. These were Lori Udall from the Environmental Defense Fund and Patrick 
McCully from International Rivers Network. Interviews with these individuals were 
conducted during a day trip to Berkeley, USA in June 2006. I examined the rest of the 
international campaign through documents produced by participant INGOs of the 
campaign. Temporally, the collection of these documents spanned all three phases of 
24 As a mark of respect to the elders who asked me to wear jewellery I did eventually conform. This also 
increased their trust in me. 
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the fieldwork, and were therefore retrieved from NBA offices, an extensive personal 
collection of another researcher in India, as well as from the International Rivers 
Network office in Berkeley, California. The documents gathered related to NGOs 
spanning across the world as well as through time from the initial stirrings of the 
campaign in 1983 to the current day. The collection included newspaper clippings, 
official and informal letters, NGO and World Bank memorandums and faxes between 
domestic and international activists. This data added to the analysis of the evolution of 
the local movement and its relationship with international NGOs. 
Summary of Research Process 
Phase I 
(Mar 05 — April 05) 
Phase II 
(Oct 05 — April 06) 
Phase III 
(June 2006) 
• Creating contacts with 
gatekeepers 
• Interviewing top level 
leaders, village leaders 
• Observing movement 
events and offices 
• Collecting documents from 
NBA offices 
• Ethnographic study of 
Adivasi village (Bhadal) 
and Nimari village (Pipri) 
• Visiting other surrounding 
villages 
• Observing movement 
events 
• Interviewing international 
activists 
• Collecting documents from 
International Rivers 
Network office, Berkeley 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I have already talked of my research commitment to a critical perspective that 
challenges the hegemony. However during the fieldtrip, the wider goal of social 
transformation often seemed irrelevant in the face of the immediate despair and poverty 
of people. I felt guilty for my academic arrogance in giving them the responsibility of 
shouldering change when they were already reeling under their immediate conditions. 
Indeed on occasions I was told as much by activists. During these times of self-doubt 
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however, I would reflect on the question Freire (1993) poses — "Who suffer the effects 
of oppression more than the oppressed?" (p22) and thus for whom is social 
transformation more important than for the oppressed? (Other academics such as Pearce 
(1986) have also considered this dilemma). 
At times, I have also been faced with a conflict between responsibility towards the 
people who let me enter their world against the responsibility towards the political 
project of liberation. Maintaining the wider relevance of my research to the oppressed 
has often required me to be critical of the people who extended their trust to me. All I 
have been able to offer them is an analysis that contextualises the shortcomings of the 
movement within the constraints and demands that it operates under. I have constantly 
wrestled with these ethical issues during the research. But I must confess that while I 
have tried to conquer the emotional turmoil they have created through intellectual 
judgements and rationales, I cannot say that I have always succeeded. 
Because of the asymmetry of the power dynamics constituting not only my relationship 
with research participants, but also that of my gatekeepers with villagers, the process of 
gaining informed consent was a distorted process at best. Though I explained my 
research to people and did not proceed with interviews unless they consented, villagers 
often felt obliged to concede to activists' requests to participate in my study and to help 
me as their 'guest'. Usually villagers seemed willing to participate. However, there 
were some people who appeared particularly uncomfortable during the interview 
process. On these occasions I terminated the interview and either settled for a casual 
chat or left the house depending on the extent of unease that I experienced between us. 
In this way, those who were very weary of me were able to raise their protest by being 
cagey and reticent during the interview. I drew on these as indirect cues to gauge the 
extent to which I had truly gained consent or was imposing myself. 
Associated with the ethical dilemmas of informed consent was the problem of how to 
ethically treat information arising from eavesdropping. Though I had gained consent 
from the community to live and do research with them, I still needed to consider 
121 
whether this gave me the prerogative to listen in on and record their private 
conversations when they were unaware, but also even when they were aware that I was 
within earshot of these conversations. I had been allowed to do research in their 
community, but did this mean that I could legitimately claim to have consent for using 
all aspects of their daily lives as sources of data? By giving me unfettered access to 
their community they had compromised a large element of control over what they could 
consciously consent to within the research. Precisely for this reason it was even more 
necessary to exercise my own reflexivity and conscientiousness regarding what could 
be considered public from their point of view, and thus readily available to me, and 
what was private and therefore beyond the purview of the initial consent I had gained 
for research. In that research participants could not fully protect their private lives from 
me, the interpretation of consent for research as unfettered and absolute would have 
been an abuse of this consent. Judging what 'private' constituted was in itself an 
ambiguous process. In this I was guided by considerations of the extent to which a 
person might be embarrassed, angry or nervous if I told them that I had overheard their 
conversation with someone. 
Based on these ethical issues surrounding eavesdropping, I resolved not to directly use 
any data arising from private conversations between research participants. I did record 
my observations of these interactions but did not directly quote them in data analysis. 
Indirectly however, they influenced the data collection and data analysis process. 
During data collection I would try to ask questions from people based on something I 
might have overheard, without compromising sources or bringing up the exact topic I 
had overheard. If the same topic emerged through my conversations with people this 
would be included as a legitimate source of data. 
Early on in the fieldtrip I realised that assurances of confidentiality and anonymity were 
in fact counter-productive in allaying doubts and gaining people's participation. In a 
cultural context where community is primary and the individual secondary, assurances 
of confidentiality — a mechanism for protecting the individual against the group was 
viewed with great suspicion. Thus when I tried to ease one villager's weariness by 
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reassuring him that his anonymity will be guarded, he responded by becoming even 
more suspicious, and visibly uncomfortable. The interview had to be stopped 
immediately and I had to leave. While most standard text books for research methods 
advise that confidentiality of participants be respected, not just for ethical reasons but 
also to facilitate disclosure, my experiences point to the culturally specific character of 
such values and thus the need for researchers to maintain a constant responsiveness to 
research participants as the best means of maintaining ethical boundaries and also for 
facilitating research. 
Although I refrained from discussing issues of confidentiality with research 
participants, I consider the protection of their identities to be especially important given 
the highly polarised context of social contestation that they are situated in. To prevent 
the possibility of targeted attack on individual participants I therefore use pseudonyms 
while reporting research findings. 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
After completing data collection I entered into a concentrated phase of rigorous data 
analysis. Analysis followed a number of steps that I moved between in a back and forth 
rather than strictly sequential manner. These steps are elaborated on below. 
Step 1: Transcribing interviews (in total 40 interviews) and reliving the period of data 
collection in order to reorient myself to the cultural climate within which I had 
conducted the interviews. Reading notes on observations and documents of the 
movement. 
Step 2: Re-reading the data sets and making cursory observations and comments on the 
data. 
Step 3: Engaging in more focused reading of the data and identifying patterns, 
contradictions and inconsistencies in these patterns. Creating preliminary themes across 
the data and tagging raw data with the appropriate themes (e.g. anger towards the 
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government, development as elite driven, feelings of empowerment or disempowerment 
within the movement). 
Step 4: Making connections between themes in order to develop a more holistic 
understanding of the individual themes (see appendix — section A for illustration). 
Triangulating between interviews, observations and movement documents to facilitate 
interpretation and development of themes. 
Step 5: Connecting themes with theory and literature and further refining themes on the 
basis of this. 
Step 6: Selecting data to be included in the write up. Engaging in more organisation and 
interpretation of data and incorporating this within the narrative of the thesis. Re-
analysing data in the light of ideas arising from the process of writing-up. 
The process of data analysis was guided by my research questions and my commitment 
to the values of social justice and transformation of oppression. Thus rather than 
providing a de-contextualised relativist analysis, I situate the narratives of the research 
participants within the historical, political and social contexts that empower/constrain 
them and which they negotiate with. 
Movement discourse is entwined in the narratives of people. Apart from representing 
their politicisation, at times this also reflected their desire to project a good image of 
themselves as defined by the movement. This led them to say certain things that 
conflicted with my observations25. I do not treat these simply as lies divested of 
meaning. Instead they indicate to me a negotiation and dialogue between their 
movement persona and historical-cultural identity. But also in that there is an exchange 
and interaction between these two levels of identity, expressions of oneness with 
historically separate groups is also suggestive of genuine aspirations. Of course 
aspirations however do not share a direct relationship with action and outcomes — the 
relationship is mediated by many other factors. Nevertheless the aspiration in itself is 
25 As mentioned earlier, this was part of their 'seduction' of me. 
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significant within a social context where caste divisions are legitimised by religious 
ideology that manufactures a powerful form of Gramscian consent (Gramsci, 1971). 
Though I have argued in chapter 3 that the consciousness of the movement can be 
deduced from the things that movements say as well as what they do, this assertion 
required a more nuanced treatment during analysis. While the things that NBA did 
sometimes appeared constant the ideas or ideology behind them could differ over time. 
These changes were deduced from a process of triangulating and comparing texts and 
actions at a particular time and over time (see appendix — section B for illustration). 
A NOTE ON REFERENCING DATA SOURCES 
In order to facilitate reading of data analysis from the different sources of data drawn 
upon in this bricolaged research, a referencing style has been developed that indicates 
the type of data being sourced. Within the text, different types of data excerpts are 
referenced in brackets in the following ways: 
Interviews — the name of the interviewee is followed by the day, month and year in 
which the interview was given, e.g. (Vani, 3/2/05). 
Observations in the research field — are referenced as 'fieldnotes', followed by the day, 
month and year in which the entry was noted in the field diary, e.g. (fieldnotes, 3/2/05). 
Unpublished documents written by NBA and INGOs (e.g. letters, newsletters, memos, 
pamphlets etc) — unpublished documents are differentiated from published work with an 
asterix at the end of the reference When these documents are written by a prominent 
member of the organisation the name of the person is provided with the year of the 
document's creation, e.g. (Patekar, 1995*). In cases where no specific author is 
indicated, the name of the organisation is provided. If the document is undated, year of 
creation has been estimated from the content and indicated with a 'c', e.g. (NBA, 
c1995*). References of unpublished documents when first cited in the text are 
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accompanied by a footnote that provides additional details of the type and title of the 
document. 
Published interviews and articles of and by activists — are referenced in the same way 
that other published materials are, i.e. by citing the author and year of publication, e.g. 
(Patekar, 1995). 
Full bibliographic references of published data sources are included in the main 
bibliography of the thesis. Unpublished materials from NBA and INGOs however are 
listed in a separate bibliographic list titled 'Archival material' that follows the 
`Bibliography'. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to elucidate how a critical ethnographic framework was applied 
to researching the developing world context within which this thesis is situated. I have 
argued that all research is political in that it either perpetuates or challenges the status 
quo. By emphasising the 'critical' nature of the empirical study I have declared my 
politicised commitment to contributing towards a body of knowledge that seeks to 
strengthen resistance to oppression. This does not mean manipulating data, but being 
sensitive and drawing attention to aspects of social reality that are oppressive as well as 
processes of resistance to this. By facilitating transparency regarding how my political 
orientation has guided data collection and analysis I have brought the situated and 
subjective nature of all research to the fore. This should enable readers to exercise their 
own reflexivity while engaging with this particular study. Despite this 'critical' 
commitment however, and precisely because all social contexts and relations are 
political, the research process itself was predicated on certain power relations, and I as a 
knowledgeable and well-off researcher reproduced these as I researched my less 
powerful research participants. However, though these power asymmetries cannot be 
completely eliminated I adopted various techniques for reducing these. Further 
reflection on such issues emerged in the form of ethical dilemmas between protection of 
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the interests of the research against the privacy and welfare of research participants. The 
chapter further elucidated how practical difficulties arising from doing research in 
remote, developing world contexts impinged on the research process. 
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Chapter 5 
Contextualising NBA's Politics: 'Destructive Development' 
versus 'Environmentalism of the Poor' 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter situates the rise of the Save the Narmada Movement and its opposition to 
the Sardar Sarovar dam within the socio-political and economic landscape of India. 
Independent India's industrialisation is driven by a development hegemony that 
necessitates increasing linkages between national and global capitalism. India's big-dam 
industry has been a significant element within this, and attracts large amounts of foreign 
aid from agencies such as the WB. Though India's leaders claim that development will 
provide benefits to all, the growth of new social movements in India, however, suggests 
that many have been dispossessed or left out of this process. NBA can be located within 
this tension. 
In this chapter I explore the manner in which the development hegemony necessitates 
links between national and global capitalism. I provide a brief overview of the big-dam 
industry and WB's role within this. I also investigate the impact of dams and 
development on the people of India. Identifying the environmentalism of the poor as 
one of the new social movements contesting and attempting to redefine development, I 
situate the NBA within this and provide a detailed analysis of the critique and 
alternatives that it provides. 
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DEVELOPMENT HEGEMONY AND THE STATE26 IN INDIA 
Independent India and the Discourse of Development 
As India drew closer towards independence, after over 200 years of British rule, a 
contest for power amongst the leaders of the independence struggle emerged. It would 
have significant consequences for the political and economic future of India. 'Mahatma' 
Gandhi had envisioned a post-independence India built on self-sufficient village 
republics that would employ simple technology, ensuring employment for everyone. 
Gandhi aspired not only to secure economic independence through this model but to 
protect the cultural traditions of India, which he believed could be found in their most 
pristine form in the village community (Baviskar, 2004). However as the Indian 
National Congress — the political organisation which had led liberation efforts came 
increasingly under the influence of capitalists, Gandhi and his vision of village 
republics were sidelined (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). Jawaharlal Nehru openly scoffed at 
Gandhi's ideas: "It is many years since I read Hind Swaraj and I have only a vague 
picture in my mind. But even when I read it twenty or more years ago it seemed to me 
completely unreal...A village, normally speaking, is backward intellectually and 
culturally and no progress can be made from a backward environment" (quoted in 
Baviskar, 2004, p21). Meanwhile, B.R Ambedkar, a radical communist, and adamant 
opponent of the Congress, which according to him, was "a party of the Brahmans and 
26 India is a secular, federal parliamentary republic with a multi-party representative democracy. 
Governance of India rests with two main organs of the Indian state — the executive, headed by the elected 
head of the government — the Prime Minister; and the legislature, comprised of two chambers of 
parliament - one consisting of democratically elected, and the other of nominated members. The judiciary 
is independent of the executive and legislature. The President is the formal head of the state, though his 
duties are largely ceremonial. The structure, functions and responsibilities of the Indian state are 
enshrined in the constitution of India which came into force on 26th November 1950. The federal union of 
India consists of 25 states and 7 union territories. While each state has its own executive, legislature and 
judiciary, the union territories are administered by the President through an administrator appointed by 
him. The constitution demarcates the responsibilities of the central and state governments. Parliament (at 
the central level) has the power to make laws for any part of India's territory. It has exclusive power to 
legislate on may matter included within the 'Union List' which includes defense, foreign affairs, 
currency, income tax, railways etc. State legislatures have exclusive rights over items included within the 
`State List' such as police, public health, agriculture, sales tax etc. Matters that the central and state 
legislatures can both legislate over are included within the 'Concurrent List', and include electricity, 
newspapers, criminal law, price controls etc. 
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the bourgeoisie" (quoted in Omvedt, 1993, p21), was leading an organised revolt of the 
lower caste Dalit peasantry. In a country where class and caste stratifications converge, 
the Dalits formed the class of wage labourers and bonded labourers most oppressed by 
the landowning Brahmans (ibid). For Ambedkar then the fight was to uncover the 
exploitative relations of feudalism inherent in the village communities that Gandhi held 
as sacrosanct as well as the processes of capitalism that drew on these "traditional social 
structures" that were "used, transformed and accentuated in the process" (ibid, p20). 
In the end though, despite the communist revolts, it was the Congress that held sway. 
And Nehru, inspired by the Enlightenment ideals of progress upon which the British 
Empire was built, finally took the helm when India gained independence in 1947. 
Driven by this "colonialist teleology of modernity" (Gandhi, 2003, p482) he firmly 
placed India on the path of rapid industrialisation. However, Nehru was not insensitive 
to the gross socio-economic inequalities that characterised Indian society. He thus 
embarked on a model of 'state-managed capitalism' where the paternalistic state would 
steer "industrialisation, economic production for a world market, and capital savings" to 
ensure prosperity to its starkly differentiated population (Kamat, 2002, p8). The process 
was named 'development'. This discourse of development however presented economic 
growth as a natural, apolitical process and concealed the global and national relations of 
capitalist power that it was predicated on (Ferguson, 1999). These relations nevertheless 
became more apparent as India's pursuit for development led it to the World Bank soon 
after gaining independence. 
Development, the WB and Globalisation 
The industrialisation model of development chosen by India needed substantial capital 
investment which could not be met by the newly independent country. It thus turned to 
international financial institutions, primarily the World Bank and later also the IMF. 
Between 1951-1956, (so called India's first five year plan of economic development) 
the WB lent $120.14 million and by 1961 had invested in 61 irrigation projects, 
amongst other development schemes essential for industrialisation such as transport, 
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power generation, railways, ports, and steel plants (Dash, 2000). Modernisation yielded 
dividends — urban centres as well as parts of rural India now enjoy modern 
infrastructure such as electricity, piped water, public education, health care and 
transport (Baviskar, 2004). The WB also provided fmancial and technical resources for 
the mechanisation of agricultural production in the 1960s. The process known as the 
Green revolution greatly boosted crop yields and facilitated India's attainment of self-
sufficiency in food by the early 1990s. WB lending to India has now dramatically 
increased and between 2004-2008 stands at 10246.69 million (lending in volume) (WB, 
2008) — a rise of more than 85 times from the 1st five year plan. For many, the strong 
and continuous lending history is testimony to the fact that "Both the Bank and the 
country have been wedded to development goals of growth, stability and social justice" 
(Dash, 2000, p311). 
This benevolent picture of mutuality and partnership, however, is contested by many. 
While requests for foreign aid were initially buttressed by assertions that they were a 
means to achieving economic 'self-sufficiency', it is argued that foreign aid has 
"dragged India into the foreign debt trap" (Mehta, 1993, p'7). Not only did this 
necessitate further borrowing but, it also allowed the WB and its sister organisation, the 
IMF, to dictate measures for economic restructuring of the state's interventionist role. 
Signs of this could be seen as early as the 1950s when the World Bank provided funds 
for the privately owned Indian Iron and Steel Company and Tata Iron and Steel 
Company but declined support to the state-owned sector. To further encourage the 
private sector the WB suggested and financed the formation of the Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation of India in 1955 to provide financial resources especially 
foreign exchange to private enterprises. This institution was particularly significant 
because it allowed the WB for the first time to circumvent the state and deal directly 
with private companies (Bhambhri, 1980). 
These 'modernisation' efforts were further consolidated in 1991 when, following an 
"acute balance of payment crisis" (Mehta, 1993, p197), India applied for a loan from 
IMF. The conditionalities attached to this loan were referred to as the 'structural 
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adjustment package' and came to be embodied in India's New Economic Policy, the 
three guiding principles of which were liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation 
(LPG). Combined, these economic principles embodied the neo-liberal ideology that 
equated development with free, competitive and efficient trade, nationally and 
internationally. 
Since the implementation of these policies, the economy of India has undergone 
significant changes that indicate its increasing globalisation and liberalisation. The ratio 
of international trade to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 
15.6% in 1990-91 to 20.8% in 1991-2000. Foreign investment has increased from $103 
million in 1990-91 to $5181 million in 1999-2000. The ratio of foreign investment in 
India to exports increased from a small 0.6% in 1990-91 to 13.4% in 1999-2000. This 
suggests that foreign investment in India is generating a greater amount of exports than 
it previously was. Simple mean tariff has reduced from 79.1% to 32.2% during 1990-91 
to 1999-2000 indicating greater import friendliness and commitment to 'free trade'. The 
number of foreign collaborations with Indian businesses has also increased from 289 in 
1991-92 to 1665 in 1997-98 (Bawa, 2003). 
The social and economic impacts of LPG policies have been mixed. Amongst the most 
lauded positive effects has been the rise of GDP growth from 5.6% in the 1980s to an 
average of 6.8% between 1994-1995 to 1997-1998, reaching 8.4% in 2006-2007 (WB, 
2007). This positions India as one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Assaf, 
2004). Foodgrain production reached its highest ever levels in 1999-2000, with 209 
million tonnes produced (Bawa, 2003). 
However many social concerns have been raised in relation to these economic 
developments. While GDP has risen, this has not been met with a rise in employment, 
spurring critics to refer to this as 'jobless growth' (Daft, 2003). Withdrawal of the 
public sector and pursuit of technological efficiency in the private sector is resulting in 
the loss of jobs. Thus growth rate of employment fell from 2% between 1983 and 1993-
1994 to less than 1% during 1993-1994 to 1999-2000. The rise in GDP is largely due to 
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significant growth of the service sector in India which employs an educated, skilled 
workforce. As of 2007 this sector accounts for a little over 50% of India's GDP 
compared to 39% in 1986, while agriculture and industry account for 18% and 29% 
respectively (CIA, 2008). However while this sector employs educated and skilled 
workers it cannot provide employment opportunities for the majority of the workforce 
which is unskilled27. These concerns are reflected in India's low rank on the human 
development index which stands at 128 out of 177 nations according to the 2008 
Human Development Report — a ranking which has not changed significantly since 
1991 when India ranked 123/160 (United Nations Development Programme, 2008). 
Further, following a market logic, an orientation towards profitable export of foodgrains 
has been promoted, meaning that grains are not reaching starving populations even 
though production has increased. Thus per capita food grain consumption reduced to 
418 grams a day in 2001 from 476 grams in 1990 (Ghosh, 2005). 
Critical perspectives thus suggest that development is "creating new demands, largely 
elitist in nature" (Mehta, 1993, p222) that while guided and funded by WB/IMF has 
contributed towards serving "neo-colonial" ambitions (Shiva, 1998; Sharma, 1995). 
Relying on foreign aid for development, the Indian state on the other hand has "virtually 
no influence over the decision-making process of the twin agencies" and is thus 
"coerced" into accepting their conditionalites (Dasgupta, 2005, p34). Yet, as Escobar 
(1992) suggests the discourse of development also provides cultural legitimisation for 
this coercion by "plac(ing) the Third World in a position of inferiority" (p66) in relation 
to 'scientific' technologies of the West. While the discourse of development is thus 
normalised, it acts as a cultural and economic imperative for India's inclusion in the 
global capitalist market (Parajuli, 1991; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992). 
While this narrative emphasises the power of global capitalism and India's helplessness 
and dependency on it, it obscures the fact that capitalist interests within India are also 
served by liberalisation and globalisation and that the discourse of development that 
27 As of 2003 60% of the labour force is employed in agriculture which is considered an unskilled 
occupation (CIA, 2008). 
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legitimises this is thus actively promoted too (Bhambhri, 1980; Randeria, 2003). 
Development is not simply a form of Western cultural imperialism but a discourse that 
unites hegemonic forces across nation-states. 'Big Businesses' have thus grown 
enormously with the support of foreign aid from the WB, and when the NEP was 
introduced political support for this was strongest in these quarters (Ghosh, 2005). Even 
the Bharatiya Janta Party-led coalitional government (1998-2004) that promoted right-
wing nationalism, keenly pursued LPG policies that favoured big businesses and global 
capitalism (ibid). At the same time, while the Green Revolution mentioned earlier has 
reaped enormous dividends for international fertiliser companies and large-holding 
`rich' farmers who already had the fmancial and cultural resources to take advantage of 
agricultural technologies, it has resulted in the proletarianisation of a vast number of 
small-holding farmers whose lands have become non-viable (Shiva, 1991). Generally 
the widening gap between the upper and lower crust of Indian society, following 
globalisation, is also suggestive of the mutuality between national and global 
capitalism. One of the many ways in which the development ideology has facilitated 
links with global capitalism is through the big-dam industry, to which I now turn. 
Dams and Development 
Large multi-purpose dam construction, requiring intensive capital investment, is a 
significant aspect of India's capitalist model of development. Nehru famously projected 
dams as 'the modern temples of India' that promise to deliver drinking water, irrigation, 
flood control and electricity to propel industrialisation (Khagram, 2002). Dams also 
attract significant funding from foreign sources, prominently the WB. They are thus one 
of the many conduits through which links between national and global capitalism have 
been established. By the 1990s between eleven and twelve hundred dams were already 
constructed, with more than 550 awaiting completion. In 1993 alone the World Bank 
lent India $8.38 billion for the construction of 104 big dams (ibid). 
Though dams are projected as the panacea for a wide range of ills, in reality their 
impact has been skewed. While feeding water intensive factories and providing 
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irrigation, they are displacing some of the most vulnerable sections of Indian society, 
primarily tribals and poor peasants, without adequate prospects for rehabilitation. It is 
estimated that between the period 1950-1990, out of 164 lakh people that have been 
displaced by dams in total, 38% (63.21 lakhs) are tribals, of which only 25% have been 
adequately compensated or rehabilitated (Sangvai, 2002). The distribution of benefits 
from dams is also very skewed. Reporting on the Hirakud dam, the National Centre for 
Human Settlements and Environment finds that small landholders representing 66% of 
the land within the command area are only receiving 24% of the dams irrigation output 
(ibid). Further, mounting concerns are being expressed internationally as well as within 
India for the environmental consequences of large-scale projects that cause 
deforestation, erosion of topsoil, water salination and destruction of wildlife (McCully, 
1996). 
Not only this, but doubts regarding the very ability of dams to provide substantial 
benefits have also been raised (McCully, 1996). By 1986, even the Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi (Nehru's grandson) was expressing resignation regarding their usefulness: "We 
can safely say that no benefit has come to the people... We have poured money out, the 
people have nothing back: no irrigation, no increase in production, no help in their daily 
life" (quoted in Khagram, 2004, p60). Some suggest that whatever benefits do accrue 
from large-scale dams can also be gained from smaller-scale projects that require lower 
capital investment and cause less displacement and environmental damage. Thus 
Baviskar (2004) notes that during 1951-85, while large and medium size irrigation 
projects commanded 64% of the total revenue for irrigation they "irrigated only 30.5 
million hectares of land, while minor projects have irrigated 37.4 million hectares!" 
(p27). Despite the ambiguous benefits of large dams the government and international 
funding agencies however continue to favour capital-intensive projects. 
The role that dams play in capitalist development is perhaps an important reason for 
their perpetuation. Apart from fulfilling the water needs of industrialisation and 
mechanisation of agriculture they also facilitate a process of 'primitive accumulation' of 
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resources for capitalist development. This involves the 'enclosure of commons'28 
whereby land, forests and water resources that are communally owned by local people 
are appropriated by the state and reconstituted into private commodities (Shiva, 2005; 
Cavanagh and Mander, 2002). Further those displaced by these projects are transformed 
from landowners into cheap labour to be exploited in urban factories and commercial 
farms (Prasad, 2004). 
Thus far I have suggested that big-dams are an element of the wider hegemonic project 
of capitalist development. In the next section I look more closely at resistance amongst 
those who have been adversely impacted by such development. 
RESISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT - NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN INDIA 
Here I conceptualise processes of resistance against the development hegemony as the 
new social movements of India and explore the political space that was created within 
Indian politics for their emergence. Following this I take a closer look at the 
environmental movement in India, within which NBA is often placed. 
Conceptualising New Social Movements in India 
By the 1980s, academics noted the emergence of political formations in India that did 
not fit the traditional mould of proletarian politics that articulated their needs through 
institutionalised parties. Early theorising on these political phenomena was lead by a 
NGO called Lokayan; the most prominent sociologist within this group — Rajni Kothari 
conceptualised these as 'non-party political processes' (Kothari, 1984). The term 
encompassed a broad range of political activity such as local voluntary organisations 
known as 'social action groups' that were often funded by national and international 
agencies; new women's organisations and non-party mass organisations. Even though 
28 This was identified by E.P. Thompson (1980) as a key process in the formation of 'private property' 
necessary for the establishment of the foundations of capitalism in England in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century. 
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the concept of non-party political processes attempted to capture the rise in politicised 
civil society initiatives that moved beyond development work, it did not fully depart 
from reformist "NGO-generated ideologizations of social movements" 29 (Omvedt, 
1993, pxv). Grassroots mass mobilisations were thus not included within non-party 
political processes. However, by the 1990s, intellectual interest began shifting to these 
grassroots mobilisations, that many argued possessed greater transformatory potential. 
These movements were identified as the new social movements of India consisting of 
women, tribals, backward castes and peasants (Amin, 1993; Wignaraja, 1993; Shah, 
2004). 
The struggles of these actors do not conform to the 'traditional' Marxist 
conceptualisation of exploitation that is epitomised by the oppression of urban and rural 
proletariat in India, and defined in terms of the extraction of surplus value of their 
labour in the process of commodity generation by the owners of the means of 
production (Omvedt, 1993). Instead, the new movements are of those who have been 
dispossessed or left out of development and are therefore not directly located within 
`traditional' labour-capital relations of production (Monteiro and Lingam, 1998). 
Nevertheless the marginalisation of these 'new' actors in the development process still 
raises material concerns, unlike NSMs in the West that are moving towards cultural 
contestation. In India, NSMs therefore still express some resonance with Marxist 
analysis of politics and society, albeit in relation to political conflicts that have 
previously drawn less attention from Indian Marxists. For instance in the case of the 
`new' environmental movements in India, Baviskar (2004) notes that "The struggle over 
nature...has an inherent class dimension because nature also provides resources which 
are the bases of production" (p40). While NSMs continue to articulate a Marxist 
concern with class relations, Omvedt argues that their newness lies in exploring the 
multiple other, 'non-traditional' arenas of capitalist exploitation as well as resistance. 
Thus feminist movements are exploring the manner in which capitalism is strengthened 
29 Kamat (2002) locates civil society organisations within the present context of neoliberal withdrawal of 
the state's welfare role — she writes — "international capitalism, global development institutions and the 
Indian state have `hijacked' NGOs for the purposes of creating a world market and managing protests of 
disadvantaged groups" (p24). 
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by the exploitation of women whose domestic labour in the home is not paid for, and 
does not involve commodity production, but enables commodity labourers to work, and 
allows capitalists to pay lower wages to them. Omvedt (2003) therefore asserts that 
contemporary movements in India "redefine exploitation" and "rethink Marxism"; they 
ask the question "who is really 'proletarian' in the sense of being the most oppressed, 
and being at the advance point of efforts to change the system of exploitation" (p306). 
In asking such questions NSMs indicate the various other processes beyond the 
proletarian takeover of the means of production through which capitalism can and must 
be challenged. In short, NSMs 'reinvent revolution' (ibid). 
The newness of these movements can also be understood in terms of the manner in 
which they are beginning to more directly question the symbolic processes implicated in 
exploitation (Baviskar, 1995). Their grievances are articulated through a critique of the 
discursive as well as material forms of oppression inherent in the development 
paradigm (Monteiro and Lingam, 1998). Thus, they uncover the manner in which 
development not only subjugates local knowledge and ways of living but also how this 
is linked to material oppression. For instance lower caste movements have begun to 
tackle the cultural dimensions of caste ideology that legitimise their economic 
subordination within the development hegemony, while also asserting their unique 
cultural identities (Omvedt, 2001). 
The emerging concern amongst new social movements to tackle the cultural 
legitimisations of their exploitation is consistent with a Gramscian analysis of 
hegemony. Gramscian influences on scholarship in India are therefore increasing but 
are being applied to contexts removed from that of the new social movements. Most 
notable amongst these developments is the formation of the Subaltern Studies group 
that is committed to a historical analysis of the struggles and political consciousness of 
`subaltern' rural 'peasants' (encompassing tribals and other agrarian groups) in colonial 
India (Guha, 1982; 1987). While tending to leave unacknowledged the class divisions in 
the 'peasantry', historians within this tradition emphasise the relative 'autonomy' of 
peasant consciousness from the 'elite' hegemony of both the Indian bourgeoisie and 
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colonial rulers (Arnold, 2000). They therefore provide a representation of the Indian 
peasantry as possessing unique cultural identities, distinct from the nationalist 
constructions of identity formulated by the Indian elite during the independence 
struggle, and also emphasise their resistance to attempts by the colonial order to 
appropriate their lands. The `Gramscian' analysis of peasant resistance by subaltern 
scholars, however, puts greater emphasis on cultural analysis while neglecting the 
political dialectic of collective struggle that is essential to Gramsci's philosophy of 
transformation (Brass, 1991). They therefore interpret peasant insurgency in terms of 
Scott's 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' in the sphere of everyday life (see p67-
68) rather than collective mobilisation (Guha, 1989; 2000). Further, the depiction of 
peasant consciousness as autonomous is contested. Indeed one of the most eminent 
subaltern scholars, Guha, acknowledges the manner in which peasant identity in 
colonial India was based on an internalisation of their hegemonic representations. Thus 
"His [peasant] identity amounted to the sum of his subalternity, in other words, he learnt 
to recognise himself not by the properties and attributes of his own being but by the 
diminution, if not negation, of those of his superiors." (Guha, 1983, p18). 
Surprisingly the grafting of Gramscian frameworks of analysis onto contemporary 
struggles in rural India are generally missing despite the growing articulation amongst 
new social movements of the intersections between material and cultural dimensions of 
oppression and resistance in post-colonial India. The few attempts at Gramscian 
analysis that have been made either suggest the contradictory nature of peasant 
consciousness as displaying elements of consent and resistance (Patnaik, 1987), or as 
being increasingly absorbed within, and actively consenting to the development 
hegemony (Chatterjee, n.d). These studies aside, scholarship within a Marxist 
framework overwhelmingly focuses on structural analysis of class relations amongst the 
peasantry and their location within capitalist production (Desai, 1986; Breman, 1985; 
Athreya et al, 1987; Patnaik, 1988). This leaves virtually unexplored the Gramscian 
interest in the dialectic between structure and consciousness through which a group 
transforms from a structurally determined 'class-in-itself to an agential and conscious 
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`class-for-itself 30. Having discussed current conceptualisations of NSMs in India and 
their continuing articulation of class issues, below I briefly explore the origins of NSMs 
and their role within Indian politics. 
The Political Space for NSMs in India 
The roots of these post-independence mass mobilisations can be traced to the alternative 
political visions (described earlier) that Gandhi and B.R. Ambedkar had provided 
people during the independence struggle, despite being sidelined during the formation 
of the Indian nation (Omvedt,1993). While the failure of development provided the 
galvanising force for these movements, their resistance discourses are interlaced with 
the ideologies of these two leaders. Apart from the failure of development however, the 
inability of traditional party politics to fully address their grievances has further 
strengthened these alternative processes. 
Following independence, the ruling Congress Party was confronted by a communist 
uprising known as the Naxalite revolt (Banerjee, 1980). The movement, failed to 
achieve a communist revolution largely because of brutal state repression but also 
because of internal divisions that weakened its political influence. Although quelled, the 
revolt was an indication of unresolved contradictions emerging in the development 
trajectory. Between 1972-1975 discontent against the Congress Party began to rise 
again, and increasingly took the shape of traditional class politics mobilising 
agricultural labourers, peasants, workers, and even the frustrated middle class. 
New social movements also arrived on the scene although they maintained a back seat 
at this stage. Amidst this upheaval, a Gandhian Socialist, Jayaprakash Narayan, took the 
helm, calling upon the existing students' movement to mobilise a revolt of the low 
castes and rural poor against the hegemony of the upper-caste elite bureaucrats and 
3° Though Omvedt examines the class ideologies of NSMs in India, she does not explicitly refer to 
Gramsci in her work. She also does not demonstrate the processes through which these ideologies 
emerged. 
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landlords. Sensing a 'crisis of legitimacy' at this point the Prime Minister, Indira 
Gandhi seized control by declaring a state of Emergency in 1975 — turning India into a 
virtual dictatorship. The severe restrictions and abuse of civil and human rights which 
occurred during this phase crippled the uprising. However, the Emergency was unable 
to quell the deeply embedded dissatisfaction of the people, and when general elections 
were held in 1977, after the Emergency lifted, the Congress were defeated in a landslide 
victory by the Janta Party (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). 
The Janta Party came to power with the promise of a people-centred, progressive 
agenda. The government encouraged the establishment of NGOs and various other 
voluntary organisations, which grew rapidly under the patronage of the state. It was in 
this context that theorising on non-party political processes emerged under the Lokayan 
group. However it soon became clear that the Janta Party represented "just another 
episode in the ongoing crisis of the ruling elite" (Omvedt, 1993, p176)), and that non-
party processes had been co-opted by its predominantly neoliberal agenda. The failure 
of the Janta Party to deliver to the rural impoverished, led to the re-election of the 
Congress Party in 1980. By this time many on the left had become disenchanted with 
party politics and this served to reinvigorate the new social movements. 
During the mid-1980s the Naxalite revolt that had been crushed earlier, resurfaced in 
the form of Naxalite inspired organisations and movements which supported the work 
of new social movements viewing them as allies in their cause (Omvedt, 1993). These 
organisations coalesced under a 'mass political organisation' known as the Indian 
People's Front in 1983. Functioning as the mass front of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist-Leninist) (CPI(ML)), it sought to pose an alternative to the development led 
agenda of the Congress. However though initially the Front showed a strong propensity 
for positioning new social movements at the vanguard of alternative politics, towards 
the end of the 1980s it increasingly came under the influence of the traditional Marxist 
ideology of the CPI(ML) which looked towards industrial and rural workers as the 
`truly' exploited. This resulted in its re-immersion into traditional institutionalised class 
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politics and concomitantly, the closure of dialogue with new social movements 
(Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). 
New social movements have thus had an uneasy relationship with mainstream politics 
in general as well as Marxist political parties. This has perhaps strengthened their 
resolve to chart an alternative to traditional political formations. Environmental 
movements, to which I now turn, are amongst those which are pursuing this alternative. 
Environmentalism in India 
Environmental movements in India have inspired international campaigns and sought 
alliances with powerful environmental NGOs in the West. However the social and 
economic conditions under which they have emerged differ starkly from the contexts 
that have produced environmental movements in the West. This difference is reflected 
in the socio-economic background of Third and First World collective actors as well as 
their movement objectives. In developed countries thus environmentalism generally 
mobilises middle and upper class activists fighting against the depletion of bio-
diversity, industrial pollution and global climate change, without adequately addressing 
the marginalisation of the poor in development (Adams, 2001). While striving to secure 
a better quality of life, some argue that such movements tend to project a reformist form 
of 'sustainable development' (Esteva and Prakash, 1992), which fails to "rock the boat 
of the capitalist mode of production or technology" (Parajuli, 1996, p29)31. Indian 
environmental movements, on the other hand articulate an 'environmentalism of the 
poor' that, as we shall see later, contests the very basis of the development paradigm 
(Prasad, 2004). 
The emergence of environmentalism in India is commonly traced to the Chipko 
movement that arose in the forests surrounding the Himalayan foothills during the 
31 Reformist sustainable development is evident in the growth of 'market environmentalism' involving 
the environmental valuation of goods and 'green consumption' as well as 'ecological modernisation' seen 
in the drive towards technological solutions to 'energy efficiency' (Adams, 2001). 
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1970s and 80s (Guha, 2000). Comprising of tribals and low-caste peasants it emerged as 
a response to commercial logging in the area that threatened the forests upon which 
their very livelihood depended. Adopting a symbolic and highly emotive protest action 
of physically embracing trees, the campaigners attempted to prevent the logging. From 
this act they also came to derive their name — `chipko' meaning 'to hug' in Hindi. The 
movement inspired by Gandhian ideals espoused village self-rule as the only way to 
counter the state's destructive desire for 'profit, resin and timber' that concealed what 
the movement believed to be the true value of the forests as 'soil, water and pure air' 
(Sethi, 1993). The movement thus connected economic concerns over livelihood with 
the environment and argued that these could most effectively be protected if village 
communities have political control of their resources. The movement therefore raised a 
direct challenge to hegemonic development based on the centralisation of resources. 
The radical concerns it raised gained international recognition, in a manner 
unprecendented in independent India, and its ideals continue to form the basic core of 
present day environmental struggles in India, including the NBA (Dwivedi, 1998). 
Apart from forest-based struggles such as the Chipko, environmental struggles 
encompass traditional fisherman's movements against over-exploitation of marine 
resources by massive commercialised trawling32, and movements against development 
projects involving irrigation and dams33, mines34, power projects35 and industrial 
plants36. Within the environmental movement these struggles of the poor have had the 
strongest presence, however smaller movements against industrial pollution have been 
led by the urban middle and upper class37 also (Sethi, 1993; Andharia and Sengupta, 
1998). 
Environmental struggles of the poor against development projects have an ambiguous 
and somewhat contradictory relationship with Marxism as articulated by leftist political 
32 E.g. National Fisherman's Forum working for traditional fisher folk in Kerala. 
33 E.g. Tehri Bandh Virodh Samiti. 
34 E.g. Anti-Bauxite mine movement (Balco Project) in Orissa. 
35 E.g. Jan Andolan in Dabhol against Enron. 
36 E.g. Organisations of victims of the Union Carbide poisonous gas leak in 1984. 
37 E.g. Movement against pollution of Sone River by the Gwalior Rayon Factory. 
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organisations in India (Prasad, 2004). As I showed earlier, dams (and development 
projects in general) have facilitated the 'primitive accumulation' of capital and 
accentuated inequalities in resource distribution. Tribal and peasant movements 
resisting the appropriation of natural resources for these projects thus resonate with 
Marxist contestation against capitalism. At the same time however, Marxist political 
parties notably the CPI(ML), have expressed unease in rejecting development projects 
altogether. From their perspective large-scale development projects produce the kind of 
surplus which is required for economic development and which cannot be achieved 
through the smaller-scale technologies of production available to peasant societies. 
Science and technology are viewed as playing an essential role in freeing peasants from 
feudal relations and modernising society. Leftist organisations have thus also 
historically refrained from supporting the demands of environmental movements for 
communal rights over local resources and autonomous and decentralised governance 
(Sethi, 2003). Instead they express the need for transformation of unequal and 
exploitative relations within rural communities. Marxist political formations, as such, 
have tended to concentrate on securing fair rehabilitation for oustees of development 
projects and equitable distribution of their benefits rather than outrightly opposing such 
development. 
The differences between the left and environmental movements, however are not 
irreconcilable, and should instead be viewed as points of dialogue and debate. After all 
both these perspectives agree on the undesirability of capitalism. Indeed as Prasad 
(2004) notes, the CPI(ML)'s position, of late, has been changing towards adopting a 
more critical stance towards development projects. It is increasingly forming alliances 
with environmental movements, while recognising their strategic importance in halting 
the process of primitive accumulation and in providing alternatives to capitalism (which 
I discuss in further detail later). 
The hegemony of capitalist-led development and resistance to this in the form of new 
social movements, and environmental movements in particular, provides the political 
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context within which the Narmada Bachao Andolan has emerged. I now turn to a more 
in-depth exploration of this movement. 
NBA AND THE CRITIQUE OF 'DESTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT' 
NBA's fight against the Sardar Sarovar dam, continuing for over twenty years, is 
regarded as one of the most important environmental movements in India. For NBA and 
its supporters this development project epitomises the destructive capacities of 
capitalist-led development. Here firstly, I introduce the grassroots of the movement, 
secondly, I provide a brief chronology of NBA's formation and contestation with the 
state, thirdly, I analyse NBA's discourse of resistance and alternatives (cognitive 
praxis). 
People of the Narmada Bachao Andolan 
Environmental movements in India, such as the NBA, are principally movements 
seeking to redefine 'development' by those who have been left out or culturally and 
economically subjugated by the process. The very existence of their economies and 
cultures is believed to provide a political critique and alternative to the development 
process. However, the protagonists of movement's against capitalist development are 
not a homogeneous group. As I have indicated earlier, in the case of NBA, they consist 
of two socio-culturally and economically distinct groups (this, I will argue later, 
highlights the complexities of the development hegemony, as well as efforts to 
transform it). Supplementing my own observations with that of Baviskar's (2004), who 
conducted a more extended ethnographic study in the Narmada Valley, below I provide 
an account of these two groups — the hill Adivasis and Nimaris. 
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Hill Adivasis 
The enclosed topography of the hills where hill Adivasis of the Narmada Valley reside 
has to a large extent buttressed these communities from the cultural and social 
influences of mainstream society (Baviskar, 2004). They have mostly been ignored by 
state-sponsored modernisation and thus villages do not have roads and electricity. State 
schools have also been absent, though with the recent establishment of schools owned 
and run by the movement the first generation of Adivasis are becoming literate. 
As such, unlike amongst Adivasis living in the plains of Nimar, here a unique Adivasi 
identity and lifestyle is palpable. Instead of worshipping a spectrum of Hindu gods they 
believe in the spiritual powers of the hills, trees, mountains and their ancestral 
forefathers. Indal pooja — a collective ritual worshipping the union of the rain and earth 
producing crops — is unique to the Adivasis; and the gayana, sung during this ritual 
which is a myth of creation of the world from the Narmada river, is non-existent in 
Hindu culture. Curiously, as Baviskar also notes, though the Narmada river is accorded 
such importance in their mythology of creation, Adivasis do not seem to engage in any 
ritual worship of the Narmada. Indeed the river is traditionally referred to with no more 
reverence than the Moth Nadi or big river. This contrasts with its veneration in Hindu 
Nimar as a sacred goddess and mother around which elaborate ceremonies of worship 
are carried out38. Women in Adivasi societies are given greater freedom as is reflected 
in festivals such as Bhagoria where women can meet and elope with men of their 
choice. 
38 Adivasis also refer to the river as Naramda mata (mother), in the same way that Nimaris do, but as one 
Adivasi told me this is a relatively new development — perhaps a result of increasing cultural exposure to 
Nimaris through the movement. 
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Adivasi economy is based on pre-capitalist forms of subsistence agriculture that is 
largely divorced from the market. As Baviskar notes, these communities are 
characterised by "relatively egalitarian relationships embedded in kinship" such that all 
families have almost equal access to land (ibid, p92). Adivasis also practice a unique 
system of "labour-sharing" known as laah where members of the village pool together 
to work on each others fields during crucial periods of the agricultural cycle (p93). 
Staple crops such as jowhar and bazara apart from chillies, corn, vegetables and 
tobacco are all organically grown. Other produce such as fruits, temru leaves for 
wrapping tobacco, muhda from which liquor is made, fodder and wood for fuel are 
collected from the surrounding forests that have so far allowed them to lead relatively 
self-sufficient lives. Based on their distinctive economic, cultural and religious 
practices, Baviskar (2004) suggests that adviasis represent tribes rather than low level 
castes within the Hindu hierarchy. Yet Adivasis have been historically derided by state 
authorities and the mainstream population who view them as 'backward Hindus' or 
untouchables. 
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15 acres of land, categorised as middle farmers predominate (Dass and Deulkar, c2002), 
with some large farmers owning over 15 acres. Both middle and large farmers engage in 
mechanised farming for commercial trade, and often employ wage labour in order to 
produce cash crops such as bananas, cotton, papaya, chillies, wheat, and pulses. 
Villages are connected by highways and farmers own motorcycles and other luxury 
commodities such as mobile phones and televisions. 
While Patidar, Yadav, and Rajput castes predominantly own land, agricultural labourers 
who are employed to work on the fields by farmers tend to be mainly low caste Harijans 
and Adivasis who occupy a marginal socio-economic status in the village, often below 
the poverty line. In Nimar participation in the movement is largely derived from farmers 
rather than labourers. When hill Adivasis occasionally migrate to Nimar for seasonal 
work they experience the direct oppression of Nimari farmers who generally pay below 
minimum wages. 
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submergence. By the early 1980s Arch-Vahini, an NGO for Adivasi welfare, was 
raising these issues amongst tribal villages in Gujarat. However when Medha Patekar, 
visited the valley in 1985 as a community worker from an NGO called SETU, she soon 
realised that Arch-Vahini had "not raised the issue of the whole project affected area 
and nor about the project itself' (Patekar, 5/4/06). 
By 1986 she had mobilised tribal areas of Maharashtra under the Narmada 
Dharangrasta Samiti (NDS), solidified links with the already existing tribal 
organisation Khedut Mazdoor Chetna Sangath in M.P. and the Narmada Asargrasta 
Samiti (NAS) in Gujarat, and in 1987 succeeded in reinvigorating the Narmada Ghati 
Navnirman Samiti (NGNS) in Nimar39. Jointly they continued raising issues of 
rehabilitation, but in 1988 they took a radical turn declaring complete opposition to the 
dam. At the same time, through linkages established with ING0s, they began to contest 
the presence of the WB in the project. In 1989 they formed the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan (NBA) unifying grassroots mobilisations against the dam in the three states as 
well as supportive national civil society organisations. Arch-Vahini however departed 
from this coalition preferring to limit their efforts to securing adequate compensation. 
The formation of NBA signalled its transition from a local struggle for rehabilitation to 
a nationally and even globally relevant movement against environmentally and socially 
destructive development. The process through which this happened will be discussed in 
chapter 7. 
While NBA thus far had opposed the dam on the grounds of displacement and 
environmental issues, in the midst of state repression it also began to investigate the 
benefits that the government claimed would accrue from the project. Sympathetic 
scientists and other experts conducted their own investigations through which a body of 
counter-knowledge emerged that refuted the government's cost-benefit analysis. Based 
on these studies, NBA pointed to technical faults in the project's design and oversights 
in financial costs and asserted that the poor and drought-stricken regions of Gujarat and 
39 Though started in the 1970s by a group of Gandhian activists during the first wave of agitation against 
the SSP by fanners in the Nimar plains, the organization became defunct when the protests were co-opted 
by local politicians. 
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Rajasthan were unlikely to be the beneficiaries of the project as officially declared. 
Believing that the government would respond more favourably to objections raised in 
the government's own language of cost-benefit the movement decided to build strategic 
action on this newly acquired information. 
In December 1990, NBA revised its radical no-dam position and organised what was 
called the Long March to demand a comprehensive review of the project. Thousands of 
tribal and Nimari protesters marched for six days from Barwani in MP towards the dam 
site in Gujarat with a view to occupying it. At the Gujarat border however they were 
stopped by a wall of police and Gujarati civilians who had been mobilised by 
government officials. In response to the government's refusal to engage with the 
movement's demand, 2000 protesters stayed at the border for a month in the cold 
winter, while a group of seven people, including Patekar went on hunger strike. The 
government did not respond and on the twenty-second day of fasting the movement 
retreated from the border, symbolically declaring non-cooperation with the state 
through the slogan — hamaare goan mein hamaara raj (Our rule in our villages) 
(Baviskar, 2004). This protest event was not entirely futile however. The WB buckled 
under pressure from INGOs, intensified by the hunger strikers, and agreed to launch an 
independent review of the project. Following the review, the WB withdrew from the 
project in 1993, vindicating NBA's cause. 
The site of resistance during 1991-1996 shifted to the hill villages of Adivasis who 
began facing submergence. Yearly satyagrahas (passive resistance) were held during 
the monsoons where samarpit dais or 'save or drown squads' would threaten to let 
themselves drown in the rising waters of the river. Fatalities however were averted by 
police forcibly removing the protestors from the water. Between 1990 and 1994 NBA 
also made repeated requests for project reviews that were either rejected outright or 
accepted only to be left unfulfilled. Though by 1993 the World Bank had withdrawn 
from the project, the government's failure to dialogue with the movement led it to seek 
redress from the Indian Judiciary in 1994. However, in October 2000 the Supreme 
Court announced its verdict supporting dam construction. 
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Following this the movement's space for political manoeuvre greatly reduced and its 
mass base has dwindled with many taking what ever compensation the government 
offers. In the meantime the dam's construction continued and by 2000 had reached 
90m. The movement has turned its attention from mass mobilisation to more judicial 
activism to secure better rehabilitation for oustees. Periodically demonstrations are also 
held, and in 2006 a rally in Barwani, MP was attended by over 5000 people — many of 
whom having left the movement had returned to protest against dismal conditions at 
rehabilitation sites. 
The discourse of resistance and alternatives that arose from and informed these political 
encounters is elaborated on below. The analysis is based largely on documents 
produced by the NBA in the late 80s and early 90s and is supplemented by interviews 
with movement leaders taken during the research. 
NBA's Discourse of Resistance and Alternatives 
NBA's opposition to the Sardar Sarovar dam revolves around a critique of development 
that is socially and environmentally destructive: 
"...what we are up against is the prevailing model of 
development and its accompanying 'bigger is better' ideology 
and consumerist value system, for which these modern projects 
are the 'modern temples of progress' ...It has only succeeded in 
creating islands of affluence amidst the large surrounding ocean 
of poverty and deprivation; and it is rapidly destroying our 
natural resource base and life-support systems on which depends 
our very survival as a nation. The so-called 'development' it 
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produces is socially unjust and ecologically unsustainable" 
(NBA, c1989-1990, p 1 0*)4°. 
The NBA constructs the environment as the resource base upon which the people derive 
their livelihood. This is not dissimilar to statist approaches to the environment which 
have also viewed forests, land and water as resources to fuel development. The 
difference however lies in NBA's concern that capitalist-fuelled development has 
involved the transfer of ownership of natural resources from the majority of people to 
the elite minority, the result of which is an "ocean of poverty and deprivation". Not only 
has this transfer of ownership caused impoverishment but it has also involved 
unsustainable use of the environment. That is, capitalist development is inextricably and 
directly related to environmental destruction — actively, by using natural resources in a 
non-replenishable manner and passively by taking land away from rural communities, 
in particular tribals who are dependent on the products of land for their livelihoods and 
who have thus developed sustainable means of using it. The symbiosis between 
environment and rural communities and their livelihoods thus constitutes an 
`environmentalism of the poor' where the struggle against ecologically destructive 
development is a struggle for the right to life and livelihood4I : 
"The bountiful environment — land, forest, water that formed the 
basis of their sustenance for generations, is being exploited, and 
through it, they themselves are being exploited" (Patekar, 1989, 
p19*)42.  
NBA's environmentalism of the poor can be viewed as an instance of what Omvedt 
refers to as the 'rethinking of Marxism' and 'redefining of exploitation' by NSMs in 
40 `Sardar Sarovar Project - economic, environmental, human disaster' (pamphlet). 
41 It is perhaps because of the intertwinement of issues of tribal rights with ecology in the 
environmentalism of the poor that such movements, including the NBA, are arbitrarily referred to by 
some as environmental and by others as tribal (Pathy, 1998; Prabhu, 1998). 
42 'Statement of Medha Patekar on behalf of Narmada Bachao Andolan concerning a critique of the 
World Bank financed Sardar Sarovar dam', presented to the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, 
Agricultural Research and Environment, US House of Representatives. More is said about the context in 
which this presentation was given in chapters 6 and 7. 
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India. Thus the capitalist exploitation of actors of NBA does not occur in the traditional 
sense of the extraction of surplus value of wage labour, but through the dispossession of 
land upon which their livelihoods are dependent (Whitehead, 2003). In that these actors 
are resisting the appropriation of land for capitalist accumulation and development, they 
can be conceived as 'reinventing revolution' in Omvedt's terms. 
Apart from the broader issue of ownership of resources, NBA have also raised more 
specifically ecological concerns regarding the impact of the dam on the surrounding 
environment, including water logging, salination, soil erosion and increased 
susceptibility to drought and flood. Even these environmental issues however, are an 
extension of the overall concern over land, its productive capacity and livelihoods 
which are dependent on these factors. Conservation of biodiversity, on the other hand, 
which in western movements tend to emphasis conflict between ecology and human 
welfare, is absent in the NBA. Instead the issue of preservation of nature, is subsumed 
within an analysis of tribal lifestyle and culture as "naturally conservationist" (Patekar, 
20/9/05). 
Amongst communities that derive their cultural ethos from their geographical 
surroundings, displacement not only represents economic dispossession but also cultural 
erasure. The unique identity of hill Adivasis is especially vulnerable. Their mythology 
and religion are deeply embedded in the hills and forests which are believed to be 
endowed with the spiritual powers of their ancestors. Knowledge of local medicinal 
herbs has already severely diminished as the forests that they lived in have been 
stripped bare by commercial logging. Large-scale development such as SSP therefore 
also jeopardises the cultural survival of these communities. 
While the capitalist model of development represents "a centralization" of processes 
and products that are "undemocratic, unsustainable and unjust" (Patekar, 26/2/06), the 
NBA has presented the subsistence economies of rural communities as a basis for more 
egalitarian and democratic political alternatives: 
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"The new model of development will be based on sustainable 
and equitable utilization of natural resources, avoiding human 
and environmental exploitation, promoting an egalitarian 
distribution of resources, with full democratic participation in 
decision-making. Such development will be based on the 'real' 
needs of the people..."(NBA, 1989, p9*)43. 
Whereas the dominant model of development economically dispossesses poor 
communities and therefore disenfranchises them from political participation in their 
own development, an alternative development model based on subsistence economies 
provides a concrete basis for politically empowering village communities. Within this 
model power is decentralised and distributed across village communities that are 
collectively involved in taking decisions regarding the management of their resources. 
The NBA's articulation of a 'new model of development' is part of the movement's 
efforts to take "social control over the main cultural patterns" (Touraine, 1985, p785) of 
society by engaging in a normative reframing of development rather than an outright 
rejection of it. For the state however this has been tantamount to anti-development 
fanaticism — a western led conspiracy to keep India backward. What is interesting 
however is that while new social movement theories refer to the process of 
reinterpretation of norms and social meaning as postmodern way-of-life struggles, the 
NBA's 'new model of development' is based not simply on a postmodern 
preoccupation with diversity and lifestyles but on modernist concerns of basic needs 
and "egalitarian distribution of resources" (in extract above). Where the NBA departs 
from the old social movement framework is in their treatment of culture as not simply a 
product of the economic sphere but as a factor in the formation of economic relations. 
Thus "non-consumerist lifestyles and decentralized democratic participation" (Patekar, 
13/4/05) between village units are essential for securing the 'real', read basic needs of 
the people. Though the 'bigger is better' ideology critiqued by the Andolan depends on 
science and technology, this does not lead to an "anti-modern" rejection of these tools 
43 'We want development not destruction' (pamphlet). 
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as Prasad (2004, p 1 4) has suggested. Instead NBA have championed the "appropriate 
utilisation of scientific knowledge and technology" to achieve the modernist goals of 
equality (NBA, 1999, p3*)44. 
As should be clear by now, NBA's environmental concerns, as of other movements 
more broadly subsumed within the "environmentalism of the poor", are largely by-
products of the primary concern over land and livelihood that are under threat from 
capitalist development. The environmental label, as Guha (1988) suggests, has thus 
been a "cloth" draped over peasant movements by "sympathetic intellectuals" (132579). 
Though NBA is not averse to this environmental image — indeed it helped the 
movement gain much needed media and civil society attention as we shall see later — it 
is not a portrayal that those within the movement self-consciously identify with. For 
instance Medha Patekar (20/9/05) herself describes the movement as an "alternative 
development model" and even central activists of the international campaign who 
represented environmental NGOs refer to it as a "social justice movement" or a 
"movement for land rights and human rights"45. 
However that the exclusions of development and the alternatives provided by 
movements such as NBA are not as absolute as is sometimes suggested, is evident from 
the differential socio-cultural and economic status of the grassroots constituents in 
NBA's 'alternative development movement'. While the rural, and in particular tribal 
societies of the Narmada Valley are championed as alternatives to the development 
hegemony, in reality they occupy somewhat contradictory positions in relation to 
capitalist development and the environment. Ironically, in Adivasi societies the process 
of development itself has caused changes in their cultural and economic practices, 
which now conflict with the environmental credentials bestowed on them by NBA 
leaders. State-sponsored logging, accelerated by the impending submergence, has led to 
the severe depletion of the forest and the quality of the soil, making life that much more 
44 'True development through 'Narmada' — Policy and strategy: One tapa, one vow'. Statement by Medha 
Patekar and her colleagues, during the Narmada Satyagraha, 1999. 
45 Interviews with Patrick McCully of International Rivers Network (USA) and Lori Udall of 
Environmental Defense Fund (USA) respectively, 20/6/06. 
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difficult. Crop yields have reduced and livestock have been dying as fodder becomes 
less available. In response to these hardships, some Adivasis have recently turned to 
cash crop such as cotton to sell in the market, and high-yielding hybrid varieties of 
staple crops such as jowhar that require the use of pesticides (fieldnotes, 19/11/05). The 
reduced fertility of soil generally and the submergence of prime land at the riverbanks 
has led to an increase in nevad, involving the clearance of forested areas for cultivation. 
Whereas earlier the percentage of deforestation due to nevad was minute and easily 
replenishable, in the present context of massive commercial logging it has become a 
less sustainable practice (Baviskar, 2004). In this context, some critics therefore charge 
the movement with eco-romanticism for failing to acknowledge the forces that are 
altering Adivasi relationships to the environment and thus also for reifying and 
idealising these communities (Baviskar, 1995; 1997; Omvedt, 1999). 
The position of Nimari society to alternative development and the environment is even 
more contentious. While Nimaris have been dispossessed and exploited they have also 
been beneficiaries and exploiters in the process. Their commercial farming practices are 
a product of the hegemonic development model. While they employ hybrid seeds, large 
amounts of water, fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals these farming methods are 
also hardly environmentally ideal. They thus contradict the alternatives that tribal 
society is believed to provide. Nimaris have also been the direct exploiters of Adivasis 
who when migrating to Nimar for work are employed as agricultural labourers for 
below minimum wages. Clearly there are apparent contradictions in this alliance that 
are indicative of the complexity of capitalist development itself. 
Amongst Marxist commentators in India the formation of cross-class alliances within 
movements such as NBA have been viewed sceptically as encouraging populist 
tendencies to obfuscate issues of class oppression and struggle (Brass, 1994; 1997). 
However the very complexity of capitalist development renders such criticisms, which 
are based on an absolutist approach to class relations and categories, difficult to sustain 
at the practical level of political struggle. Instead there is a need to appreciate the 
relative, shifting and complex nature of class categories as well as the evolving and 
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agential quality of class consciousness which can lead to changes in class relations. 
Thus while the farmers of Nimar might be construed as exploiters and capitalist 
producers in relation to hill Adivasis, both these protagonists still occupy much lower 
rungs in the chain of capitalist production compared to the more powerful state and 
WB. As such movements like NBA continue to be part of a wider effort to problematise 
capitalist development and its relationship to the environment. 
CONCLUSION 
The development paradigm in India provides a link between national capitalism and 
globalisation which has proceeded from WB and IMF funding of development towards 
structural adjustment on neo-liberal lines. Not only national but global forces are thus 
implicated in the hegemonic process of development that is destabilising and 
impoverishing communities such as those of the Narmada Valley. In this context, dams 
that are hailed as integral to 'development' are uprooting communities that depend on 
land and forests for livelihood, and destroying and transferring environmental resources 
to the capitalist elite. Reacting to these processes, movements such as NBA can be 
located within a wider environmentalism of the poor that points to the convergence of 
environmental and class issues within the context of India. While the hegemonic 
development model economically exploits those who depend on the environment, it is 
also a tool of cultural subjugation, silencing other perspectives on development. 
Cultural lifestyles of rural, but especially tribal societies that live off the land provide a 
model of development based on democratic, decentralised, equitable distribution of 
resources that is supported by the appropriate use of environmentally-friendly 
technology. As such the environmentalism of the poor can also be understood as an 
alternative development movement. However this is not to suggest that development 
and the alternative development movement represents an easy binary of class interests 
and positions. In the case of NBA, the cultural and economic relationship between 
Nimaris and Adivasis has historically been of subjugation. Yet within the 
national/global development hegemony, the joint marginalisation of communities such 
as these is leading to their positioning as 'subalterns', necessitating the formation of 
counter-hegemonic alliances between them. In chapter 7 I will examine how NBA 
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developed this counter-hegemonic resistance across local, national and global scales of 
contention. However in the next chapter I focus on the manner in which international 
NGOs, galvanising in support of NBA, raised a focused challenge against the 
international financers of the Sardar Sarovar Project, i.e. the World Bank and the 
Japanese government. 
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Chapter 6 
International NGOs in the Narmada Campaign 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the strong network of international NGOs that supported NBA in 
its campaign against the Sardar Sarovar Dam. In collaboration with NBA, this network 
was instrumental in projecting the movement's grievances to an international audience 
and successfully challenging the involvement of global funders in the project. As such 
the international Narmada campaign is widely hailed by INGO activists (Rich, 1991) 
and academics as an instance of global civil society in action and an example of the 
changing contours of politics from state-centric international relations to global 
governance (Carter, 2001; Khonder, 2001). Others such as Khagram (2004), are 
reluctant to commit to the notion of global civil society but nevertheless view the 
International Narmada campaign as part of the growing phenomenon of transnational 
struggles that operate within a 'world society'. The Narmada transnational coalition is 
perceived to be part of 'global governance', lending to the process of "globalizing 
norms" and thus also to the construction of "acceptable identities and behaviours of 
actors across the world" (ibid, p15). 
Accounts of the international Narmada campaign have already been given in great detail 
in countless books and articles. However, what this chapter provides is a 
reinterpretation of the international campaign, questioning perspectives that view it as 
an example of global civil society and thus as a harbinger of global citizenship. Through 
an analysis of the discourse and strategies employed by the international campaigners, it 
is argued that international NGOs behaved more like actors within their own national 
polities rather than a common global civil society, and drew upon notions of national 
citizenship rather than global affiliation to mobilise public opinion. This brings into 
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question the strong reliance within GCS literature on INGOs as the trustees of the 
transformative, global visions of GCS. 
This chapter uses scholarly descriptions of the international efforts and first hand data to 
provide an account of the Narmada campaign. First hand data includes interviews with 
key activists involved in the campaign at the international level; documents such as 
correspondence between international activists, movement leaders, national and 
international supporters and governments of various countries as well as the World 
Bank; memos from the World Bank; and press releases and memos from involved 
international NGOs 
At the outset, it must be noted that there was more than one international lobbying effort 
regarding the Sardar Sarovar Dam, that while overlapping in some part, broadly 
occurred in consecutive time spans (S en, 1999). These two campaigns were aligned to 
different local movement actors with differing positions regarding the dam. The first 
international campaign spearheaded by Oxfam in partnership with a local NGO called 
Arch-Vahini, adopted a 'moderate' position, calling simply for more progressive 
resettlement policies rather than outright cancellation of the dam. This chapter focuses 
on the second international campaign which associated its self with the Narmada 
Bachao Andolan and supported the movement's no-dam position. It is this international 
network which is commonly referred to in literature on the Narmada struggle. 
The chapter begins with a historical account of the international Narmada protest, and 
highlights the material successes of the campaign. Following this a deeper examination 
of the campaign's discourses and strategies, is engaged in to address whether and to 
what extent the international campaign was a phenomena of global significance as is 
often implied. 
THE INTERNATIONAL NARMADA CAMPAIGN: A CHRONOLOGY 
While the Narmada campaign is often subsumed within the general field of international 
or global environmental activism (Guadalupe and Rodrigues, 2004), it is the 
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involvement of global funders in the project that created interest and sustained the 
engagement of international NGOs in the campaign. In 1985 the World Bank approved 
a loan of $450 million for the project. Though this was a small percentage of the 
investment actually required for the dam, its significance lay in the "stamp of 
credibility" it provided to the dam (Udall, 1993). Having gained the approval of the 
WB, the Indian government was able to secure the involvement of the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan to fund turbines manufactured by the 
Sumitomo and Hitachi corporations. The Canadian International Development Agency 
conducted environmental impact assessments and the Overseas Development Agency 
(UK) was enlisted to conduct downstream impact studies (Khagram, 2004). 
The First International Campaign: The Oxfam-Arch Vahini Alliance 
Oxfam was the first international NGO to get involved in the project and its efforts 
formed the first of the two main rounds of international lobbying mentioned earlier. 
Oxfam was keen to expand its field of action to include issues relating to economic and 
social injustice resulting from large development projects. In 1982 John Clark of Oxfam 
took a trip to the valley and was alarmed by the shortcomings in provisions of 
resettlement and rehabilitation of oustees of the project (Sen, 1999; Khagram, 2004). 
Clark established links with a Gujarat based organisation called Arch-Vahini which was 
already mobilising Adivasis to be displaced by the project in Gujarat. To enhance its 
leverage with the WB, Oxfam also sought the support of other international actors such 
as Survival International and The Ecologist, both in UK (Khagram, 2004). 
Pressure from this alliance through letters and meetings with Executive Directors of the 
Bank as well as public letter-writing campaigns forced the Bank to reassess its 
rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) practices regarding the SSP to bring them closer 
to the Bank's own policy guidelines as well as "human rights norms on resettlement and 
indigenous/tribal peoples" (Khagram, 2004, p94). Important advances were made in 
terms of securing oustees' rights to land-based resettlement over monetary 
compensation regardless of the possession of valid land titles. However, though the 
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Oxfam alliance had managed to get the World Bank and Indian authorities to sign a 
loan agreement based on the obligation to ensure just rehabilitation, Oxfam soon started 
to get reports from Arch-Vahini that the Gujarat Government was attempting to 
override this obligation through the Supreme Court. Further pressure by the 
transnational coalition was applied on the WB to make the governments of the three 
states (Gujarat, MP and Maharashtra) involved in the project align their resettlement 
policies with those established in the loan agreement. Responding to this grudgingly, 
the governments made incremental changes that brought their resettlement policies 
closer towards WB standards (Khagram, 2004). Thus this transnational alliance was 
able to make important gains in terms of policy reform regarding resettlement, however 
it did not at any point seek to challenge the legitimacy of the dam itself. The efforts of 
Oxfam continued for some time in parallel with, but also at times in interaction with 
that of the second international coalition that emerged to contest the dam. 
The Second International Campaign: The NBA-Environmental NGOs Alliance 
By 1985 Medha Patekar had mobilised tribal oustees in Maharashtra under the Narmada 
Dharangrasta Samiti (NDS). The second round of trans-border action established closer 
ties with Patekar and her organisation which later became the Narmada Bachao 
Andolan. This local-global alliance gradually began to take a more radical position than 
that of the Oxfam and Arch-Vahini and asserted that the Indian authorities would never 
be able to resettle the oustees according to the guidelines. On this basis they declared 
opposition to the dam (more will be said about this in chapter 7). 
The international coalition that emerged to support the anti-dam movement of NBA, 
consisted of activists and organisations that had been engaged for some years in a 
campaign to seek reform of multilateral development banks (MDB). This campaign was 
guided by the conviction that large-scale projects financed by multilateral development 
banks had a large role to play in the ecological destruction occurring in the South. The 
coalition also criticised the "chronic failure to involve and consult with local people and 
the inaccessibility of its project and sector information" (Udall, 1993, p203). The efforts 
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of the MDB reform campaign pushed the WB to adopt better environmental safeguards. 
In 1984 the Bank committed itself to assessing environmental factors before signing 
loan agreements and even forbade its involvement in projects that would lead to 
significant or irrevocable environmental damage (Payne and O'Bannon, 1994). 
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) was one of the international NGOs that were 
part of this coalition. In 1986 Bruce Rich of EDF went to the Narmada Valley with a 
view to showcasing the project as an example of destructive MDB led development. He 
established contact with Medha Patekar. Later, Lori Udall who was working along with 
Rich at EDF took the forefront in organising the Narmada campaign. In the initial years 
the international campaign sought to raise issues regarding the neglect of social and 
environmental problems, with the Bank's staff. However this proved ineffective. 
Reflecting on this Udall later wrote: 
"...since Bank staff who make a decision about continuing a 
project despite loan violations are the same people with a vested 
interest in the project, and since careers are rewarded inside the 
Bank for pushing projects forward and not for project quality, 
the continuation of a project is usually guaranteed if the task 
manager or the director of the Operations Department supports 
the project" (Udall, 1993, p205). 
In 1987 Udall invited Medha Patekar to Washington to attend an annual general 
meeting held by the World Bank with international NGOs. This meeting allowed 
Medha to widen her international contacts. It also gave international NGOs the chance 
to strengthen their own networks with each other. 
The meeting led to a change in the strategy of the international campaign. Instead of 
targeting the Bank staff, international NGOs turned to the Board of Executive Directors. 
The coalition was successful in gaining their attention. This was a significant 
development given that Executive Directors need to give their approval for all the 
policies and projects initiated by the Bank. Paul Arlman, the Executive Director of 
Netherlands took the lead in engaging with the voices of concern raised by the 1NGOs 
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as well as the growing resistance in India. He organised a series of meetings with the 
Bank's staff and Executive Director's of various other Northern countries including 
India and established regular correspondence with Medha Patekar. This was the first 
time in the history of the Bank that Executive Directors had taken such an active 
interest in a project and the first time that they had started demanding access to 
information from the Bank's staff. As a result of the various channels of communication 
that they established with the movement and INGOs, and those that they prised open 
within the Bank, opinion began to crystallise amongst Northern Executive Directors that 
huge failures and violations of Bank policy were occurring in the Valley (Sen, 1999). 
Following mounting tensions within the Bank, a mission was appointed in April 1989 to 
reassess the progress made by the state governments in terms of resettlement and 
rehabilitation. The team, headed by Scudder, came out with a damming report which far 
from pointing to progress in R&R, instead clearly stated that "there has been a very 
serious deterioration" (Scudder quoted in Udall, 1993, p210). Based on this assessment 
he recommended "either permanent or temporary termination of World Bank 
disbursements" (ibid). However, yet again the WB failed to take decisive action. 
At the same time that pressure was being applied directly on the WB, the EDF and other 
Washington based NGOs were raising the issue of the Sardar Sarovar Project within the 
US Congress which allocates American taxes to the WB. Since USA is the largest 
donor, NGOs perceived this to be an effective strategy for holding the Bank in check. In 
October 1989 Udall of EDF arranged for Medha Patekar and Girish Patel, a human 
rights lawyer, to give testimony to a US Congressional Subcommittee on the Project. 
Medha Patekar's testimony not only referred to the violations of the Bank's policies but 
made a critique of the social, environmental and economic consequences of the dam as 
well as suggesting alternative solutions. Her testimony proved to be a galvanising force 
for the international campaign. Many members of the Congress wrote letters to 
President Conable of the World Bank urging for the suspension or cancellation of the 
dam. Congressman James Scheuer held a meeting with members of Global Legislators 
for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) from around the world to discuss the Narmada 
issue and to subsequently raise questions regarding it in their own countries (Udall, 
1993). 
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Discussion on the Narmada project at the GLOBE meeting was of special relevance to 
the Japanese Diet members attending it because Japan was financing the dam's turbines. 
The meeting alerted the Japanese legislators to the growing concern regarding the 
project. By that time Friends of the Earth Japan (FoEJ) had also been following the 
developments in the Valley and was keen to incorporate the SSP within the MDB 
reform campaign that it had been part of since 1986. FoEJ made contact with the 
Narmada Bachao Andolan through Lori Udall and planned a research trip to the Valley. 
On returning they organised the first ever 'International Narmada Symposium' in 
Tokyo. The symposium was a huge success, with activists from India, Japan and 
international NGOs, parliamentarians, lawyers, journalists and scholars in attendance. 
Japanese and other INGOs continued to apply pressure on the Japanese government and 
in May 1990, a month after the symposium, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
declared that it was revoking funds for the project in light of opposition from oustees, 
and failures in planning for the environment and rehabilitation. 
This was the international network's first major success that further strengthened the 
linkages between various NGOs. With the Japanese government out of the project, the 
international coalition focused more intensely on the WB. The network that till now had 
been a loose association of NGOs, began to coordinate a lot more closely, with a group 
of 15-20 NGOs from USA and other European countries forming the core. This core 
group called its self the Narmada Action Committee (NAC) and was in charge of 
coordinating with the movement, relaying information from the local to a wider 
international audience via the internet and fax, and forming strategies for international 
action. The group included the Environmental Defense Fund (USA), International 
Rivers Network (USA), Probe International (Canada), The Ecologist (UK), Survival 
International (UK), Friends of the Earth (Japan), and Bread for the World (Germany) 
amongst others. 
Between December 1990 and January 1991 the Long March took place in India. Medha 
and other protesters began fasting to put pressure on the government to halt dam 
construction and comprehensively review the project. As the hunger-strike went on, 
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international efforts to get the World Bank to concede to a review were pursued with 
greater vigour. Discussions with Executive Directors were held and public awareness 
regarding the situation was raised through press releases from international NGOs. 
After 21 days of fasting, on January 27th 1991, the bank agreed to organise an 
independent review of the project (Udall, 1993). 
In order to maximise pressure for the establishment of the independent review and 
ensure that it is taken seriously by the Bank, European activists organised a tour for 
Shripad Dharamadikary and Kisan Mehta, activists of NBA. The tour which took place 
between April and May 1991 was aimed at securing public support for the movement as 
well as encouraging members of parliament to raise the Narmada issue with the Bank. I 
will go into more details regarding this later. 
Though NBA and supporting INGOs were concerned regarding the level of autonomy 
the WB review would have from the Bank, they decided to cooperate with the 
reviewing committee led by Bradford Morse and provided them with invaluable data as 
well as physical access to villages facing submergence. In June 1992 the report 
published by the Morse committee (Independent Review of the Sardar Sarovar Project, 
1992) vindicated the movement's stand. It recommended that the Bank should "step 
back" (p356) from the project given the failure to adequately consider environmental 
impacts and the improbability of achieving rehabilitation of all the displaced. The report 
even suggested that the project would fail to deliver expected benefits due to flaws in its 
hydrological design. Further it was warned that continuing construction would be 
"impossible except as a result of unacceptable means" (p356) in a context where local 
opposition was strong and unrelenting. 
Ignoring these strongly-worded recommendations, the WB continued funding the 
project for at least another six months, during which time certain benchmarks for 
rehabilitation were set. Scrambling to achieve these targets the Indian government 
began forcibly evicting villagers; the breaches in human rights that ensued were closely 
monitored and reported by international activists. As the six month period came to an 
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end it was clear that authorities were far from the proposed benchmarks. Amidst 
international outcry and pressure from WB executive directors the Bank withdrew from 
the project on 30th March 1993. 
From the historical account of the international Narmada campaign it is evident that it 
played a major role, along with local resistance, in making the global lender retreat from 
the project. Its collaboration with activists of the movement was crucial in this process, 
who were able to provide international activists with updated information of violations 
of Bank policies and human rights occurring on the ground. Armed with this 
information activists lobbied with the Bank's Executive Directors and Northern 
parliaments who held influence over the Bank as shareholders. Apart from achieving 
the immediate goal of forcing the WB to withdraw from the project, the campaign was a 
catalyst for other institutional changes within the Bank as well as changes in the wider 
governance of the big dam building regime. As Khagram (2004) notes the campaign 
"compelled the World Bank to constitute the first ever independent review of a Bank-
supported project under implementation" (p195) which "set the precedent for such 
initiatives in the future" (p125) and paved the way for the formation of a permanent 
Independent Review Panel, assigned with the responsibility of assessing the 
environmental and social impacts of every World Bank development project. For these 
reasons Khagram suggests that the coalition "played an especially crucial role in the 
formation of a transnational anti-dam network, and the establishment of an 
unprecedented World Commission on Dams [WCD]" (italics added, p138). The WCD 
is a multi-stake holder process involving global financial institutions, civil society 
organisations and affected people, the goal of which is to review the development 
effectiveness of large dams, assess alternatives to these as well as develop guidelines for 
the monitoring and decommissioning of dams. In fact, Khagram goes to the extent of 
arguing that the Narmada campaigns were so influential that they contributed 
significantly to the global decline of the big dam industry. While it is not within the 
scope of this thesis to engage with his analysis in depth, I will suggest that activists who 
were actually engaged in this process are less certain of its transformative effects. 
Given that the dam continued to be built after the WB withdrew, some international and 
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local activists suspect that the campaign only drove the Bank to conceal its funding of 
the project. In an interview Udall admitted: 
"...we really thought that the dam would be stopped after the 
World Bank withdrew, and it should have. There is a whole 
train of thought that the Bank is funding it through the structural 
loans so World Bank money is going to it anyway, but we can't 
track it" (Udall, 20/6/06). 
Patekar, who is still actively contesting other WB funded development projects in India, 
goes even further in rejecting suggestions that the WB has been reformed: 
"...the World Bank is still continuing with big dams and now it 
has become aggressive - some time after the WCD report, till 
then it was lying low key on the large dams, doubtful about 
things, now they are very aggressive." (Medha, 26/2/06). 
Thus, though international action was successful in terms of forcing the WB to 
withdraw from Sardar Sarovar, the extent to which the Narmada campaign has resulted 
in any significant global transformations in the hegemony of big dam ideology and the 
structures of global finance is still a matter of debate. 
Having outlined the trajectory of the international Narmada campaign and its material 
successes, the next section turns to exploring the extent to which this represents an 
instance of global civil society. 
THE INTERNATIONAL NARMADA CAMPAIGN: AN INSTANCE OF GCS? 
As shown in chapter 2, INGOs are commonly viewed as important actors within GCS. 
In particular, attention has been given to INGOs involved in the Narmada campaign as 
exemplars of this field of global politics. In this section these characterisations of the 
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campaign are briefly presented, following which the campaign's discourses and 
strategies are critically dissected in order to examine the extent to which the meanings it 
gave to international activism and the identities it constructed — local, national or global, 
cohere with its depiction as an instance of GCS. 
The Narmada Campaign as GCS 
Theorists of global civil society are not only interested in its "objective structural" 
manifestations but just as importantly in its "subjective ideological dimensions" 
(Taylor, 2004). The emergence of global discourse, identities and citizenship are thus 
viewed as integral constituents as well as constructions of global civil society. In the 
emergence of these subjective processes international NGOs are normally given prime 
responsibility. Thus, according to Munck (2004) "INGOs certainly have the 
cosmopolitan grand vision to build GCS" (p19). 
In terms of the Narmada coalition of INGOs the 'objective' dimensions of GCS are 
believed to be present in its ability to engage in transnational networking that 
transcended state-centric politics. This is viewed as a particularly important instance of 
GCS in that the network achieved important milestones in the global anti-dam 
resistance, such as contributing to the "emergence of novel forms of global governance 
like WCD" (Khagram, 2004, p207), as described above. The intersection of these 
objective dimensions with the 'subjective ideological' concern for global environmental 
protection adds to arguments for viewing the Narmada campaign as a representation of 
GCS. 
According to Carter (2001) "groups that campaign for a better environment can be seen 
as a quintessential expression of global civil society and world citizenship" because 
"environmental issues naturally tend to cross state boundaries" (p93). In this sense 
Carter proclaims that social movements such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan and 
international organisations such as Friends of the Earth which engage in 'green 
activism' constitute actors of global civil society and are agents of global citizenship 
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(also see Guadalupe and Rodrigues, 2004; Breitmeier and Rittberger, 1998). Apart from 
academics, international activists who have written articles about the Narmada 
contestation after their involvement in it, suggest that the campaign cohered around 
certain global visions. In 1993, after withdrawing from active engagement in the 
struggle, Lori Udall wrote "Partnerships and alliances have been forged among NGOs 
in the World Bank's member countries that have a common vision of sustainable 
development that is decentralized, socially just, and environmentally sound" (p203). 
Bruce Rich of EDF, who was one of the first international campaigners to take up the 
Narmada issue, later declared "No longer at risk is just a river valley here, and a forest 
there, but cumulatively the biosphere itself...a global civil society is trying to emerge in 
the throes of struggles like Narmada" (1991, p105). Apart from these focused 
treatments of the campaign, countless other articles mention the Narmada INGO 
coalition as a powerful example of the globalisation of concerns for the environment, 
human rights and democratic participation, and thus as an example of GCS (Chandhoke, 
2002; Katz, 2006; Khonder, 2001). 
Discourses and Strategies in the International Narmada Campaign: Contradicting 
GCS? 
While the above representations of the Narmada campaign claim that it was a global 
phenomenon, in this section I take a closer look at documents prepared by and for the 
campaign to examine whether these claims actually bear testimony in the discourses and 
strategies adopted by INGOs to mobilise support for the Narmada struggle. The critical 
analysis of the international campaign is structured around three dimensions: the 
campaign's use of environmental discourse, its political strategies in relation to the 
campaign against the WB, and its use of 'global' human rights as a political strategy. 
Global ecology or local environment? 
The international Narmada campaign's credentials as part of global civil society are 
tied, as mentioned earlier, to an assertion of its role in ecological protection. The bio- 
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sphere is believed necessarily to be a global phenomenon and thus political action 
surrounding it is expected to crystallise global identities and citizenship. In the case of 
the Narmada campaign however I argue that this assumption of the globality of the 
environment is not met. This calls into question the extent to which its environmental 
discourse provides grounds for the formation of global identities and citizenship, and by 
extension therefore its characterisation as a phenomenon of global civil society. 
Of the hundreds of documents dated between 1982-1994 that were collected and 
analysed, only two make specific reference to the environment as a global construct and 
the Narmada struggle as a common global struggle for the environment. In a letter 
written to the President of the World Bank, 'citizens of Sweden' express their concern 
over the 'environmental situation in India'. They write: 
"The global ecological crisis has reached such magnitude that 
resolving the crisis requires the active participation of the whole 
world community... the nature of environmental problems which 
we face today proves that in our interdependent world very often 
the sources as well as the consequences of ecological depletion 
do not respect any national boundaries. Managing the natural 
resources that we are given is our common future" (Citizens of 
Sweden, 1989*). 
In this text while the environment creates a cause of common concern with the people 
of the Narmada Valley it is not in itself a sufficient condition for the creation of a 
`whole world community'. It is the unique interdependence of the world in which we 
find ourselves today that has led to the 'nature of the environment' being such that 
`ecological depletion does not respect any national boundaries'. Thus it is the emerging 
interdependence in the modern age that is the crux of a world community which 
transcends national boundaries. A similar sentiment is expressed in the second letter 
written by an Australian activist who, referring to the Narmada Projects, writes: "...our 
land and all that depends on it is dying" (1989). In talking of the Narmada Valley as the 
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destruction of 'our land' she also is drawing on a notion of interdependence between 
people across countries. 
However, such invocations of a common struggle based on notions of interdependence 
and 'our land' are starkly missing from the rest of the hundreds of documents that were 
analysed. In contrast to references to the destruction of the global and interdependent 
environment seen in these two documents, the Narmada project is far more frequently 
referred to as "hurting the poor and their environment" (Probe International, 1992*)46 
rather than that of a global 'our' environment. In this framing environmental damage is 
understood as a local rather than global issue. In fact these localised constructions of 
environmental issues are more accurately seen as concerns relating to livelihood and 
land rights. According to Survival International: 
"Tribal people live in very close contact with their environment. 
Their livelihoods are therefore totally dependent on the lands 
that they have lived on for generations" (Survival International, 
1991*)47. 
International support then is garnered not out of a sense of global struggle to protect the 
common environment but rather out of a sense of duty towards weaker sections of 
people. This is how Friends of the Earth Japan present the problem of the Narmada 
Valley: 
"The Japanese people are informed that it would be tribal people 
(Adivasi) who would be affected the most by the project, in 
other words those people who are at the bottom of Indian 
society and among the poorest citizens whose lives depend 
heavily upon local natural resources and their surrounding 
environment. Could Japan support this destructive project that 
46 'Position paper on International Development Aid (IDA)'. 
47 'Narmada environmentalists make emergency visit to UK' (Press release) 1st May 1991. 
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will sacrifice the weakest and poorest in Indian society and 
damage their natural life support system? Should Japanese 
companies profit from such projects while lending a hand to the 
destruction? These are the basic questions that Japanese citizens 
were confronted with" (FoEJ, 1991*)48. 
Absent here, is the presentation of a radicalised global identity as the human collectivity 
that mobilises for a common cause. Rather it is separate national identities that are 
evoked — where the Japanese people are confronted with the moral obligation to 
support the poorest sections of Indian society and their environment. Further, Japanese 
companies, rather than global forces, are highlighted as causing the deterioration of the 
`natural life support system' of the Adivasis. This puts added moral onus on the 
Japanese citizens who have democratic responsibility for their national politics and 
economy and are thus implicated in the destruction of the Valley if they fail to act. 
FoEJ thus construct a one way relationship of dependency of the people of the Narmada 
Valley on the citizens of Japan to act morally to save them and their environment. 
Missing is a sense of interdependence and common cause between the people of these 
two places that Taylor (2004) argues is crucial to a notion of global civil society and 
global citizenship: "In transformative terms, global civil society seeks to reclaim 
democracy and reconfigure power by generating a sense of global citizenship within 
which there is increasing awareness of how social issues — near or far — that were once 
differentially focused and geographically bounded are actually interpenetrated and 
interdependent" (p9). 
That global environmentalism was not a guiding framework of action for the 
international campaign is evident from the fact that even activists of pivotal 
environmental INGOs reject such as categorisations of the movement. As McCully of 
International Rivers Network reveals: 
48 'Destruction in the name of development: The World Bank and the Narmada Valley Development 
Project in India- Loans for what and for whom?' (Report), Second Narmada International Symposium, 
May, 1991. 
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"...it would be pigeon-holed as an environmental movement but 
we would never sell it like that...we always talked about 
displacement, resettlement and the necessity of the dam." 
(McCully, 20/6/06). 
So far, it has been shown that the international Narmada campaign was not motivated 
by global concerns for the environment, contrary to scholarly as well as popular 
depictions. References to the environment were generally constructed in bounded, 
isolated terms as having localised significance for the people who gain their livelihood 
from it. Following from this it is argued that the Narmada contestation did not produce 
global identities based on a common ecological concern. 
Campaign against the WB — TNGOs and the discourse of national taxpayers 
The absence of global identity and citizenship formation in the INGO campaign is also 
evident in their strategic campaign against the WB, which I will show, was largely 
structured around national politics and relied on evoking the humanitarian responsibility 
of national citizens towards the Narmada people. 
For INGOs involved in the campaign the destruction occurring in the Narmada Valley 
was seen as directly related to the World Bank's neglect of its own procedures and 
violations of its laws rather than simply the responsibility of the Indian government. 
This made it the primary target for the international campaign against the Sardar 
Sarovar dam. A report written by EDF highlighting its concerns regarding the Bank's 
involvement, states: 
"...there has been negligence in resettlement and rehabilitation 
planning and implementation... and no serious consideration of 
alternatives or consultation with local NGOs. These factors have 
led to mounting opposition to the project, now in its sixth year, 
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amongst international NGOs as well as constant protest in 
India" (EDF, 1991*)49. 
As has already been mentioned, opposition to the World Bank was strategically 
structured around putting pressure on the Board of Executive Directors. In order to 
understand the manner in which the campaign evolved it is important to know that the 
twenty-four Executive Directors of the Bank are directed to vote on Bank policies and 
projects by the finance ministry of the shareholder country they represent. Since 
Northern countries are the largest shareholders with correspondingly greater influence 
over the Bank, the international campaign concentrated on lobbying the Executive 
Directors of these countries. This led to a campaign structure that focused primarily on 
national politics where international NGOs behaved like national civil society actors 
applying pressure on their respective governments and creating national public opinion 
against the dam and the World Bank. The various state-bound Narmada campaigns 
were led and organised by, what the activists referred to as 'nodal NGOs' in each 
country which took the responsibility for planning action and enlisting the support of 
other NGOs in the same country. Here is a plan of strategy prepared by Lori Udall in 
USA in June 1992, around the time when the Morse report was released: 
"Following are the points of action we are taking here and ask 
you to take as the leader of the Narmada Campaign in your 
country...1) Please initiate an immediate letter writing 
campaign. Letters are critical from NGOs and the general public 
in your country, to your relevant government agencies, 
parliaments and directly to the WB...3) Please meet with your 
parliament members and fmance ministries and ask them to 
write letters to the EDs and to Preston (President of WB)" (EDF, 
1992*)5°. 
49 'Environmental, social, and economic concerns related to the World Bank-financed Sardar Sarovar 
dam and power-project and Sardar Sarovar water delivery and drainage project'. 
50 'Release of Report of SSP Independent Review Team', Memorandum from EDF (June 21st). 
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It cannot be denied however that these national campaigns were indeed coordinating 
and cooperating across borders by sharing information and pursuing common campaign 
goals. What is argued though is that these campaigns did not create or espouse global 
identities and affiliations, rather they depended on evoking national frames to encourage 
action over the Indian dam. 
While NGOs held their government responsible for World Bank's lending operations, 
governments responded to this by disapproving of the project on the basis that it did not 
meet national goals of development aid. For example in a letter to the President of the 
World Bank, Swedish members of Parliament state: 
"Sweden's development assistance has five fundamental aims: 
economic growth, economic and social equalization, economic 
and political independence, a democratic development model 
and environmental care. Being a member of the World Bank, 
Sweden shares the responsibility for how Bank funds are 
spent...we are, however, uncertain as to whether the Sardar 
Sarovar Project...meets the aims of Swedish Development 
assistance... We therefore appeal to you to halt further 
disbursements for the Sardar Sarovar and not to approve any 
new loans" (`Swedish members of Parliament', 1991*). 
Financing of the project is thus treated as a national issue relating to Swedish 
development assistance rather than essentially global funding by the World Bank. 
The national framework which structured the campaign was substantiated at the level of 
public discourse generated by international NGOs. Citizens, whose taxes went towards 
development aid and World Bank shares, had the right as well as responsibility to 
question their government regarding the use to which their taxes were put. Thus the 
UK-based NGO — The Ecologist, invokes the 'British taxpayers' to hold their 
government to account: 
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"Write to your MP expressing outrage that British taxpayers 
funded the Narmada dam and studies against the local people's 
wishes...Stop the government using our money to harm the poor 
and the environment of the Third World" (Ecologist, c1994*) 51 . 
Even when challenging the World Bank, the public's political claim over the bank is 
established through their status as national taxpayers. A letter to the Executive Directors 
from 'students and staff at the Department of Civil Engineering of the University of 
Karlsruhe, Germany' states: 
"Continued support for the Sardar Sarovar Project in its present 
state is totally unjustified, and so is continued public support for 
the Bank if it is blithely to continue using taxpayer's money to 
fund it" (1993*). 
As taxpayers whose money funds the Bank, they have a moral responsibility to ensure 
that the Bank's development projects are justified: 
"What right has the Bank, what right have we whose money is 
being used, to disperse families, to break up village 
communities, to deprive people for their friends and relations?" 
(ibid, original emphasis). 
Here the concerns of German citizens for the project and the Bank's involvement in it 
stems from humanitarian concerns regarding the well-being of those affected by the 
project. The moral responsibility of people towards the displaced is based not on their 
status simply as global humans but as national taxpayers. 
Letters from citizens of other countries convey similar standpoints: 
51 'Unhappy Birthday World Bank' (pamphlet). 
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"As American taxpayers, we do not wish our tax dollars to be 
used for so-called "development" projects which submerge 
villages, uproot cultures, pauperize indigenous peoples and 
destroy long-standing agricultural eco-systems" (`American 
citizens', 1990*)52. 
Or here Canadian citizens writing to Executive Directors even threaten to withdraw 
funding from the Bank: 
"...if the World Bank conducts its affairs in ways that are 
abhorrent to the Canadian public we will have to withdraw our 
membership" (` Canadian citizens', 1991*). 
From all these letters, it is clear, firstly, that support for the people of the Valley stems 
from humanitarian concerns directed towards a localised, bounded community rather 
than emerging from global issues of interdependency that could draw First World 
citizens into a common struggle with the people of the Valley. Secondly, national 
identities are primarily evoked while raising opposition to the Bank. Supporting the 
Bank's immoral involvement in the project is viewed as counter to the essence of their 
national ethos and values — thus "As American citizens" the dam cannot be supported, 
just as the World Bank has conducted its affairs "in ways that are abhorrent to the 
Canadian public". An essential American or Canadian political nature is constructed 
which cannot support the unjust manner in which the Bank has behaved. By opposing 
the Bank and supporting the people of the Valley, citizens are performing their national 
citizenship, where humanitarian concern is viewed as part of their national 
responsibilities. 
52 Letter to Executive Director of USA and Senior Vice President of the Bank, from 'American citizens' 
(April 21' 1990). 
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The campaign for the withdrawal of the WB from the project was therefore structured 
around the state-centric politics of national taxpayers. 'International' NGOs behaved 
more like national rather than global civil society actors, concentrating on mobilising 
public opinion and lobbying governments and Executive Directors of their own 
countries. 
Human rights and the Indian state 
The prominence of national processes in the politics of INGOs of the Narmada 
campaign can also be seen in the way in which they were unable to organise political 
action to prevent human rights abuses in the valley, even though these abuses were 
rhetorically denounced. Human rights are viewed to be an important ideological and 
legal mechanism that provides the basis for the alternative politics of GCS by 
challenging national sovereignty (Chapter 2). The inability of INGOs to mobilise 
against human rights abuses calls into question the extent to which they were 
constructing GCS. 
The impotence of INGOs in mobilising global structures of governance of the UN to 
challenge national sovereignty in order to protect human rights became visible very 
early on in the campaign. In 1986 the UK-based INGO — Survival International wrote a 
petition regarding the abuse of HRs in the valley, to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in Geneva — a United Nations organ for the promotion of HRs of 
tribal and indigenous communities. ILO followed this up with a letter to the Indian 
government. This intervention however was met with resistance by the Indian 
authorities who brushed it aside with "fake" assurances of the state's respect for human 
rights. ILO failed to pursue the issue and quietly surrendered. For Medha Patekar this 
made the "limitations of the UN organisations clear to us" (20/9/05). The international 
campaign subsequent to this remained cautious of encroaching on the Indian state's 
jurisdiction. As Patekar suggested in an interview, foreign attempts to hold the 
government accountable to human rights violations would have been 
"counterproductive", only fuelling government allegations that the NBA was a Western 
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led attempt to sabotage India's development. Accusations of HRs violations were thus 
directed towards the WB rather than Indian government. Indeed once the World Bank 
withdrew from the project international activists were left without a "hook" with which 
to latch on to the Project (Udall, 20/6/06). While human rights abuses by the state 
increased after the World Bank withdrew and continue till today, international human 
rights activists have been left powerless to confront the Indian state. Indeed active 
international support for the movement reduced drastically after the WB withdrew even 
though the issues around which the campaign mobilised remain unresolved. The 
privileging of national sovereignty of India over the human rights of local communities 
in the international Narmada campaign again throws into question claims that the INGO 
campaign represents an emergent global civil society and an alternative to the nation-
state system. 
CONCLUSION 
A basic assumption underpinning theorisations of GCS is that it is a form of global 
governance that provides an alternative to state-centric politics. INGOs are viewed to be 
the primary enactors of this alternative politics, performing global action and promoting 
global identities. This is contradicted by analysis presented here from one of the most 
celebrated instances of GCS — the International Narmada campaign of INGOs. In the 
case of this campaign, while contestation was co-ordinated across national boundaries, I 
have argued that it did not fully transcend the state system to create deterritorialised 
global forms of action, discourse and identity. This is evident firstly, in the localisation 
and territorialisation of 'environmentalism' as a concern for the livelihoods of local 
people, secondly, in efforts to awaken the moral conscience of 'national citizens and 
taxpayers' in the West against the WB's destructive development policies, and finally, 
in the failure of the international network to uphold human rights as a legitimate 
concern over and above India's national sovereignty. 
By calling for national taxpayers in the West to protect defenceless local communities 
and 'their environment', the international campaign failed to represent the Narmada 
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issue as a global struggle. Rather than construct an equal partnership between the people 
of the Narmada valley and Western public in a global struggle (whether against global 
capitalism represented by the WB or for environmental justice), the campaign tended to 
promote a depoliticised discourse of the moral virtue of INGOs and the international 
community to act on behalf of dependent and disempowered local communities. This 
was not conducive to the formation of politicised global citizenship. 
This chapter thus opens-up debate regarding the constituents of GCS, where consensus 
otherwise prevails regarding the role of INGOs in promoting global citizenship and 
global struggle. Though the Narmada campaign coordinated political action across 
national boundaries, it did so on the basis of national identities. It was therefore at best 
constructing a transnational citizenship but not a de-territorialised global citizenship 
which is based on the recognition of common global objectives. Indeed, dependency of 
local communities on the moral conscience of INGOs, rather than equal participation in 
common struggle, is made a more probable basis for an alliance between these two 
actors because of the power (in terms of economic and cultural resources) that INGOs 
tend to have over grassroots movements. This thus calls into question the ability of 
INGOs to lead the development of radicalised global citizenship. From this point of 
departure, the following chapters turn to a more detailed discussion of the grassroots 
movement of NBA as a potential site of global citizenship and the pedagogical process 
of social struggle that facilitates this. 
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Chapter 7 
NBA's Collective Identity — Political and Cognitive Praxis at 
the Local, National and Global Scales 
INTRODUCTION 
While analysing NBA's collective identity as a struggle of local, national or global 
relevance, from the perspective of the movement, this chapter explores the possibility of 
instantiating GCS in and through NBA. In doing so it attempts to counter the perceived 
marginalisation of local movements in GCS literature. Drawing on the Gramscian 
interpretative framework developed in chapter 3, it examines how the collective identity 
of the movement at various scales — local, national and global, evolved through a 
dialectical interaction between the political and cognitive praxis, or action and reflection 
components of the movement's collective identity. This dialectical interaction is viewed 
as an educative process, with the learning emerging from this encompassed in and 
constituting the movement's collective identity. In order to answer whether the 
movement is a collective actor within GCS, the chapter examines the possible forms in 
which the movement's collective identity reflects learning of connections between local 
struggle and national and global scales of transformation. 
The chapter begins by identifying analytical problems in current understandings of 
NBA's collective identity and multiple scales of action. Before turning to address these, 
the Gramscian notion of collective identity that informs analysis is revisited and 
connected to the notion of scale and scale frames. The next section explores the 
movement's construction of the scale of struggle from local, national, transnational to 
global. At each scale the interactions between the political and cognitive praxis of the 
movement is explored to understand the learning processes that led to the extension of 
scale of action and collective identity. Finally these processes of political-cognitive 
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praxis and learning are brought together to understand the evolution of NBA's 
collective identity. 
ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS IN CURRENT THEORISATIONS OF NBA 
As I suggested in chapter 2, theoretical representations of political alliances between 
local social movements and international NGOs are dominated by Keck and Sildcnik's 
boomerang model of transnationalisation. Within this, weak local movements are often 
portrayed as adopting global identities and discourses as tactical mechanisms for 
drawing support from powerful NGOs to defend local claims. Earlier I showed how this 
creates and reinforces a dichotomy between local as parochial and global as 
transformative. 
Studies on NBA's efforts to transnationalise its resistance also tend to feed into this 
trend (Gandhi, 2003). Thus the NBA's 'liberation consciousness' of environmentalism 
and destructive development, i.e. the global dimensions of NBA's collective identity are 
analysed by Dwivedi (1998) as simply a "constructed strategic predisposition" that is 
"selectively drawn upon" when addressing its global constituency (p161-162). It is also 
suggested by many that environmental discourse was not only selectively deployed at 
the transnational level but came to dominate the movement's collective identity 
(Guadalupe and Rodrigues, 2004; Randeria, 2003). Thus "after aligning itself with some 
of the world's most prominent environmental organisations, the NDS/NGNS had 
steered sharply towards environmentalism" (Sen, 1999, p357, italics added). These 
analytical conclusions of global determinancy are drawn even when descriptive 
accounts in the same article point to national sources of environmentalism. Whitehead 
(2005) even suggests that NBA's alliance with INGOs led to a distortion and neglect of 
local demands — "Mobilization came to be focused on an anti-dam policy that 
conformed to a western environmental discourse that had international legitimacy, 
while the issues of compensation became secondary" (p17). These accounts imply that 
the presence of global discourses within NBA appeared through emulating or 
mechanically transplanting discourses of INGOs. 
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Associated with accusations of undue international influence on NBA is the criticism 
that it retreated from engagement with national political institutions. For instance, 
Randeria (2003) notes "The vocabulary of the movement as much as the timing of local 
action was often determined by demands of the global arena and transnational 
constituency building instead of seeking to work through regional and national political 
institutions" (p315). 
Such accounts are problematic in at least four ways. Firstly, they create a model of 
unmediated local to global linkage that removes the local movement and its grievances 
from the national context of power and struggle. Secondly, discourse is simply seen as a 
mobilisation resource, which misses its relevance as a process of critical reflection and 
articulation of politicised positions. Thirdly, local mobilisations and their demands are 
treated as static. Consequently they fail to see the construction of collective identity of 
local movements as an ongoing and dynamic process of learning through engagement 
with national and global power structures. Fourthly, various scales — local, national and 
global are seen as separate and distinct. This fails to identify the enmeshment of 
national and local level processes in the transnationalisation of grievances. 
In terms of the first of these shortcomings, namely the obfuscation of the national 
dimensions of NBA's politics, it should be clear by now (and will become clearer in the 
course of this chapter) that the movement engaged with national political institutions 
(chapter 5) in parallel with international institutions (chapter 6). Thus the suggestion 
that the movement's politics represented a shifting upwards of resistance from national 
to transnational simply ignores the manner in which the campaign against the WB was 
carried on alongside and was bolstered by an equally strong campaign targeting the 
Indian state. Indeed this politics of multiple levels is already acknowledged by some 
observers (Dwivedi, 1998; Bose, 2004). 
However beyond concrete engagements with political institutions, movements are also 
continuously engaged in subjective processes of interpreting political institutions and 
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constructing grievances. These processes have not been fully acknowledged in the case 
of NBA, and this failure underlies the last three problems in current studies on NBA 
highlighted above, which together lead to simplistic and mechanistic accounts of NBA's 
development. In order to avoid such mechanistic accounts there is a need to explore the 
manner in which a movement's political actions both lead to and are shaped by the 
subjective aspects of its collective identity. Below I elaborate on the conceptualisation 
of collective identity guiding this chapter and its relationship to the notion of political 
scales and scale frames. 
DEFINING COLLECTIVE IDENTITY, SCALE AND SCALE FRAMES 
The collective identity of a movement is the "enduring self-definition that a group 
constructs in the process of collective action" (Taylor and Whittier, 1995, p165). This 
self-definition is apparent according to Melucci (1985) in the structural 'form' of the 
movement. Thus the "form of a movement is a message" (p801). Collective identity is 
therefore a symbolic property emergent from the practices of the movement such that 
"their practices...are their self-definition" (Castells, 2004, p'73). In this chapter I 
identify NBA's collective identity in terms of political and cognitive practices or praxis. 
Political praxis involves engagement with political structures and refers specifically to 
movement tactics which are strategic responses to these structures. Cognitive praxis 
pertains to discursive and physical practices within the sphere of civil society and is 
identifiable in two forms — firstly in terms of collective action frames that refer to "sets 
of beliefs that justify and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns" (Kurtz, 
2003, p894). These discursive frameworks for action construct the movement's 
grievances and assign meaning to political structures in a manner that guides and 
substantiates strategic action. Secondly, cognitive praxis is evident in the self-
constituting practices of a movement. These practices express the movement's cognitive 
praxis, for instance through the formation of ideological (rather than strategic) alliances 
and self-help strategies. The political and cognitive praxis of the movement represents 
the doing and thinking of the movement's collective identity and together constitute the 
nature of the movement's 'us' in opposition to the opponent 'them'. As we shall see, the 
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political and cognitive praxis of a movement exist in dialectical interaction with each 
other leading to a process of learning that is embodied in the movement's collective 
identity. 
The notion of collective identity suggests that the actions and grievances of a movement 
are not inevitable and pre-existing, but are reflexively constructed by the movement. An 
important part of developing and constructing actions and grievances involves 
determining the political scale at which they should be exercised. 
The concept of scale is used to analytically structure space, i.e. to create boundaries. 
However as Marston (2000) emphasises scale is not an 'ontologically given category', 
but is itself socially constructed - "scale is not necessarily a preordained hierarchical 
framework for ordering the world — local, regional, national and global. It is instead a 
contingent outcome of the tensions that exist between structural forces and the practices 
of human agents" (p220). In this sense the creation of scales is a political process 
(Brenner, 1997), which provides a "mode of understanding the world" (Perreault, 2003, 
p64) rather than a fixed, unchanging frame of reference. The constructed nature of 
scales is evident from their relational quality in that a scale is identifiable only when 
juxtaposed against other scales. 
The construction of the scale of protest is driven by the formation of scale frames that 
are a form of collective action frames that discursively construct the scale at which 
blame is attributed and grievances identified. Scale frames are thus the "the discursive 
practices that construct meaning (and actionable) linkages between the scale at which a 
social problem is experienced and the scale(s) at which it could be politically addressed 
or resolved" (Kurtz, 2003, p894). Scale frames therefore determine which political 
institutions are targeted, at what scale and in what manner. These subjective 
frameworks can be seen as part of the cognitive praxis of the movement which 
themselves are a product of learning arising from a movement's political praxis. The 
scale at which a movement constructs and contests its struggle is therefore reflective of 
the movement's collective identity. The significance of these processes and their 
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interconnections will become clearer as I go on to examine the manner in which NBA's 
collective identity evolved and was constructed at various political scales. 
Before this however one final point must be made. Collective identity represents the 
"shared definition" (Taylor and Whittier, 1995, p 1 72) of a movement. The following 
investigation of collective identity therefore focuses on the public, consensual image of 
the movement rather than internal differences and tensions. Analysis is therefore based 
on observations and interviews of people and media through which this image is 
projected — urban activists, leader figures, documents, newsletters and press releases of 
the NBA. 
PROCESSES IN NBA'S MULTISCALAR POLITICS AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
In this section I explore the evolution of NBA's collective identity as a local struggle to 
one of national and global relevance. I examine how the expansion of the movement's 
political scale of contestation was based on a process of learning emerging from a 
dialectical interaction between the movement's political and cognitive praxis. 
The Local Scale Frame and Collective Identity 
The first three years of NBA's struggle against the SSP, from 1985-1988, were, I argue, 
conducted at the local scale of contestation, in that mobilisations during this time were 
organised solely around the demand for adequate rehabilitation. Since this demand was 
only of material relevance to those immediately affected by the dam, the movement at 
this stage was 'localised'. Of course this local scale of contestation is only apparent in 
juxtaposition against the other scales at which the movement's political struggle later 
developed (as will be described soon). The local as is referred to here, therefore, was 
not a pre-existing, concrete entity. Indeed its spatial contours evolved between 1985 and 
1988. While Medha Patekar first started mobilising tribal villages in Maharashtra, 
gradually also Gujarat, and eventually Adivasi and Nimari villages in Madhya Pradesh, 
the 'local' grassroots mass base of the movement developed from families in different 
villages and states, to encompass 'people of the Narmada Valley'. Though the local was 
189 
clearly not a pre-existing 'thing', the localness of the political struggle at this stage is 
nevertheless visible in the bounded relevance of political demands for rehabilitation to 
those directly affected by the project. 
The political praxis of the movement at this stage, thus involved petitioning local 
authorities, the state and national governments to meet these demands. Patekar also 
sought to form linkages with sympathetic national civil society organisations which 
were viewed as 'opportunity structures'53 that could increase pressure on the 
government to respond to local demands for rehabilitation: 
"Actually in the beginning I thought, gosh...how will we reach 
the district officials, state officials and the government, how will 
we put pressure on them working from such an interior 
place...That's why I came up with the model of support 
groups...The first support group we formed was in Dhargaon 
tehsil in Maharashtra, then we formed one in Dhulia in 1986." 
(Patekar, 26/2/06). 
The linkage of the grassroots struggle to national civil society clearly had an important 
strategic function. It also led to an interaction between the actors who would come to 
play a large role in the development of the normative aspects of the NBA's collective 
identity, as we shall see later. 
At this stage, however, the cognitive praxis of the movement was governed by a local 
scale frame that assumed and targeted a localised failure in the government's duty to 
deliver provisions. This framing of grievances did not explicitly challenge the state's 
legitimisation of the dam as necessary for national progress. Neither did it rebuke calls 
for the displaced to 'sacrifice' for this cause as dam authorities such as S.C. Varma 
(former chairman of the Narmada Valley Development Agency) here urges them to do: 
"Because the land occupied by the family is required for a 
development project which holds the promise of progress and 
53 This concept is taken from resource mobilisation theory (see p64). 
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prosperity for the country and people in general. The family 
getting displaced thus makes a sacrifice so that others may live 
in happiness and be economically better off." (Quoted in 
Baviskar, 2004, p223). 
The movement's acceptance of the project as a whole also did not raise any challenges 
to arguments in support of the dam that were based on the assertion that 'backward' 
Adivasis would also benefit from displacement by being brought into the mainstream 
society and economy (Baviskar, 1995). 
As such, NBA apparently conceded to the hegemonic image of the state as neutral 
arbitrator of 'development for all' and protector of citizens' rights and well-being. In a 
document outlining the 'Role of Voluntary Organization in Rehabilitation' Patekar 
states: 
"In the welfare state that India is, with the State responsible both 
for the macro-planning and execution of the projects concerned 
as also welfare of all sections of the disadvantaged (who include 
the oustees), the government is rightly held responsible as the 
main actor in this regard. The compulsory nature of relocation 
makes it much more obligatory for the State [to provide 
rehabilitation] (Patekar, c1985, p4*). 
Patekar's characterisation of relocation as 'compulsory' suggests that the necessity of 
development projects for the national interest was not questioned and that the 
displacement of people for this purpose was considered legitimate. Patekar further 
evokes the image of the state as impartial promoter of universal development by 
emphasising the state's role in protecting the 'welfare of all sections of the 
disadvantaged' in the development process. 
The displacement of local communities was thus not connected to a systemic critique of 
the development model. As such a local scale of contestation was constructed that bore 
no relevance to those beyond the locality and therefore did not necessitate mobilisation 
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beyond this bounded area. This scale frame was expressed in self-constituting practices 
of the movement such as holding meetings and demonstrations in which people came to 
view themselves as visthapit or 'displaced people', initially of various villages, and 
slowly of the Narmada Valley. 
From the political and cognitive praxis of the movement at this stage it can be suggested 
that the collective identity of the movement was that of a localised struggle in which the 
local communities to be immediately displaced by the Sardar Sarovar dam constituted 
the movement community. NBA's collective identity did not remain as such however. 
From 1988 onwards it began to develop at a national scale as we shall see below. 
The National Scale Frame and Collective Identity 
In August 1988 NBA's political praxis underwent a transition. The movement ceased 
simply demanding rehabilitation and stopped cooperating with the state authorities. This 
signalled a political opposition to the state's development policies that culminated in the 
declaration of complete opposition to the dam. Underlying this declaration was a 
qualitatively different collective action frame that operated at the national scale. While I 
will elaborate on the content of this national framing later, here it is necessary to draw 
attention to how this framing emerged. Essentially this process was based on learning 
from movement experiences arising out of the movement's political praxis at the local 
level involving firstly, direct engagement with the state to deliver local provisions and 
secondly, the formation of linkages with national civil society organisations to facilitate 
this engagement. Through these experiences the movement learnt that the state's 
hegemonic image as protector of human rights and neutral arbitrator of competing 
interests could not be upheld. This shift in understanding led to changes in the 
movement's political and cognitive praxis that transformed NBA's scale frame of 
political contestation from local to national. 
Examining the first dimension of NBA's political praxis, the movement's interactions 
with government institutions and personnel had a pedagogical impact in that it enabled 
the movement to directly encounter and experience the state in a way that conflicted 
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with its hegemonic image, and thus played an important role in NBA's reassessment of 
the state. This process of learning occurred gradually and started with movement 
leaders' efforts to gather information regarding rehabilitation plans from the three state 
governments involved in the project — information that shockingly oustees had not yet 
been given. Apart from obtaining and analysing policy documents and rehabilitation 
blueprints, activists also held public meetings in which they questioned local officials in 
front of oustees. They also initiated collective searches and examination of resettlement 
land identified by the governments. From this it became apparent that there were serious 
shortcomings in the arrangements for resettlement made by the three state governments, 
ultimate responsibility for which fell with the central government. These concerns are 
raised in an NBA document dated around 1988: 
"...the most preliminary information regarding the number of 
villages and families affected, the extent of the areas which is 
going to be sub-merged, the number of hamlets likely to be 
displaced either because they will be surrounded by water of for 
other reasons is not available from the states till today, leave 
aside the detailed plan for rehabilitation" (NBA, c1988, p4*)54. 
The mobilisation, however responded to this situation by "continu[ing] to pursue a 
process of dialogue" (Patekar, 1993, p159). Activists in consultation with oustees 
formulated a list of thirty-six demands mostly relating to the form of rehabilitation 
required by oustees as well as the need for more information on existing and future 
government plans for rehabilitation. These demands were presented to the government 
accompanied by a mass rally of oustees in 1986. The government's response to this, 
according to the movement, however was the formulation of more "paper policies and 
paper provisions" (NBA, c1988, p5*) that did not materialise on the ground. 
Reflecting the movement's original acceptance of the state's hegemonic image of 
neutrality, movement leaders often understood the government's inadequate planning of 
54 `Sardar Sarovar on the Narmada: Why do we oppose?' (pamphlet). 
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rehabilitation in non-politicised terms, as "mistakes" (Patekar, c1987a, p2*)55, "lack of 
coordination" (ibid) and "bureaucratic failures and insensitiveness" (Patekar, c1985, 
p2*), rather than as an indication of the state's class character. However this assessment 
started to slowly change — though unevenly, in that activists persisted in expecting the 
state to perform its hegemonic function and thus deliver entitlements to oustees, while 
at the same time increasingly voicing a more critical view of the state's 
unresponsiveness as suggestive of "vested interests" (Patekar, c1985, p4*) and lack of 
political will. As recounted by Patekar: 
"We have been betrayed many times by the state. They have 
broken the promises they made to us...After having dialogue, 
questioning, getting information and saying you have to show us 
full rehabilitation, finally we got tired of saying this and we 
realised that they will not do these things, there is no political 
will, they are not capable of giving full rehabilitation" (Patekar, 
26/2/06). 
Patekar's expression of 'broken promises' and 'betrayal' highlights the fact that the 
movement had clear expectations that the government would support its cause. At the 
same time it suggests an emerging recognition of the fallacy of these expectations. The 
crystallisation of this shift in the movement's perception of the state is even more 
apparent in the way in which a new reason is attributed to the government's failure to 
respond — i.e. a lack of "political will" that reformulates the state as a politicised and 
biased agent of development (the presence of 'vested interests' that is implied by this 
will be elaborated on below). That this shifting perception involves learning, is evident 
from the manner in which it is "realised" through a process of "dialogue and 
questioning" of the state. An emergent criticality towards the state also led activists to 
question the legitimacy of the state's model of 'development' itself: 
"Can we describe this displacement of large number of poor 
people...as 'Justice' or 'development'?" (NBA, c1988, p3*). 
55 'A brief note on the Narmada Dharangrast Samiti' 
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The government's callousness with regard to rehabilitation of poor people, who need 
development the most, was thus exposing the fallacy of development as a universal 
project of economic betterment. 
In 1988 one last meeting was organised by activists which was attended by state and 
central level authorities and 300 project affected people. In this "fmal dialogue", lasting 
for six hours, when no concrete solutions to the issue of resettlement were forthcoming, 
the mass-organisation decided that "we must give two months' time to the government 
and, then if we do not get the answers, oppose the dam" (Patekar, 1993, p161). 
The learning leading upto this ultimatum, and eventually to a national scaling of NBA's 
grievances (as will be shown below), was a result, as suggested by movement leaders, 
of "the experience we continued to gain through our interaction with the governments" 
(NBA, 1991, p6*)56. This pedagogical process however was supported by another 
dimension of the movement's political praxis, to which I now turn, i.e. interactions with 
national civil society organisations, primarily NGOs. 
The strategic linkages that NBA formed with NGOs, as I suggested earlier, facilitated 
access to the government. It also encouraged deepening and broadening of the 
awareness that was already emerging through NBA's local experiences with the state, 
of the systemic and oppressive nature of development. NGOs contributed to this process 
in a number of ways. Firstly they drew attention to the fact that the plight of SSP 
oustees was not isolated but had been repeated in relation to other dams in India. 
Secondly, and most importantly, they helped NBA to widen their critique of SSP itself 
to include environmental and economic issues apart from rehabilitation. In fact this 
critique by NGOs had already begun to emerge before grassroots mobilisations arose. 
In 1983, following a research trip to the Narmada Valley, the Hindu Nature Club at 
Delhi University in conjunction with Kalpavriksh, an environmental NGO in Delhi, 
published a scathing report on the SSP suggesting that the model of development it 
represented is "not only ecologically non-sustainable, it is also socio-culturally 
56 'Response to Arch-Vahini's critique of Narmada Bachao Andolan and anti-dam arguments'. 
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destructive" (Kalpavriksh, 1985, p285)57. This report was widely circulated to NGOs 
within India as well as internationally. The report was also presented to the recently 
created Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) who were keen to establish their 
position as custodians of environmental issues in India. Based on Kalpavriksh's study 
they withheld environmental clearance for the project. At the same time investigations 
by supportive organisations uncovered inaccuracies in the government's assessment of 
costs and economic benefits of the project. This served to build a body of counter-
knowledge that challenged the very grounds upon which the government legitimised the 
project — i.e. its importance for the economic and social progress of the nation. Based on 
technical examinations of project plans, it was also argued that the main benefits of the 
dam would go to rich farmers and industrial factories in Gujarat rather than the 
impoverished and drought-stricken region of Kutch and Saurashtra that the project had 
been proclaimed to serve (NBA, c1988*). 
Despite MoEF's refusal to give official approval to the project, the Indian government 
proceeded to secure a WB loan for SSP. In 1987 however, MoEF finally gave 
conditional clearance. Through their contacts with environmental NGOs in India, 
movement leaders learnt that the clearance was given under intense pressure from the 
central government and that the Ministry was still concerned about the ecological 
impact of the project. This further validated the movement's increasing realisation of 
the politicised nature of development, which their experiences of demanding 
rehabilitation had already begun to suggest. It highlighted: 
"...the irrationality in government's decisions related to Sardar 
Sarovar, [as] a perfect example of the vested interests active in 
pushing large scale 'development projects' without ensuring 
their justifiability both in economic and social terms, weighing 
the benefits and costs in the light of 'equity and justice' 
(Patekar, c1987a, p3). 
57 This is an abridged version of the original report authored by The Environmental Action Group and the 
Hindu College Nature Club, Delhi University (1993), titled - 'The Narmada Valley Project —
Development or Destruction?' 
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The depiction of the government as irrational in its bias towards "vested interests" is 
again suggestive of the change in the movement's understanding of the state which was 
previously viewed as a 'rational' agent arbitrating justly and fairly between competing 
interests. The state's "irrationality" in making decisions regarding development exposes 
the failure of the dominant model of development as a process based on "equity and 
justice", for the 'public interest' (NBA, c1988, p11*). 
In that NGOs made movement leaders aware of wider environmental and economic 
critiques of the dam, and showed the ways in which official procedures of the 
government were "bulldozed" (Patekar, 4/3/05) as in the case of the mandatory 
environmental clearance, NGOs provided an indirect means through which the state 
was further experienced by NBA. 
The movement's political praxis of engagement with the state and civil society 
organisations at the local scale thus provided direct and indirect pedagogical 
experiences of the state that crystallised into an awareness of the "hegemony of the 
myth of 'development"' (NBA, 2002, p9*)58. In August 1988, this learning culminated 
in a shift in the movement's political praxis from demanding rehabilitation to outright 
opposition to the dam and was articulated through slogans such as: 
Vikas niti dhoka hai, dhaka maro mauka hai! (Development 
politics is a fraud, kick it out, this is the chance!) 
Punarvas niti dhoka hai! (The rehabilitation policy is a fraud!) 
This tactical change was thus driven as much by an ideological opposition to the state's 
development model, as it was by a conviction that the state would never be able to fully 
rehabilitate the displaced. 
The political learning that led to opposition to the dam was condensed within an 
expanded cognitive praxis of the movement, involving a broader ideological critique of 
development as capitalist-led, non-democratic, environmentally destructive and 
58 Tor a true national interest: Save the Namada Valley' (pamphlet). 
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exploitative of the poor. In opposition to the hegemony of development the movement 
formed a counter-hegemonic discourse of the 'environmentalism of the poor'. While I 
have elaborated on the nature of this discourse in chapter 5, here it is necessary to 
highlight that this cognitive praxis extended the scale frame of the struggle towards the 
national level: 
"The oustees today have declared their total opposition to the 
project not only to protect their own properties and interests but 
also in the interest of the nation; in the interest of real 
development" (NBA, c1988, p20*). 
The local struggle of the displaced for their homes, land, forests and livelihood was 
recast as a matter of wider national significance, suggesting a dialectical relationship 
between local concerns of the Narmada people and national interests. This was achieved 
by conceptualising the local plight of oustees as symptomatic of problems with the 
hegemonic model of development promoted and executed by the state. NBA is 
therefore positioned as a struggle for the 'real development' of the nation. By equating 
tribal and rural people's struggle against displacement in the Narmada Valley with 
`national interest' NBA suggests that these people, and the poor people that they 
represent, are the 'real' India in opposition to the elite few who benefit from the 
dominant model of development. Thus the movement: 
"...became a significant attempt of empowerment of people to 
face and challenge the mighty state and its design to pauperize, 
deprive masses while favouring prosperity of a much small 
stratum of society as is the final result of such development 
strategy" (NBA, 1991, p 1 *). 
NBA's identification of the Narmada people as members of the 'masses' who are 
commonly exploited by 'development', provided the discursive basis for uniting various 
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other oppressed groups across India to formulate a broad-based, and thus counter-
hegemonic challenge to the hegemonic model of development. 
The movement's challenge to destructive development however, did not just remain at 
the discursive level but was manifested in its self-constituting practices that consisted of 
the formation of alliances with other social movements of the poor broadly fighting 
against destructive development within India. The beginnings of this network were 
made in September 1989, when the Narmada Bachao Andolan organised the 'National 
Rally Against Destructive Development' in Harsud. The first of its kind, the rally 
attracted 50,000-100,000 people who were fighting their own struggles against 
development beyond the Narmada Valley (Sangvai, 2002). The civil society interaction 
emerging from this rally finally led to the formation of the National Alliance of 
People's Movements (NAPM) in 1996. The Alliance consists of over 200 
environmental, tribal, lower caste, women's and human rights organisations and 
movements as well as groups such as the National Fisherman's Forum that are striving 
to achieve: 
"people's rights over natural resources, for true internationalism 
and for a just, sustainable and egalitarian society, with a clear 
ideology against corporate globalisation, religious 
fundamentalism and discrimination of any kind" (NAPM, 
c1996*)59. 
Though the NAPM is national in organisation it is apparently also committed to an 
"internationalism" that recognises the dialectical relationship between national and 
global forms of oppression. More will be said about this later. 
For NBA this alliance was different from the partnerships that it had formed with NGOs 
within a local scale frame. While those linkages had been treated as an important 
strategic mechanism to support and strengthen the local struggle, the alliances with 
59 'National Alliance of People Peoples' Movements' (leaflet). 
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social movements at the national scale were based on the perception of an ideological 
and political affinity. These alliances thus served to constitute NBA's struggle as one of 
national relevance: 
"At another level, the NBA has always been relating to the 
wider struggle. NBA to NAPM, that process does not merely 
[mean] going to different struggles and then saying, "We 
support you, and you support us". It means building a 
comprehensive ideological position and taking local to national 
action" (Medha quoted in Bose, 2004, p145). 
In that alliance formation is not limited to strategic considerations, and instead attempts 
to construct a "comprehensive ideological position" that challenges the hegemony, 
NAPM might be understood as formative steps towards the coalescence of various 
isolated struggles into a counter-hegemonic 'bloc' that is engaged in a Gramscian 'war 
of position'. Attempts to further strengthen this revolutionary praxis is evident in 
proposals by NBA leaders to "have a national struggle from NAPM to NPM — from 
national alliance of people's movements to national people's movements" (Patekar, 
26/2/06). Though this would be the next step in the transformative dialectic between 
action and reflection, leaders of the various movements within NAPM have not yet "felt 
prepared enough" (ibid) to move in this direction. 
By developing a national framing of their local grievances NBA was also expanding its 
collective identity to include not just the displaced of the Narmada Valley but all poor 
people in India who are fighting against destructive development policies promoted by 
the state. NBA was thus projecting itself as part of a broader national movement of the 
`environmentalism of the poor'. 
This account of the extension of NBA's collective identity from a local to a national 
scale movement is significant in two ways. Firstly it illustrates the manner in which 
experiences gained from the movement's political praxis of engaging with the state and 
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national civil society organisations led to critical awareness of local displacement as a 
symptom of the inequitable nature of development. A process of learning was therefore 
involved in extending the movement's scale frame of contestation from local to 
national, and in the associated formation of NBA's counter-hegemonic alliances at the 
local level. Secondly, and emerging from the first point, the account of learning 
processes in NBA's transformation from a local struggle for rehabilitation to a wider 
struggle against destructive development counter-checks those accounts that attribute 
NBA's development to a mechanical process of adopting environmental discourses 
from INGOs. 
Though I doubt the extent to which INGOs were involved in determining the 
environmental aspects of NBA's discourse, the movement's political engagement with 
INGOs and the WB was instrumental in producing other aspects of the movement's 
collective identity, to which I now turn. 
Transnational Scale Frame and Collective Identity 
As I have shown so far, the movement's political interactions with the state led to an 
emerging awareness of the state's political apathy to the movement's legitimate 
demands. This encouraged the movement to launch a strategic trans-border campaign, 
alongside national contestation that targeted the fmancer of the project — the WB. 
The extension of political contestation across national borders is commonly treated as 
evidence of the formation of global scale frames. However this is based on a misguided 
conflation of trans-border activity with the global (Tarrow, 2005). As we shall see, 
NBA did take its struggle beyond the national level, but this did not automatically lead 
to a global scaling of their grievances. To avoid this conflation, I will highlight the 
manner in which NBA's international campaign operated at transnational and global 
scales of contention. 
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Tarrow identifies two forms of 'transnational' action in which the state is either directly 
or indirectly a target of protest — one which he refers to as internalisation where local 
actors appeal to their governments to prevent global forces impinging on national 
politics; and externalisation, based on Keck and Sikknik's Boomerang model, where 
local actors seek global support to prevent state injustices. As I will show, NBA's 
linkage with INGOs and the campaign targeting the WB itself was at least initially 
based on externalising transnational protest. The political praxis of the movement at the 
transnational scale thus involved indirectly targeting the Indian government and its 
management of the project through external agents — the WB and INGOs. 
There were two distinct phases at this transnational scale of struggle that roughly 
coincided with the periods before and after NBA's declaration of opposition to the dam. 
The political praxis of externalising protest against the government in these two phases 
took two different forms and was based on different crystallisations of cognitive praxis. 
In a manner similar to how NBA evolved from local to national scale frames, the 
transition from the first to the second phase of the transnational scale of contestation 
was driven by what the movement was learning about the nature of the WB directly 
through its engagement with this institution, and indirectly through its interactions with 
INGOs. 
The first phase — WB as political opportunity structure 
In the early phase of NBA's mobilisation, before opposition to the dam was declared, 
the movement's political praxis targeted the WB as an external 'opportunity structure' 
through which the movement's demands on the state could be amplified. As the 
financer of the project, the WB had a significant influence over the government's 
management of SSP which under conditions of the Bank's loan agreement was legally 
bound to follow certain environmental and rehabilitation guidelines. Taking advantage 
of this, the movement used the WB as a leverage to coax the government to comply 
with conditions and prepare studies. While in this period the Indian government was 
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largely identified as the source of grievances, the presence of the WB in the project was 
not directly challenged. 
By 1986 the movement was receiving attention from INGOs involved in the MDB 
reform campaign. Medha Patekar was quick to realise their utility in facilitating the 
movement's access to the WB. For instance in 1987 Medha Patekar wrote to an 
international activist suggesting ways in which he could ask the WB to intervene in the 
domestic management of the project: 
"...Gujarat are trying their best to seek clearance for S.Sarovar 
not through fulfilling the rational, technical criteria put forward 
by the Central Government in India but through political appeals 
and pressures...WB should shut the power-lobbies within 
India...by declaring that WB will not release assistance...unless 
all these preconditional studies/plans are completed..." (Patekar, 
c1987b*)6°. 
The role of INGOs in the movement's political praxis also involved maintaining the 
`boomerang circuit' (Keck and Sikknik, 1998) between the movement, WB and Indian 
government by relaying information between these parties. While liaising with 
grassroots leaders, international activists reported government failures in rehabilitation 
planning and implementation to the Bank. In turn they also provided key insider 
information to the movement regarding the Bank's reactions to the ground situation. 
INGOs were thus an important channel through which NBA were able to politically 
engage with, and experience the WB. By extension they were therefore also integral to 
NBA's emerging tactical evaluation of the Bank's role in the project. This is not 
however to suggest that INGOs were the only means through which NBA accessed the 
WB. Leaders of the movement often wrote letters directly to the institution or would 
cease opportunities to personally interrogate WB officials when they made occasional 
trips to India. 
6° Letter written to Bruce Rich (EDF) from Patekar. 
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In this phase political praxis at the transnational scale was maintained by a cognitive 
praxis that accepted the WB's hegemonic role in facilitating development as an 
equitable process of economic betterment. NBA thus relied on the WB's "credentials as 
a Development Bank for the world's poor" (NBA, c1987*)61 and appealed to the WB 
and its staff of "modern, civilized decision-makers" (Patekar, c1988*)62 to live up to 
these credentials by forcing the Indian government to address outstanding issues of 
rehabilitation and economic and environmental impact assessments that had not yet 
been adequately addressed in this development project. 
The second phase — WB as a political structure of constraint 
Towards the end of 1988, the first phase of transnational contestation gave way to the 
second phase, in which NBA's political praxis was revised to a demand for the 
withdrawal of WB from the project. The Bank's withdrawal, it was argued would throw 
into question the legitimacy of the project. Further it would lead to the retraction of 
much needed finances without which "the implementation of the project would not have 
been possible" (CAWBADIA, 1994, p6*)63. 
This change in strategy was an outcome of a process of learning from the movement's 
direct and indirect political interactions with the WB in the first phase of transnational 
contestation. These engagements were pedagogically significant in that they enabled the 
movement to experience the WB and its operations. While these experiences 
contradicted the movement's cognitive praxis of the institution as a positive political 
structure for economic betterment, the movement was spurred to reconsider this 
position. 
61 NBA Memorandum. 
62 letter from Patekar to Moeen Qureshi, (WB). 
63 'A report of the preparatory meeting of Global Campaign Against World Bank and Destructive 
International Aid (CAWBADIA)'. 
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Movement activists first made direct contact with the WB in 1986 when Bank 
consultant, William Partridge and other WB officials visited the Valley to examine 
progress on rehabilitation. Patekar made the Bank aware of the government's failures 
on this front and found Partridge to be particularly "sensitive" (Patekar, 11/3/05) to the 
concerns raised by her. Though this encounter confirmed the movement's initial 
appraisal of the WB as a political opportunity structure, subsequent experiences with it 
were less encouraging: 
"We thought that everything we said, and they agreed, would be 
reflected in their report, which would come to the logical 
conclusion that the project was not fully planned and all the 
compensatory plans were not established and so the project 
could not go on at that pace. But then that never happened. We 
went on and on with the meetings, and there were many positive 
responses. We got a lot of information and documents, but we 
never saw commitments being seriously followed up, or an 
acknowledgement of the logical conclusion that emerged from 
the ground reality." (Patekar, 1993, p173). 
The view that the WB would 'logically' respond to NBA's concerns suggests that it was 
perceived to be politically neutral and without class affiliations, reflecting the 
institutions hegemonic representation as a positive force for social betterment. This 
image was supported by the global institutions own environmental and social guidelines 
and procedures for funding development projects. However faith in the Bank's 
credentials was shaken when activists became aware of its failure to uphold these 
guidelines in the midst of their flagrant violation on the ground. In addition, activists 
discovered through investigations of documents received directly from Bank officials 
and through INGOs, that before giving the loan: 
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"...the Bank had never gone through the basic issues and had 
based its assessment mostly on the data provided by the 
interested party — the government" (NBA, 1991-1992, p15*)64. 
Even more damagingly it was found that: 
"...the Bank signed the credit agreements before the Project was 
granted the necessary environmental and Planning Commission's 
clearance, under the laws of this land" (ibid, p15*). 
This emerging understanding of the WB's inadequacy and carelessness in ensuring that 
the government conform to its formal standards for rehabilitation and environmental 
assessment, at the stage of both project planning and construction, led to the second 
phase of transnational contestation in which this learning was condensed into a new 
cognitive praxis that supported a demand for the withdrawal of the Bank from the 
project. This cognitive praxis involved greater cognisance of the WB's negative impact 
on national processes and therefore also it's presence as a political structure of 
constraint in relation to the movement's objectives. This still constructed a transnational 
scale frame, however, in that it was indirectly attempting to target the Indian 
government and stop the project by removing the "influence of the World Bank [which] 
would make the project a fait accompli" and lead to a "distorted decision-making 
process" within national institutions (Patekar, 1993, p173-174). 
It must be noted that focusing strategic action on the WB in this way was not simply a 
natural, evident outcome of the WB's role as fmancer of the project. That WB's 
culpability for the national situation was constructed by the NBA is evident from the 
highly polarised debate this strategy gave rise to within NBA's national support groups. 
When Medha Patekar went to the US Congressional Subcommittee in 1989 to testify to 
the "environmental and social problems" caused by the "World Bank financed Sardar 
Sarovar Dam" (Patekar, 1989*), Ashish Kothari on behalf of three Delhi-based NGOs 
64 'Towards sustainable and just development: The people's struggle in the Narmada Valley' (pamphlet). 
206 
wrote a letter to members of the Narmada Bachao Andolan expressing their disapproval 
of Medha Patekar's testimony to the US Congress: 
"It seems to us unwise, both as a fundamental principle as well 
as strategy, to appeal directly to a foreign government or state 
(or a part of this, such as Congressmen) to intervene in a matter 
that is primarily internal. The Narmada Project has been 
conceived, legitimised, and implemented by our own 
governments, and we feel it is wrong for us to ask for an 
external agency's influence to seek accountability of Indian 
institutions" (Kothari, 1989*). 
According to this view, only the state can be a legitimate target of protest. The presence 
of the World Bank in the project was viewed as an autonomous decision of the state 
which should therefore not be subjected to foreign deliberation. 
Leaders of NBA however argued that the Bank's impact on the national level would 
have to be acknowledged and addressed in order to stop the dam's construction. 
According to activists, the Bank was providing legitimacy to the project by lending 
"prestige and tacit approval...to the mighty plan" (NBA, c1988, p14*). It provided a 
powerful political tool to the government for suppressing national debate regarding the 
project and was therefore also a perpetuating force in the state's abuse of social and 
environmental safeguards: 
"In fact the continued Bank support to the project is being 
interpreted as a kind of carte blanche by the Indian government 
to go ahead and do whatever pleases it...This includes large 
scale social and environmental disruption as well as serious 
human rights violations" (Dharamadhikary, 1992*)65. 
65 Letter to Executive Directors of Bank from Shripad Dharamadhikary — prominent activist of NBA. 
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The dubious environmental clearance given to the project by the Ministry of 
Environment in 1987 was seen as directly related to the distorting effects of the World 
Bank on national decision making processes: 
"The state governments, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh now 
argued that the Bank had appraised the project and had agreed to 
fund it...MOEF had no business to stall the project. The 
pressure kept mounting and among other arguments this became 
the strongest push factor for the MOEF granting an 
environmental clearance." (Patekar, c1992, p6*)66. 
The funder was thus seen as a "main force and main influencer" (Patekar, 4/3/05) behind 
the decisions of the government. The cognitive praxis of the movement in this phase of 
transnational contention thus involved a growing recognition of the power of trans-
border forces on the state and their role in undermining democratic processes. 
Through its political and cognitive praxis of transnational contestation, it can be argued 
that the movement was constructing its collective identity as a national struggle against 
destructive development that was also beginning to raise critical questions regarding the 
transnational dimensions of such development. The collective 'we' of the movement 
was thus the same as that constructed within the national scale frame, but with a 
recognition of the transnational political opponents in addition to the state that 
represented the movements 'other'. This could be seen in the adoption of anti-colonial 
rhetoric: 
"...[the] government seems intent on entering all of us into a 
new era of colonialism. At this moment it is not clear who is 
running the government, the Congress or the World Bank or the 
IMF...The movements against Narmada, Suvarnarekha, Tehri, 
and so many other foreign-funded or foreign-inspired dams in 
" Letter to Scott Hemphill, Harvard International Review, from Patekar. 
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India, were in a sense a precursor to [a] second independence 
struggle..." (NBA, 1992, p3*)67. 
Through foreign funded and inspired development projects, the government was viewed 
to be surrendering political control of India to transnational institutions such as the WB 
and IMF. Movements such as NBA that were resisting such projects were therefore 
conceived as part of a 'second independence struggle'. The trans-border dimensions of 
NBA's struggle were strengthened under a global scaling of the movement's grievances 
to which I now turn. 
The Global Scale Frame and Collective Identity 
NBA's opposition to the Bank had an added dimension that entirely circumvented the 
national level and thus operated at a global scale. Political praxis at this scale continued 
to involve a demand for the withdrawal of the Bank, but on the basis that it was an 
"independent party to the project" (Patekar, 26/2/06) and not simply an "influencer" of 
national politics, as was argued within the transnational scale frame. Accordingly the 
Bank was not only allowing or condoning the government's abuse of the environment 
and human rights but was actively and directly perpetrating these by virtue of financing 
the dam: 
"The Bank has, since its earliest involvement, blatantly violated 
every guideline, every principle and has been an equal partner 
in the destruction and trauma that is going to be the result of this 
project. The people's struggle in the valley...has highlighted 
continuously the gross violations by the Bank of not only its 
own policies and principles, but also of all norms of human 
rights and natural justice" (NBA, 1993, pl*)68. 
67 'Narmada: A campaign newsletter'. 
68 'The Project, the struggle: Introduction and latest situation'. 
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Attached to the position that the World Bank are directly responsible for the dam and its 
adverse effects was the stance that the Bank was answerable to not just the Indian 
government with which it had a loan agreement but also directly to the people who were 
affected by that agreement: 
"The Bank has not felt it worthwhile to consult or even inform 
the oustees of what it planned to do or what ought to be done" 
(Dharamadhikary, 1992*). 
This position in a fundamental sense challenged the sovereign jurisdiction of the state 
over its people and added another external actor to this otherwise exclusive relationship. 
As an 'independent party' the WB were directly perpetrating human rights abuses and 
thus deemed to be directly accountable to the people of India. This strand of NBA's 
campaign was clearly constructing a model of globalised conditions where local-global 
connections were not simply mediated through the state but were also being formed 
independently of it. 
In 1993, after sustained lobbying of the WB with the active support of international 
NGOs, the movement was successful in securing the Bank's withdrawal from the 
project. The global framing of the WB's role in the project had important strategic 
implications in that it allowed NBA to rhetorically continue holding the World Bank to 
account for social and environmental destruction caused by the dam even after the Bank 
had withdrawn. As Medha reflects: 
"Even during the campaign when the WB was in we questioned 
the WB as an independent party to the project...So to that 
extent, one would say that even now that role which the WB 
played is responsible for the present situation" (Patekar, 
26/2/06). 
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Again, this strategic rhetoric was based on the formulation of a local-global relationship 
that circumvented the national level in that the WB's responsibility towards the 
Narmada people was not perceived to be only conditional upon, mediated or shaped by 
the government's duties towards its citizens. Instead, even though the WB's formal role 
as lender to the Indian government had ended, movement leaders continued to hold the 
WB, and not simply the state, to account for the plight of the Narmada people. 
NBA's political praxis of holding the WB responsible as an 'independent party to the 
project' involved challenging a wider context in which its campaign against the WB 
was condemned by the Indian government as an attack on its sovereignty and where the 
WB also hid behind the issue of sovereignty to desist the responsibilities that were 
being thrust upon it by NBA. While asserting the primacy of the Indian government's 
decisions, the hegemonic discourse of 'political sovereignty' enabled dominant powers 
to conceal the WB's responsibilities and therefore subvert resistance against it. As such, 
challenging the WB involved deconstructing this discourse by uncovering its active role 
in facilitating capitalist interests through funding SSP. This critical awareness was again 
learnt through NBA's experiences of the Bank. Firstly by investigating WB and 
government documents - 
"It became very clear that their decisions were the decisions of a 
money-lender and that, more or less, this was an irreversible 
process as is evidenced by their...sending the first 
reconnaissance mission in 1979 itself and giving $10 million for 
the basic planning of the project. This is contrary to the general 
impression that, oh, the government and its ministries and 
departments form the project and all the poor little World Bank 
does is merely lend money" (Patekar, 1993, p174). 
This highlighted how the WB was not just passively responding to the government's 
request for funding of project construction, but instead played a formative role in the 
project by providing financial assistance for project planning. To movement leaders, 
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this indicated the WB's active pursuit of its economic interests as a moneylender. 
Perhaps the most important experience leading to this realisation was of the WB's 
continuing support of an environmentally and socially destructive project: 
"In the case of SSP, the WB has been exposed. It has witnessed 
the flagrant violation in letter and spirit of its own conditions 
and guidelines...It is doubly guilty of destructive development 
while trying to present a 'humane and environmental face" 
(NBA, 1990, p3)69. 
The metaphor of 'exposure' suggests that a process of learning had occurred in which 
the movement realised the Bank's true nature through direct experiences of it. As the 
institution violated its formal principles in practice, it contradicted the "humane and 
environmental face" it cultivated, and this led to the movement's reappraisal of the 
Bank as inhumane and environmentally destructive. In the context of the NBA's 
broader discourse of 'environmentalism of the poor' this appraisal of the Bank equated 
with a critical awareness of it as an agent of global capitalism. Through its political 
engagement with the WB, NBA had therefore learnt about the global forces of 
capitalism implicated in India's 'development' trajectory — a systemic dynamic that was 
otherwise concealed by the hegemonic discourse of 'sovereignty'. 
This counter-hegemonic learning was embodied in an expanded cognitive praxis that 
constructed a global framing of NBA's grievances. This framing extended the 
opposition to the WB from a tactical manoeuvre to stop the project by removing 
funding and legitimacy (transnational scale), to a broader struggle against "neo-
imperialism in the form of the WB" (NBA, 1993, p 1 *)7° (global scale). As an agent of 
neo-imperialism, NBA argued that the WB "pushed ahead" projects that were "against 
the developmental priorities and goals of the nation" (ibid, pl). Instead the Bank: 
69 'News update' (leaflet). 
70 'Narmada Samachar', Newsletter. 
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"...chooses to define social and economic changes to the 
advantage of established market forces of the world and then 
calls it development, claiming that this will mitigate all human 
and natural problems" (Patekar, c1992, p3*, italics added). 
The global scale of contestation created by the movement's cognitive praxis involved 
emphasising the agency of the trans-border institution in constructing the path of 
development in India to serve the interests of global capitalism. This is evident in the 
quote above from the way in which NBA perceives the WB to 'choose', 'call', and 
`claim' what development is and will be. 
What made this critique truly global in nature was the argument that India is not simply 
forced into this development trajectory by neo-imperialist forces from outside. Rather, 
the Indian elite also benefit from development projects and therefore 'collude' with 
these forces: 
"...these mega-projects involving huge sums of money and 
international contracts...offer an ideal field of operation for 
these vested interests. The various cuts, kick-backs, 'perks', 
spinoffs, political mileage and opportunities for patronage they 
bring to our politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen are often 
the decisive inducement for their implementation." (NBA, 
c1989-1990, p10*). 
Beyond micro-level incentives, alliances between the WB and the Indian elite, who 
NBA often referred to as 'rulers', is also embedded in a shared macro-political agenda 
of capitalist accumulation that is driven by a: 
"...centralised, capital intensive, consumerist, urban oriented 
polity sustained by continuous drain of resources from the rural 
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and tribal hinterlands with the connivance of multilateral 
agencies." (NBA, 1991-1992, p1-2*). 
This suggests the existence of a capitalist class whose economic interests cut across 
national boundaries and who therefore 'connive' with each other to facilitate capitalist 
development. As indicated earlier, the Indian state was also perceived to actively 
facilitate and align with the interests of the transnational capitalist class, through its 
promotion of large-scale development projects such as SSP: 
"People in the rural and tribal regions are compelled to justify 
their survival, establish their right to the traditional generations 
old source of livelihood protect their properties, community life 
and culture from the encroachers not the colonialist, consumerist 
societies outside and within their nation state but also the State 
itself as the wildest and the biggest encroacher" (Patekar, c1991, 
p 1 4)71. 
Rather than suggesting the decline of the nation-state in the face of an "irresistible and 
irreversible globalisation" (Hardt and Negri, 2000), NBA perceived power to lie in 
multiple sites including the national level where the "cunning state" remains an active 
agent in transposing (neoliberal economic globalisation) nationally and locally" 
(Randeria, 2003, p306). 
While the movement's cognitive praxis at the national scale of struggle had already 
started to politicise development and falsify the hegemonic image of the Indian 
government as a neutral provider of development, the movement's cognitive praxis at 
the global scale added to this a recognition of the role of transnational capitalist forces 
in 'development' and the nexus between these and national capitalism. 
71 Speech given by Patekar while accepting a 'Right Livelihood Award'. 
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The counter-hegemonic nature of the movement's cognitive praxis at the global scale is 
evident in the movement's self-constituting practices that involved the formation of 
alliances with other social movements across the world, as well as the enactment of 
alternative development practices. As wider counter-hegemonic initiatives against 
destructive development and neo-imperialism, these practices developed and were 
strengthened even after the WB retreated from the project in 1993. In fact after 1993 the 
transnational strategic alliances that NBA formed with INGOs to force the WB to 
withdraw from SSP, gave way to global politico-ideological coalitions with trans-
border struggles against global capitalism. 
For instance, in 1993 activists and supporters of NBA initiated a process called the 
`Campaign Against World Bank and Destructive International Aid' (CAWBADIA), 
envisioned to develop into a global campaign drawing together the experiences and 
issues raised by movements not only within India but in the Third World as well as 
grassroots groups in Western countries. The motivation for the global campaign was to 
raise a systemic, globalised challenge against global enemies: 
"The emerging nexus between multilaterals, GATT, 
transnational corporations and national and global economic 
elites that is gradually encircling India, are active elsewhere in 
the Third World. It is this overall context and the fact that the 
kind of resistance that we witness in India is paralleled all over 
the world, has impelled some of us to plan a global meeting to 
more unitedly and more politically launch a coordinated global 
campaign" (CAWBADIA, 1993*)72. 
NBA also became involved in other global processes such as the World Commission on 
Dams mentioned in chapter 6. Leaders of the movement also began developing ties with 
other social movements against dams in developing countries. In 1997, NBA co-
organised the 'First International Meeting of the Struggles of the People Affected by 
72 'Campaign against World Bank and Destructive International Aid' (leaflet). 
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Large Dams', held in Brazil. The Conference culminated in the Declaration of Curitiba, 
announcing the need for a common struggle against the international fmancial 
institutions and global capital that are responsible for centralised and undemocratic 
development. Global linkages were further strengthened when NBA co-organised and 
participated in the World Social Forum held in Mumbai in 2004. In that these global 
alliances articulated a recognition of common political interests, they were beginning to 
extend to the global scale, the 'war of position' that NBA was already forming at the 
national scale in alliance with other struggles of the poor within India. 
Apart from these global alliances, the movement's self-constituting practices of its 
global struggle were enacted through the promotion of alternative development 
practices which provided a lived social and cultural challenge to the globally dominant 
model of development. This initiative was named by the movement as Navnirman or 
Re-creation and Renewal. It expanded the movement's political struggle to the cultural 
plane and reconstructed the local as an important site of this struggle. 
Opposing the 'bigger is better' ideology of the state, NBA has developed small-scale, 
eco-friendly technologies of irrigation and electricity production. The greatest 
achievement in this direction is the construction of a small-scale dam across a rivulet in 
the Valley in 2002, which generates 300 W of electricity for the surrounding 12 hamlets 
of Bilgaon village, without causing human displacement or environmental damage73. 
The centralised, non-participatory, and marginalising effects of development are also 
being traced to the prevalent model of schooling. This gave rise to Jeevanshalas or 
`Life Schools' for Adivasi children based on an "alternative educational paradigm" 
(NBA, c 1996, p 1*)74. Beginning with two schools in the villages of Chimalkhedi and 
Nimgavana in 1992, the schools now operate in 14 different villages, fmanced by 
private donations, and funds collected from tribal and Nimari participants in the 
73 Unfortunately this project has now been submerged under the rising waters of the Narmada reservoir. 
74 `Jeevanshalas: An initiative towards the renewal of tribal social life in Narmada Valley' (pamphlet). 
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movement75. Based on the motto — Ladai padhai saath saath! (` Study and struggle hand 
in hand!'), these schools not only provide basic education in communities which have 
never received adequate state schooling but also challenge the alienating, authoritarian 
pedagogy of the prevalent educational model. In contrast, Jeevanshalas emphasise 
student-centred, interactive learning. While tribal culture and identity are marginalised 
and portrayed negatively in official curriculum, Jeevanshalas seek to "provide education 
that is meaningful and relevant for the Adivasi children" equipping them to "relate to 
their culture, preserving as well as creatively transforming it" (ibid, p2). Though the 
framework of the official curriculum is followed, course material is also based on 
Adivasi mythology and traditional skills relating to forest-living, house-making, and 
indigenous medicines that strengthen and affirm subjugated knowledges. Further, local 
languages are used as the medium of instruction and pioneering work has been done to 
develop textbooks in Pavri, a tribal language. 
Though the initiative for Navnirman is reflective of a new social movement concern for 
symbolic critique of the hegemony, it is not however part of a postmodern struggle for 
the 'reclamation of autonomous spaces', to construct alternative ways of life 
(Habermas, 1981). Rather than retreating from the state, NBA is constantly seeking to 
involve the government in the financing and administration of the initiative which is as 
much an effort to provide basic services neglected by the state as an attempt to develop 
global alternatives. By drawing the government into this process, Navnirman has 
become not only a cultural struggle against development but a political and economic 
attempt to 'reclaim' the state from global and national neo-liberal processes that are 
legitimising the state's withdrawal from welfare activities. As Medha Patekar explains: 
"We must make the government work and not substitute the 
government as NGOs do. After all, that is what multinational 
corporations and institutions such as the WB want. If the 
government disappears these forces will be given free reign over 
75 Though Jeevanshalas have faced submergence many times, they have continued to function due to the 
determination of villagers. When school buildings went under rising water, children and parents laboured 
together to reconstruct them on higher ground. 
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the people, that's why we need to fight to make the government 
work for the people" (Patekar, 26/2/06). 
The movement's attempts to draw the state into processes of Navnirman are therefore 
part of a strategic manoeuvre to protect people against global oppressors by using the 
state as a possible shield and counter-force against these forces. This however has its 
own problems. While relinquishing the alternative practices of Navnirman to the state, 
there is a danger that they become co-opted as the hegemonic apparatus of consent and 
therefore cease to be a marginalised articulation of dissent. Indeed based on this concern 
some within the movement express reservations about involving the state in Navnirman 
(fieldnotes, 10/12/05). Nevertheless, regardless of the strategic position that the state 
may occupy in NBA's practices of Navnirman, the point remains that these alternative 
development practices are attempts to symbolically challenge a capitalist model of 
development that NBA perceives to be mandated and promoted by globally networked 
structures of power. The practices of Navnirman are therefore part of the movement's 
cognitive praxis at the global scale. 
Finally, bringing together the movement's political and cognitive praxis at the global 
scale, NBA's collective identity emerges as "a wider struggle, a global struggle, that we 
are all part of, a struggle ultimately for a just and sustainable world" (Dharamadhikary, 
c1992*)76. While at the national scale the collective identity of the people of the 
Narmada Valley was projected in terms of poor people fighting against destructive 
development policies in India, a global scale frame reworked NBA's collective identity 
and projected it as a movement of poor people fighting against global forces of 
destructive development. This identified the political struggle of local communities of 
the Narmada Valley with that of other subaltern groups across the world. 
76 Open letter — 'An appeal from thousands of tribals and peasants of the Narmada Valley in India'. 
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THE NATURE OF NBA'S COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
The process presented above of the evolution of NBA's collective identity shows how 
this was a product of the multiple scales at which NBA politically contested and 
cognitively constructed its grievances. At each scale of contestation the movement's 
political praxis was guided by a certain understanding of the nature of political 
structures. This understanding changed as the movement learnt more about these 
structures through its strategic engagements with them, suggesting a dialectical 
interaction between the movement's cognitive and political praxis. As this process of 
learning in social struggle led to a deeper understanding of the national and global 
hegemonic forces implicated in their displacement the movement extended the scale of 
its struggle from local to the national, transnational and global scales. It should be noted 
however that these various scales of struggle were not mutually exclusive 
developmental stages where NBA simply shifted its scale of contention upwards from 
the local scale ultimately to the global scale. Instead these scales coexisted in a dynamic 
relationship with each other. Thus the movement did not simply cease being a local 
struggle against displacement as it developed into a national struggle against destructive 
development; neither did it stop engaging with national institutions as it directed 
attention towards global forces of neo-imperialism. Rather, the movement's collective 
identity developed from a local struggle to secure the homes and livelihoods of families 
and villages in the Narmada Valley to one that dialectically related this local struggle to 
a national and global struggle against destructive development and neo-imperialism. In 
constructing this dialectic the local identity of the movement was transformed and 
politicised such that the locally displaced people of the Valley were also constructed as 
part of a wider community of subalterns of India and the world. This collective identity 
reflected the formation of the movement's counter-hegemonic consciousness. 
The various elements of the NBA's expanded collective identity and the process of 
learning (abbreviated) through which this emerged is depicted in the figure below. It 
shows that NBA's political praxis with the WB and Indian state, facilitated by NGOs, 
led to learning that was accumulated in the movement's cognitive praxis involving a 
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►
 discursive critique of the Indian state's 'collusion' with the WB as a `neo-imperialist' 
promoter of global capitalism. This learning was then also embodied in practices such 
as the formation of alliances with other subaltern movements and engagement in 
alternative development initiatives. 
CONCLUSION 
NBA started as a localised movement demanding rehabilitation for those displaced by 
SSP, but developed into a much broader national and even global movement against 
`destructive development' and `neo-imperialism'. I have shown that this evolution of its 
collective identity was a result of its reflexive engagement, with political structures —
notably the state and its auxiliary institutions, and the WB. Political interactions with 
these institutions revealed their active promotion of capitalist interests through 
development projects and the fallacy of their hegemonic representation as neutral agents 
of 'development for all'. This necessitated a shift from targeting a perceived localised 
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DIAGRAM REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
failure in provision of rehabilitation to raising a systemic challenge to the nationally and 
globally organised development hegemony, of which their displacement was viewed to 
be a symptom. This expanded struggle was visible in the movement's opposition to the 
dam and its formation of national and global alliances with other subaltern movements 
— a process that is central to the initiation of global civil society as a Gramscian 'war of 
position'. 
NBA's multi-scalar politics, and its constitution of GCS through this, therefore arose 
from a process of learning wherein an emergent awareness of the Indian state's role in 
capitalist development, the WB's influential and 'distorting' effects on national 
decision-making processes, and the active 'collusion' of the WB and Indian state in 
protecting the interests of global capital over the poor, led respectively to a national, 
transnational and global scaling of their grievances and politics. This learning was 
further facilitated by NGOs at the national and international levels that filled 
geographical and informational gaps between political structures and the movement and 
thus indirectly provided pedagogical experiences of these structures to feed into NBA's 
direct political interactions and experiences. 
An analysis of NBA's global visions and actions as outcomes of learning from 
movement experiences, challenges dominant accounts that present these as mechanical 
emulations of INGOs to strategically secure their support. While I have elaborated 
elsewhere on how such 'mechanical' accounts imply a duality between static local 
grievances and global processes, in contrast, an analysis of how systemic connections 
between the local and global are learnt, suggests that local movement's can construct a 
dialectic between local struggle and national and global scales of transformation. This is 
evident in the manner in which NBA changed from a local struggle for rehabilitation to 
one strategically and ideologically opposed to SSP and destructive development. 
Further, though movements may extend their struggle beyond the national level this 
does not necessarily lead to an abandonment of the national level as a site of struggle. 
Indeed through NBA's experiences of national contestation the state was identified as a 
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"colluder" in the process of capitalist globalisation, and therefore also as a site of 
political opportunity and resistance. 
That local movements such as NBA evolve in the process of struggle, locating their 
local grievances within an emergent awareness of wider systemic conditions and 
developing dialectically related transformative practices at multiple scales, suggests a 
radical role for local social movements within GCS. They are not simply passive 
beneficiaries of the work of globally-oriented INGOs but active agents in the 
construction of a radical GCS. While this chapter has highlighted the movement's 
emergent collective persona as an actor in GCS, the next chapter investigates the forms 
and extent to which the radical learning described here is shared by local people in 
terms of transformations of consciousness, identity, and subjective notions of 
citizenship. 
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Chapter 8 
Democratic Participation and Citizenship of the Grassroots 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the pedagogical impact of NBA's multi-scalar politics on the 
grassroots participants of the movement in terms of transformation of their 
consciousness and subjective senses of citizenship. An examination of consciousness 
and identity transformation amongst local communities is particularly relevant for 
developing a comprehensive picture of local movements as actors in GCS for two 
reasons. Firstly, since GCS is normatively conceived, the perceptions, feelings and self-
representations of actors within GCS are integral to an analysis of this field. Only those 
who have a global consciousness are actors of GCS. Secondly, a more robust account of 
GCS as a radical democratic space must also explore whether the transformative 
processes occurring at the collective level of the movement are actively engaged with 
by movement participants. As indicated in chapter 2, such in-depth research on global 
civil society at the level of local participation in developing contexts is generally scant, 
and in the case of the Save the Narmada Movement virtually non-existent. 
The chapter proceeds by examining Adivasi and Nimari experiences of historical 
marginalisation within Indian democracy prior to the formation of NBA. It then 
explores how through participation in collective struggle NBA's grassroots 
encountered, experienced, and politicised their awareness and senses of rights and 
citizenship in relation to the nation-state. Finally it illustrates how this led to changes in 
subjective expressions of belonging and citizenship from national to local and global 
scales. 
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STATE DOMINATION AND DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP 
Adivasi Experiences 
Elsewhere I have drawn attention to the marginalisation of Adivasis and the exploitation 
of their forest resources in modern India — a historical process that was legally 
entrenched during British rule and given social credence through the Hindu caste 
ideology that brands Adivasis as untouchables. Their subordination within the national 
framework and their settlement in remote hills of western Madhya Pradesh has meant 
that the tribal communities of this region have largely been left out of the process of 
modernisation. As a result, prior to the mobilisation of these villages, such people were 
largely unaware of the transformations occurring in India — from pre-colonial, colonial 
through to the nationalist state (Baviskar, 2004). 
After independence, while Adivasis were bundled into the constitutional rhetoric of 'We 
the People of India' and bestowed with citizenship rights, local officials and forest 
guards were able to take advantage of the economic and social marginalisation of 
Adivasis and maintain a feudal form of authority over them. One villager recounts how 
oppressive practices continued unabated from the pre-colonial through to the post-
colonial era: 
"The rajas used to come here occasionally to see the village —
they would come once a year. But we would have to carry them 
from village to village on our shoulders...This carried on after 
independence too. The forest officials used to oppress us a lot 
also... They used to fine us 3000-4000 rupees for taking wood 
from the forest or for building houses and ploughing new fields. 
The police used to oppress us also. Often they would beat us up 
and put us into jail" (Kishan, 16/4/05). 
The criminalisation of customary rights of Adivasis over the forest was not the only 
way in which local officials and police "created an atmosphere of fear" (Kantya, 
16/4/05, original emphasis). By making arbitrary and demoralising demands, they 
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exercised an all pervasive control over the Adivasis. Thus going into town, where the 
local bureaucrats and police resided was always a harrowing experience, as one villager 
recounts. 
"I used to be very scared when I would pass through the town, 
before the Andolan. I would stick to the gutter. People would 
catch hold of me and tell me to carry a pot of water, or to wash 
clothes. If you didn't listen to them they would beat you or tie 
you up. They would call you, and say "you bastard from Bhadal, 
come here, bring us some hens". They would write something 
down and then send me to get hens from my village. When you 
would come back with the hens they would snatch it from you 
and give you a kick — don't come back here again they would 
say. They made me carry four pots of water once. They would 
tell me to sweep the floor. Once they kept me at the police 
station for the whole day without any food" (Vanya's father, 
1/11/05). 
If following Fuller and Harriss's (2001) anthropological approach, the state is analysed 
not as a structure but as 'structural effects' i.e. "as the effect of practices that make state 
structures appear to exist" (p4), then the state as endower of rights and entitlements to 
its citizens, did not exist in the local experiences of Adivasis. The local officials and 
police were understood as the men of the `sarkar', to whom the Adivasis were 
compelled to pay unquestioning servitude, or to face the dire consequences of non-
compliance. While sarkar' is a Hindi word which translates into 'government', in this 
region the `sarkar' was taken to be the "sahib or the king" (Vanya, 3/11/05). His 
ubiquitousness and the helplessness of Adivasis in front of him are encapsulated in their 
metaphorical representation of him as 'having long arms'. In this way his powers were 
almost mystified and considered immutable- 
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"We didn't know anything else apart from the sarkar — we 
considered him most important. Whatever the sarkar said was 
right" (Vanya, 3/11/05). 
Amongst those Adivasis who have not been active participants in the Andolan, the state 
is still alienating and vaguely understood, as is apparent in the manner in which they 
consider Sardar Sarovar (which is the name of the dam) to be the name of the man who 
is making the dam, and of that man being the `sarkar'. That the sarkar is considered to 
be a single, all-powerful man, again reveals the absence of a sense of democratic control 
and voice amongst Adivasis, that in principal is bestowed to citizens of the state as a 
modern structure of representative government. 
It is important to note that while the state did exercise a coercive control over the people 
in terms of threats of imprisonment and beatings, its oppressive practices were also 
normalised in the form of Gramscian consent in that Adivasis accepted their oppression 
without critically questioning its legitimacy. Thus villagers talked of thinking of their 
village, land and forest as all belonging to the sarkar, and thus of the sarkar's men as 
acting in their rightful capacity when they would demand money and goods from them 
(fieldnotes 14/11/05). This is not to suggest that villagers did not experience this as 
unfair and oppressive but that they did not view it as illegitimate. Not only this, but 
Adivasis conceded to their subordination through a process of internalising bazaarias '77 
admonishments of their very personhood. Thus villagers believed themselves to be 
inferior- "We considered ourselves very small, gandem , uneducated. We thought of 
ourselves as monkeys, insignificant and mad" (Vanya, 3/11/05). From a Freirean 
perspective the internalisation of a dehumanised self-representation is a mechanism and 
result of oppression. So deep was this internalisation that even after participation in the 
movement I found some Adivasis, (often those whose participation had been minimal) 
referring to themselves in this way. While asserting that they are 'mad' and uneducated, 
77 This term is used by Adivasis to refer to 'market people' or 'people of the town', who generally belong 
to the mainstream Hindu culture, and includes forest guards, officials, and moneylenders. 
78 Following Amita Baviskar's translation of this word — "gande can only be roughly translated; it means 
delinquent, mischievous, untrustworthy" (2004, p191). 
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they would project themselves as incapable of talking to me even about their personal 
experiences and perceptions of the Andolan. 
The depiction of Adivasis as conceding to their exploitation is contrary to James Scott's 
(1985) notion of everyday forms of peasant resistance. According to Scott, far from 
accepting their oppression, the oppressed create 'hidden transcripts', a set of ideas and 
practices that are developed to express their opposition to the ruler but, for fear of 
retribution, are kept concealed. These forms of peasant resistance include "foot 
dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson 
and sabotage" (pxvi). I found no accounts of such resistance amongst the Adivasi 
people. However, it must be added that in my conversations with them it was also 
evident that while the authority of the sarkar was accepted it was not by any means 
trusted. The sarkar was not viewed as their paternalistic protector, an image through 
which the state often attempts to create consent (Hoffman, 1984), and which was 
perhaps reflected in movement leaders' initial faith that the government would be fair in 
its consideration of NBA's demands for rehabilitation (chapter 7). 
The schism in Adivasis consciousness of the state suggests that the oppressed do 
possess agency, crippled though it is by the unequal socio-economic relations between 
oppressor and oppressed. This contradiction in Adivasi consciousness explains how 
mobilisation of Adivasis in this area was achieved as fast as it was. But it also points to 
how the process of mobilisation and social struggle provided an experience that 
transformed participants' consciousness. In taking this view I am responding to the call 
of Barker (1999), to treat social actors as 'reflexive', "engaging in ways that might 
change their awareness and evaluation of the social world" (Marshal quoted in ibid, 
p18). I will address this process as it occurred in the mobilisation of the grassroots of 
NBA shortly. 
Nimari Experiences 
Before that, I must add the experiences of the Nimaris to the account of the 
`anthropology of the Indian state'. Nimar is a very different socio-cultural region of 
Madhya Pradesh in relation to that of the Adivasis. Relative to the Adivasi region it has 
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been culturally more integrated within the mainstream national framework and has had 
more interaction with the modern political apparatus and institutional practices of the 
state. In fact before the Save the Narmada Movement the Nimar had already been 
politically active against the dam through a series of mobilisations beginning in the 
1960s. These campaigns, however, were more closely aligned with party politics, 
failing to adequately engage the general population and thus petered out soon after 
leaders of the campaign gained seats of power. However, while Nimaris were more 
familiar with the democratic system, they too, felt alienated from the bureaucratic set-up 
and experienced state institutions as unaccountable and all-powerful. People expressed 
this sense of impotence against the state through the same representation that I had 
heard in the Adivasi area — that of the state's 'arms being long': 
"The government has very long arms, how can we fight against 
the government, they can do anything with us, they have the 
police, they will chase us away" (Namdev, 5/2/06). 
Thus the police, as the state's instrument of domination, were much feared by the 
Nimari people — "we used to see the police as the 'kings' — if they said so we could be 
sent to jail" (Mahadev, 28/1/06). The similarity in narratives of these people, with that 
of the Adivasis, suggests that even here the state commanded a form of feudal control. 
However there are differences. In Nimar people were aware of their status as citizens of 
the state; what they lacked was a sense of agency against the sarkar: 
"Before the Andolan, the people used to feel that they cannot 
fight against the sarkar. The sarkar is the final word, it will do 
whatever it wants. People used to view the sarkar with respect, 
they would accept whatever the police inspector and patwari 
would say." (Karan, 1/2/06). 
What is emphasised here is not that villagers did not know that they had rights but that 
they did not know how to challenge the 'final word' and were unable to 'fight' for their 
rights. An awareness of their status as citizens rather than subjects is also apparent in a 
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discourse of corruption that was often used when referring to government failures to 
compensate and rehabilitate people: 
"We have to do something about this corruption...we are still 
not getting the money entitled to us by law, so we are still 
fighting for that. Government officials keep saying yes, yes but 
they carry on eating money and doing what they want." (Nanak 
bhai, 17/2/06). 
The discourse of state corruption points to a sense of ownership over the state as is 
evident in Nanak's assertion that 'we have to do something' in order to get what is 
`entitled to us by law'. Gupta (1995) suggests how this "discourse of 
corruption...enabl[es] people to construct the state symbolically and to define 
themselves as citizens", further "by marking those actions that constitute an 
infringement of such rights... [it] acts to represent the rights of citizens to themselves" 
(p389). Thus the unresponsiveness of the state apparatus to the people is viewed not as 
an inherent characteristic of the state but rather as an aberration. Corruption being that 
aberration, is viewed as the violation of rights that the state otherwise bestows on its 
people. Perhaps this is why Nanak does not suggest that the government per say is 
corrupt but only that 'officials', i.e. individuals in the government are. That the 
deployment of a discourse of corruption is a characteristic of those who have a sense of 
citizenship, is apparent from the manner in which Adivasi leaders who have had closer 
interaction with the state apparatus also accuse state personnel of corruption. This is in 
contrast to those Adivasis, who while still alienated from the modern state system, 
understand the state not as a structure but as an authority figure who is directly 'looting' 
and 'thieving' from people by making a dam that will dispossess them of their land 
(fieldnotes 30/10/05). 
What is apparent from the accounts of both Adivasis and Nimaris is the way in which 
the state was experienced as an unfettered force in their lives. Neither group 
experienced their citizenship in terms of an empowering 'social contract' but rather as a 
bondage which left them devoid of agency. The next section will address how people's 
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relationship to the state changed over the course of the struggle and how this was 
related to deeper transformations of consciousness. 
SOCIAL STRUGGLE AND ENCOUNTERING NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
As mentioned earlier, Gramscian theory emphasises the need to view social actors as 
`reflexive' agents whose consciousness, while influenced by dominant hegemony is not, 
however, mechanically determined by it. This suggests the need to identify particular 
`events' which transform the consciousness of reflexive actors in ways that facilitate 
collective struggle and change (Barker, 1999). In the previous chapter I described 
NBA's collective politics of contestation with national and global structures. For village 
participants the 'events' that were involved in this politics created important learning 
opportunities that stimulated the transformation of consciousness. 
In exploring the catalytic instances that advanced villagers' sense of citizenship I will 
focus mainly on the experiences of the Adivasis, adding to this, the narratives of 
Nimaris where appropriate. I take this approach because, while Nimaris and Adivasis 
have both struggled together under the banner of the same movement and thus been part 
of the same protest actions and discursive resistance, Adivasis have had to make a 
longer journey towards citizenship (as was argued in the previous section). As we shall 
see this unique journey provides insights into how the 'politics of scale' and 
construction of 'place' are integral to the subjective creation of the nation-state. 
The protest repertoires adopted by the Andolan have involved amongst others, a 
strategy called gherao, in which villagers and activists surround unsuspecting officials 
and politicians and demand answers to state failures and violations of rights. 
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Group of women gherao a policeman79 
Medha Patekar diligently educated people about their specific rights and entitlements 
regarding displacement and rehabilitation. Villagers then used this to question and 
confront officials and police over violations. These confrontations were instrumental in 
creating awareness amongst people of the government's neglect of their rights as 
displaced people and thus led to the formation of a sense of grievance against the state: 
"We asked many questions but the government carried on the 
way it was before. So we became convinced that there was no 
real knowledge about how we will be rehabilitated and that the 
government doesn't have land to rehabilitate us. We realised 
that the dam was not for our benefit so why should we die" 
(Kishan, 14/4/05). 
Direct encounters with the state apparatus also demystified the power of the `sarkar' 
and created a feeling of ownership and agency over it: 
"Now whatever the sarkar says is not final...It is in the people's 
hands to make the government bow... We realise this is a 
79 This is a post-card photo obtained from the NBA office in Barwani. 
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PICTURE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
democracy, the government is nothing, it is ours" (Karan, 
1/2/06). 
Rama describes a similar sense of empowerment through collective action: 
"Before the Andolan the government officials — forest guard, 
collector, police — we would accept whatever they said as right, 
whatever they say will have to be done. But now we can 
question. The Andolan has given us this much courage. Now we 
have got knowledge of the laws so we can question them on that 
also." (2/11/05). 
The acquisition of knowledge of rights and the collective mobilisation of the Andolan 
that gave people the 'courage' to assert their rights, subsequently de-reified official 
power and thus enabled people to question the government. Furthermore, the feeling of 
empowerment emerging from this sparked a sense of outrage against the state's 
unresponsiveness to their demands, which people now knew to be a blatant violation of 
the state's 'social contract' with them. In the words of Vanya, an Adivasi: 
"After independence the state of India says that no one's rights 
should be violated. Whether the person is a minister or a poor 
person the laws are the same for everyone and everyone has 
equal rights. But then the sarkar makes its decisions regarding 
our lives sitting far away in Bhopal and Delhi. They don't even 
see our real situation or ask us". (Vanya, 3/11/05). 
Vanya's account constructs a sense of national community and his relationship to it 
through an assertion of equality with its members by virtue of possessing equal rights. 
At the same time however, this assertion of new found equality now creates a sense of 
alienation from the state which he experiences as unaccountable to its people. Apart 
from alienation, the consistent denial of rights also develops into a more abstract sense 
of injustice against the people: 
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"When the organisation was formed neither I nor the people 
were thinking that this is injustice. In the beginning we had 
placed demands [original emphasis] in front of the government, 
and carried on placing these demands for three years. But then 
we started to see that we are not getting our demands, then we 
started the struggle. And as we fought we saw that whatever was 
being done to us was injustice. So then we started to feel that we 
are fighting against injustice" (Kantya, 16/4/05). 
So far I have demonstrated how the movement was a vehicle through which people 
were able to begin to understand their citizenship as "a package of rights, duties and 
obligations...which implies equality, justice and autonomy" (Faulks, 2000, p13). This 
learning was facilitated by activists who provided grassroots participants with 
information and knowledge about their formal rights, entitlements and laws. However, 
most importantly, it was enabled by the manner in which the Andolan created a direct 
channel for citizens' engagement with the state, allowing them to deploy and actively 
experience this knowledge in real terms. For Adivasis especially, this interaction with 
the state involved a critical change in political consciousness and identity from bonded 
subjects to empowered and potentially equal citizens. The state's unresponsiveness, 
which previously was seen as a statement of its authority, was now reconstructed as a 
violation of their citizenship, a denial of what is rightfully theirs. This radicalised 
people's positions regarding the state. They experienced the government's neglect of 
their rightful demands as unjust and immoral. The process of radicalisation described 
here reflects the "dialectical relation between subjective and objective" (Freire, 1993, 
p33) that makes "real oppression more oppressive still by adding to it the realization of 
oppression" (unreferenced author quoted in Freire, 1993, p33). For Freire (1993) "Only 
in this interdependence is an authentic praxis possible" (p33). I therefore turn now to 
how this action-reflection led again to action, that is, to people's symbolic as well as 
concrete responses to this sense of violation. 
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POLITICISING NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP — RIGHTS AND RADICAL 
DEMOCRACY 
In 1991, after around 6 years of non-violent confrontations with the state, in the form of 
protest rallies that yielded few dividends, the NBA declared a new slogan heralding the 
beginning of a new strategy of political action — `hamare gaon me hamara raj' — 'Our 
rule in our villages!'. The realisation of this involved a strategy of gaon bandhi or 
village closure, in which officials and police were denied access to the village for 
conducting population and submergence surveys. Kishore, an Adivasi, described a 
particular instance in which such a strategy was enacted: 
"Once, villagers from Bhadal and Khariya Bhadal got news that 
an official was coming to their village. They got a big drum and 
went down to the stream from where the official would come. 
Everyone waited for him. He finally turned up with loads of 
surveyors and labourers to cut the trees. The villagers 
vehemently resisted this and fought with the police that had 
come. I was beaten badly. My mother also fought hard. She hit 
one of the surveyors and snatched his papers. Villagers from 
Kakrana also came over to join in the resistance. Finally after a 
long fight, all the surveyors and police retreated" (fieldnotes, 
20/10/05). 
Apart from the concrete effects of preventing government surveys in order to hamper 
the process of dam construction, the declaration of 'our rule in our village' had a 
profound symbolic significance. It communicated to the state, civil society and to the 
grassroots of the movement itself that the state, in its present form, was not fit to claim 
jurisdiction over their territory. Having failed to protect citizens' rights the state had 
violated the 'social contract' and thus could not claim sovereignty over their 
communities. By declaring gaon bandhi the people of the valley were establishing 
people's sovereignty - "We have right over our village because the sarkar doesn't do 
anything for us" (Vanya, 3/11/05). It is important to note here that the declaration of 
sovereignty over their villages is not a complete rejection of the people's relationship 
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with the state. It is a defence against the state's excesses but at the same time a symbolic 
protest against the neglect of the state as well as a demand for inclusion. So, on the one 
hand, many Adivasis as well as Nimaris view the realisation of village self-rule as the 
removal of the coercive presence of state personnel from their villages: 
"The slogan that we gave 'our rule in our village' — we realised 
that slogan. We don't let the patwari, or police come to our 
village without permission" (Karan, 1/2/06). 
On the other hand villagers also see the slogan of 'our rule in our village' as a 
mechanism for increasing the accountability of the state to the people and thus of 
guaranteeing their rights: 
"...the government keeps doing something or the other wrong, 
The government should consult with us and we will maintain 
our rule in our village" (Rahadya, 1/1 1 /05). 
Further, the fact that people still view the state as having ultimate responsibility for 
providing facilities such as roads, schools, electricity etc, supports the argument that the 
slogan of 'our rule in our villages' represents a symbolic attempt to reform the state's 
relationship with the people rather than an outright rejection of the state. 
Underlying villagers' assertions of village self rule as a response to the state's historical 
violation of rights, is the notion that individuals can only protect themselves from the 
state if they are politically organised. While 'our rule in our villages' represents village 
level organisation, Adivasis and Nimaris both talk of the necessity of extending this 
organisation to connect villages into a social movement and further to connect their 
social movement with other movements. The larger the organisation the stronger it will 
be against the state, it is argued: 
"The most important thing I have learnt in the Andolan is to stay 
together and get organised. The government will never listen to 
us individually. The more people there are with us the stronger 
235 
we will be, that is the only way to make sure that change will 
happen" (Namdev, 5/2/06). 
People's experience of the state's unresponsiveness seems to have led to a sense of 
redundancy of their citizenship as a relationship that binds them as individuals to the 
constitution. Instead citizenship is reframed in terms of a connection with the state 
through their membership in political collectivities or social movements. This lends to 
the notion of radical democracy where the "meso realm of social movements...are 
mobilizing society against the state" (Delanty, 2000, p37) and where the key to 
citizenship is not simply the rights and duties of individuals, but collective "democratic 
participation" (ibid). This turn towards radical democracy in the Narmada Valley is 
being accompanied by a withdrawal from representative democracy, which is visible in 
party politics as a possible strategy for the movement (fieldnotes, 16/4/06). Instead 
people's sense of radical democratic participation is entailed in their frequent assertions 
of the "need to fight for our rights", and more generally, to engage in a "life of struggle" 
(fieldnotes, 2/12/05). According to the Narmada people, rights are not directly bestowed 
by the state and passively enjoyed by individuals, rather they are politicised 
entitlements that are mediated and actively constructed by the dynamics of power. 
The process of the radicalisation of rights in Narmada communities problematises the 
manner in which rights appear to be understood as self-contained tools of empowerment 
within INGO-dominated perspectives on GCS. Though in the formal and legal sense 
these communities have long been entitled to rights, they were effectively 
disenfranchised by their historical subordination. Their political entitlements have only 
become tangible through social mobilisation, which has created a pedagogical context 
for developing a consciousness of their rights as well as the political power to realise 
these. Thus while INGOs may campaign for the codification and implementation of 
rights, it is people's active participation and mobilisation that has actually enabled them 
to meaningfully experience these rights. 
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UNDERSTANDING SCALES 
What has been described above is an evolution from the state's pre-modern feudal 
subordination of people, to their active participation in the modernist project of national 
citizenship. Of course this presupposes a particular division of space into scales — the 
national juxtaposed in relation to the local and global. The importance of scales to the 
modernist project of nationhood was vividly brought to light during my stay in the 
Adivasi village — Bhadal, when I realised that many of the villagers here had not heard 
of India. For these individuals their participation in the struggle was not about 
citizenship but resistance against the 'looting sarkar' that was dispossessing them. There 
were others however who had been actively involved in the Andolan and through it had 
learnt of their membership to India. As I will show, this process of encountering the 
national scale emerged from NBA's engagement in multi-scalar politics which provided 
Adivasis with concrete and symbolic experiences through which various scales of 
protest could be constructed in relation to each other. 
Many Adivasis, especially the women, have had little interaction with the world beyond 
their village and forest area. This was brought to the fore by an 80 year old woman — 
Minthi Hamjya, who when asked whether she thought Medha Patekar was from her 
country, replied- "Medha came from down below. That's all we know. We only saw her 
coming up from the banks of the river" (6/10/05). For this woman the boundaries of her 
world extended only so far as she could see. As such her affiliations could only be 
based on a non-modern identification with her village rather than "state-bound 
citizenships of modernity" (O'Byrne, 2003, p13). Indeed before people's increased 
exposure to the wider world through the Andolan, Adivasis mystified places that were 
not within their immediate experience: 
"People used to think that if a person goes to Dhule he will turn 
to dust over there and not come back. Once, I went to Jalsindhi 
for an NBA programme, but then some activists told me to go 
with them to Dhule for a protest action. I was quite scared about 
going but I went... When I finally got back home and told my 
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family that I had come back from Dhule it created a sensation in 
the whole village. It was as if a miracle had occurred" 
(fieldnotes, 10/11/05). 
Though Adivasis have now become quite comfortable with travelling out of their 
localities, many Adivasis I spoke to were still unaware of being part of India. Some, 
however, referred to their country or `desh' as the administrative state within which 
their village was located. 
However for other Adivasis who have been more active in the Andolan, awareness of 
their citizenship of the nation-state of India, started with the process of venturing out of 
their localities on protest events to big cities where the seats of national power are 
located. This in itself however was not enough to provide a sense of national 
boundedness. Nationhood was also discursively and symbolically created by activists of 
the NBA, who sought to integrate Adivasis into the national framework. This is 
reflected in Kishore's narration of his encounter with 'India'. 
"...I was around 16 at that time. All the activists had come to 
Jalsindhi to celebrate 'independence day'. I didn't know what 
independence day meant so I asked Yogini, an activist. She told 
me that India was freed from British rule on this day. She also 
said that the Adivasis had also fought against the British to get 
independence for India. When I asked her what India was, she 
told me that it is my country. She said that they will raise the 
flag of India to celebrate the day. But when they did the flag 
raising ceremony, the flag looked really small. I was a bit 
disappointed by that, I had thought the flag would be really big 
if it represents our whole country." (fieldnotes, 23/11/05). 
Though these encounters with the national level were important, a more robust 
understanding of the national scale could only be achieved by understanding it 
"relationally, that is, with reference, and in relation to, other scales" (Perreault, 2003, 
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p64). Here experiences of the global level were crucial. Though most villagers do not 
have knowledge of the specific campaign support INGOs have given the NBA, the 
solidarity of global civil society with the movement is known to the people in the form 
of foreign tourists and activists who constantly visit the valley. During my fieldtrip, I 
was part of many programmes organised by the NBA that involve taking outsiders into 
the valley to interact with villagers facing displacement. An extract from my field dairy 
describes one of these events: 
`After a 10 hour boat journey down the river we arrived in 
Jalsindhi around midnight. Villagers were beating drums at the 
river bank. And in the moonlight I could see a number of 
outsiders — photographers, journalists and other visitors — some 
Indian, some foreign. We all walked to the local school... Some 
visitors stood up and introduced themselves to the gathering of 
villagers — telling them where they were from and how they had 
heard of the NBA. An activist from Brazil told people about the 
destruction caused there by large dams and adds that they never 
benefit the poor. He declares that the fight of people in the 
Narmada Valley is the same as that of people in Brazil. While 
he sits down, an NBA activist translates his message of 
solidarity into Pavri. The villagers cheer and shout slogans- 'We 
are all one!', 'We will not move!' (fieldnotes, 25/3/05). 
Events such as these have been instrumental in further developing Adivasis' 
understanding of India as a country by constructing it as a unit relative to other 
countries. As Rama told me: 
"I travelled, saw and listened and I heard about other countries —
England, Japan, America. Then I started to realise that India is a 
country and that it is our country" (Rama, 2/11/05). 
In keeping with the relational characteristic of scales, the construction of the national 
and global scales has also had implications for Adivasis' perceptions of place. Thus 
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Vanya tells me of how the boundaries of place or locality have widened — whereas 
before the Andolan, Barwani used to be considered part of a different mu/uk8° from 
their village's, with increasing exposure to a wider geographical area, villagers now 
refer to it as part of the same muluk. In contrast however, Bhopal and Delhi, which are 
further away, continue to be considered different muluks. 
This relational construction of scale — from local, national to global, provides the basis 
for the construction of local, national and global citizenship. In the next section I turn to 
examine how people's affiliations and identities across these geographical scales has 
been reinforced or transformed through the process of social struggle. 
SUBJECTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP — LOCAL, NATIONAL 
AND GLOBAL 
The changing relationship between individuals and the state had repercussions for 
people's subjective expressions of belonging and affiliation to the national polity. 
Broadly three distinct forms of affiliation could be identified. While many maintained 
loyalty primarily to the state, others rejected this for regional and even global forms of 
citizenship. These three types of affiliation were sustained by particular scale frames or 
discourses regarding the nature of the movement's grievances and the scale at which 
they were politically relevant. Scale frames thus related to the manner in which the 
Narmada struggle was discursively connected to the nation and other national 
movements as well as movements abroad. While there were differences in the scale 
frames of the three types of citizens, there were also obvious commonalities. I begin by 
presenting these common discursive framings, while also elaborating on the 
pedagogical experiences and processes through which they were collectively developed 
amongst the grassroots. 
Common Themes — Corrupt Government, Development and Displacement of the 
Poor 
In a manner similar to how NBA's collective identity emerged, individuals within the 
movement came to learn about and understand their struggle through an interwoven 
80 This can only roughly be translated to mean region or area. 
240 
process in which grievance frames and movement experiences constantly shaped and 
re-shaped each other. As indicated earlier, direct confrontations with government 
officials during gheroes were an important pedagogical experience that facilitated 
people's understanding and construction of their grievances. Namdev, a Nimari, 
describes this process: 
"Whatever questioning or negotiations had to be done with the 
minister would be done right in front of the people. First Didi8' 
asked questions and then later we would also, so we would 
immediately find out what is going on. The minister had no 
answers about where they will rehabilitate us. So then everyone 
would understand the issues — the dull ones and the sharper ones 
also. We realised that the government is betraying us, and so we 
have to struggle" (5/2/06). 
Through direct interactions with officials, people thus became aware of government 
failures in rehabilitation. This led to the construction of their displacement as 
unacceptable and therefore as a point of contestation with the state. The emerging sense 
of being aggrieved was further articulated through movement slogans which were 
formed organically as the movement progressed. As Nanak bhai recollects: 
"Our slogans tell the whole history of our movement. At each 
phase we made slogans. Didi made many of them, but some 
were made by the people themselves when we would go on 
demonstrations. Someone would say we 'We will not move 
from here' and then another would say 'The dam cannot be 
built', and it would carry on like that." (20/3/05) 
Some key movement slogans created were: 
`Sarkar hamen dubayegi. Jamin nahin depayegi' 
81 Villagers express a sense of affectionate respect for Medha Patekar by referring to her as `Didi' — a 
term which is commonly used in Indian culture to address and refer to elder sisters. 
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(The government will drown us. It will not be able to give us 
land) 
`Vikas chahiye, vinash nahin' 
(We want development, not destruction) 
`Jangal jamin konin se? Amri se, amri se!' 
(Whose are the forest and land? Ours, ours!) 
These slogans, in condensed form, reflected the developing perceptions and 
conceptualisations of the struggle amongst grassroots participants. But they also served 
to circulate, reinforce, and elaborate these constructions collectively. That is, they 
enabled the shared learning of the movement's cognitive praxis in relation to 
displacement and 'development'. This function was also performed through speeches 
given by village men and women during demonstrations where they articulated their 
concerns and impressions of the struggle to fellow protestors. In turn, the audience, 
rather than applaude, would affirm and acknowledge speeches with vociferous slogan 
shouting (fieldnotes, 3/4/05). 
Alongside direct engagements with the government, and the production of slogans and 
speeches that circulated the movement's evolving cognitive praxis, there was another 
pedagogical process which had an equally profound impact on how the movement was 
experienced by the grassroots and thus on how their grievances were constructed. This 
process was of the convergence under NBA of the organisations of the displaced in the 
three states. Namdev describes the qualitatively different discourse that underlay NBA 
in relation to that of previously local mobilisations that had occurred in Nimar: 
"The Save the Nimar Movement had a limited thinking. They 
only thought about themselves. Their only slogan was `Nimar 
should be saved'. They didn't even talk of saving the Narmada 
River. With the Save the Narmada Movement we started talking 
about saving all the affected people of the Narmada valley — our 
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slogan was 'save Narmada, save life'. Also we joined other 
organisations — gas affected in Bhopal, slum dwellers and other 
dam affected. The thinking was that the affected of the whole 
world should join together to save humanity, to create a new 
way of thinking" (Namdev, 5/2/06). 
Namdev's account suggests that the discourse of 'affected people' that was used to 
create the construct of the people of the Narmada Valley was also instrumental in 
connecting their struggle to other national struggles of 'affected people'. The collective 
framing of 'affected people' in turn led NBA to show solidarity and jointly protest with 
other movements, which then, also impacted on how the Narmada people viewed their 
own struggle. Thus while movement experiences facilitated discursive construction of 
grievances, discursive framings led to new experiences that served to enhance and 
develop these framings. For instance Namdev describes the manner in which seeing and 
interacting with other movements strengthened his conviction of the legitimacy of his 
own fight: 
"When I would go to big cities for demonstrations I would see 
and talk to all these other people struggling for their issues. I 
would feel more confident and I would know that we are not 
alone. It made us feel stronger and it convinced us that our 
struggle is right." (5/2/06). 
From his point of view, the realisation that "we are not alone" gave people a sense of 
strategic strength but also validated the 'rightness' of their struggle. What Namdev 
means specifically by realising that their struggle is 'right' is not immediately clear 
however. It may refer to the manner in which the Narmada people were able to validate 
both their own judgement of being aggrieved by the state and their decision to act 
against this, through an awareness that other people are also facing and reacting to 
similar concerns. It may also be suggestive of an emerging realisation of the deeper 
moral 'rightness' of their struggle, in that the existence of other movements implies that 
their own plight is not isolated and local, but rather of wider social significance. As 
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attested to by others, exposure to other movements did enhance and broaden people's 
understanding of their grievances and the nature of the state they were fighting against. 
Thus, Suraj uses his knowledge of what has happened with people displaced by other 
dams to support the construction of a grievance frame that views the government as 
corrupt and as driving forward destructive development: 
"We have seen how people from other dams have been treated. 
They have been left to die by this corrupt government. Poor 
people will get nothing from these dams. The Indira Sagar dam 
is made now, people were displaced but the electricity is not 
going to the farmers, its going to factories. The poor will get 
poorer and the rich will get richer — that's their policy, this is the 
politics of development. It is fake development" (24/1/06). 
Through his own experiences of the state and those of other displaced people he 
concludes that the government's development policies work for "businessmen, 
politicians and capitalists" against the poor who are left destitute. Again, grievance 
constructions formed and reinforced through broader alliances with other social 
struggles allow a broader national scaling of the struggle — thus since displacement is 
happening throughout the country and is not limited to the Narmada Valley, the national 
policy of development is to blame and thus the state itself, which in collusion with 
capitalists and industrialists is working not just against the people of the valley, but the 
poor in general. This broader discourse runs through the narratives of all those I spoke 
to. In the next section I examine how this discourse is used to reinforce or transform 
expressions of political and social identification with the Indian nation-state. 
Citizens of India - National Well-Being over Global Solidarity 
Most of those I spoke to expressed an allegiance with the Indian state. This was despite 
an overarching feeling of betrayal and distrust of the government — a government, that 
is spearheading a skewed, 'fake development' (Namdev, 5/2/06) that further 
marginalises the 'poor', but strengthens the rich: 
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"...The government gives the slogan — 'long live the soldiers, 
long live the farmers' — the whole country depends on this. If 
there are no farmers then the country will starve. We are not 
getting any of the electricity produced by the dams that have 
been built, so we have not developed at all and nor has the 
nation. The government is only benefiting big companies and 
big people by the dam; poor farmers will only be displaced" 
(Mahadev, 28/1/06). 
While connecting farmers' displacement to starvation in India, Mahadev clearly situates 
the threat of the Sardar Sarovar dam in the context of the broader destruction of the 
nation and blames the government for this, as does Shanta bai: 
"Before I used to think — it is our government, if they are 
drowning us they will resettle us as well, I trusted them. But 
now our government has sold itself. There used to be a time 
when India used to be called a golden bird — our country was 
great. There used to be rivers of milk. I am telling you history. 
But now the government has sold the rivers and the golden bird 
has vanished" (Shanta bai, 28/1/06). 
Shanta bai seems to view her plight as part of the general and long term decline of the 
`greatness' of India, and holds the government accountable for this. Nevertheless she 
articulates a patriotic pride in India, which she glorifies and mythologizes as the 'golden 
bird' that it once was. However Shanta's sense of nationalism has undergone a 
transition. Previously her identification with India echoed the hegemonic nationalism, 
that Lowe and Lloyd (1997) argue "posits a historical continuity between the emergence 
of a people and the development of the state that represents its political sovereignty" 
(p8). Thus Shanta viewed the state as an extension, representative, and protector of the 
people, and hence as "our government". Now however she feels deeply betrayed by the 
government, who has 'sold' the riches of the nation. She therefore rejects state 
structures as representative of the people and their aspirations. Her perceived severance 
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of political structures of the state from the socio-cultural collective of the nation, 
suggests a nationalism that derives simply from cultural affiliation to the people of the 
nation rather than an identification with the state also. This cultural form of nationalism 
is shared by many others in the Narmada valley, who while critical of the state, continue 
to express a sense of national citizenship. 
While their struggle is discursively constructed as one not just for their land and 
immediate community, but rather for the wider well-being of the nation, the people's 
fight for their rights against the 'corrupt government' is considered to be an active 
engagement with their duty as citizens of India. 
"Yes, I am from India, I have pride in India, that's why I fight, 
because I have right over India. If I don't do something for 
India, who will?" (Shanta, 28/1/06). 
Thus their struggle against the government is not in conflict with their sense of 
affiliation to the Indian nation but rather is precisely because of it. In making this 
connection between her struggle and her allegiance to India, Shanta is actively 
performing her national citizenship, as is Bahadur: 
"First and foremost I am a citizen of India. That is why I must 
save my village, if I can't save my village, I will not be able to 
save my country" (30/3/06). 
Since the NBA's struggle is framed in terms of a broader struggle against displacement 
and destructive development, other national struggles such as those of slum-dwellers 
fighting eviction, fishermen facing displacement and those affected by the gas disaster 
in Bhopal are shown support. All these people are 'suffering together' and thus for the 
people of the valley it is not only one's "duty to support them" but joining hands with 
other organisations also "increases our strength" against a 'common enemy' — the 
government. Apart from the moral universalistic discourse of 'duty to support those 
who are suffering' and instrumental discourse of increasing ones strength against a 
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common enemy, yet another more politicised discourse is invoked to sustain solidarity 
with other national movements, as articulated here for instance by Bahadur: 
"Our fight is the same, they are fighting for human rights, social 
betterment and justice and so are we. We are all fighting against 
the anti-people policies of the government" (Bahadur, 30/3/06). 
In this sense alliance-building, is not simply a defensive reaction against 'suffering' 
caused by the state but is a larger political project towards the creation of a better 
nation. Other national movements are thus perceived to be fighting for the 'same' goals 
as NBA and alliances with them are conceived as efforts to unite oppressed actors in 
order to challenge and transform the national hegemony, characterised by anti-people 
policies. These alliances are therefore, not intended to be episodic, instrumental 
linkages for particularistic interests. They are instead based on recognition of the need 
for joint action towards long term social change, and can hence be conceptualised in 
Gramscian terms as counter-hegemonic formations. 
However this counter-hegemonic solidarity does not seem to extend to foreign 
movements as readily as it does to national struggles. Support to foreign movements 
against dams is extended only so far as it does not conflict with the interests of the 
nation: 
"Our fight is alike. They are displaced and so are we. If they are 
enemies of our country than that is a different thing. We should 
not support them then. We are not traitors of our country. 
Giving support to others is a good thing. If people gain strength 
from us then I am happy about that" (Bahadur, 30/3/06). 
Thus the struggle of foreign movements against dams is 'alike' but not the 'same' as 
NBA, though national mobilisations, whether against dams or other things, are. Though 
Bahadur's universalistic discourse of justice and human rights provides the basis for 
solidarity with other national movements, his allegiance to the nation prevents this from 
providing an ideological bridge for expressing solidarity with foreign movements — he 
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is "not a traitor". Ironically this nationalistic discourse echoes that of the Indian 
government's which condemns NBA's alliances with INGOs as anti-national. 
Apparently Bahadur's nationalism does not prevent him from engaging in 'anti-
national' linkages with INGOs when this is a matter of immediate survival. However, 
his nationalism does create a distinction between national as 'us', and supra-national as 
`them', suggesting that political and economic commonalities of interest between social 
groups within a nation are more significant and important than any that may exist 
amongst people across nations. By corollary, Bahadur's nationalism obfuscates tensions 
and exploitative relationships amongst class groupings within the nation. As Lowe and 
Lloyd (1997) note, "nationalism seeks, in the Gramscian sense, to direct popular forces, 
and thereby gain hegemony over them" (p10). Hence even while the state is colluding 
with supranational forces to establish global capitalism, as critiqued by NBA, 
nationalistic affiliation obfuscates the realisation of wider commonalities of political 
interest across borders, and thus prevents Bahadur from extending support for counter-
hegemonic alliances at the global level. When he does extend support to foreign 
movements it emerges not from a sense of participating in a common political struggle 
but on the basis of a moral compulsion to do good to others as long as they do not harm 
the nation. Bahadur is otherwise critical of the policies of the state. But by defending 
and juxtaposing the nation against the foreign, he is consciously or unconsciously also 
providing a defence for the hegemonic structures of the state which ultimately exist by 
establishing political sovereignty from the foreign. 
Further the solidarity expressed by foreigners on visits to the valley is seen as arising 
from a similar moral compulsion to 'help those who are suffering' rather than from a 
common political goal: 
"The foreigners come to see what our problems are. They hear 
that our government is repressing us and they come to help us. 
They take our news to far off places abroad and bring our 
struggle to people's attention". (Karamchand, 2/2/06). 
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In turn he believes that NBA should show solidarity with foreign movements because 
they aid his struggle — "if they help us, we will help them". Following resource 
mobilisation theory, the support of foreigners is viewed as a resource to further the 
NBA's struggle, and reciprocation of this support is treated as an investment in this 
resource. 
Thus far we have seen that those who expressed an allegiance to the nation-state viewed 
their struggle as one that is important for the wider progress of the nation. Solidarity and 
joint protest with other national struggles emerged through a sense of the strategic 
importance of larger numbers, but also as a wider counter-hegemonic project against the 
state's development politics. A discourse of nationalism however, obfuscated the 
emergence of politicised alliances with other oppressed groups at the global level. 
When support was extended to foreign movements this was based either on a sense of 
moral duty towards those who are suffering, or out of an interest in the instrumental 
value of foreign support. 
Local Identities — The Rejection of National Citizenship 
For some people the struggle against the government for their rights led to a rejection of 
their national citizenship, and an adoption of a local or regional identity: 
"Our Indian government is making the doors of destruction for 
us, then how can we say we are people of India, I would say I 
am a person of the Narmada Valley, I am NBA's people...for 
me Medha is more worthy of respect than India the country...if 
we are part of India then we should also have rights" (Prem, 
27/1/06). 
Here citizenship and allegiance to the state is not pre-given and immutable. Loyalty 
must be earned. While those who express a national allegiance, construct their 
relationship to the state in terms of duties towards the nation, Prem who rejects the 
state, emphasises formal rights. Once the state has violated these rights, the relationship 
between people and the state is negated and the state loses its authority to command 
loyalty. Rejection of Indian citizenship of course implies that identification with the 
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state did at one point exist, but has now been severed. Thus Ravi uses the metaphor of a 
mother and child: 
"If a mother betrays her child then what is the point of being 
called her child. So if the government betrays us then what is the 
point of taking up its citizenship? We are more constrained by 
the chains of the corrupt Indian government than the British 
rule" (26/1/06). 
Here the redundancy of patriotism is highlighted by the fact that he has been treated 
worse by his own Indian government than he was by a foreign government. 
Though political loyalty is transferred from the nation-state to the local level and even 
to the NBA, this is not a shift towards an exclusionary identity. Thus solidarity with 
other movements, national and global, is expressed on the basis of one's relationship as 
humans and thus on the defence of humanity. Again this moral universalism expressed 
in relation to foreign movements lacks a sense of common struggle towards a political 
goal: 
"They are humans, they also have rights. We are not concerned 
with the Indian government and African government getting 
together and making business deals, we want to help the people 
of Africa because they are suffering at the hands of their 
government" (Prem, 27/1/06). 
Prem extends support to the people of Africa against their government because they 
also have human rights and should not be made to suffer. This is despite the fact that 
supporting the people of Africa against their government may conflict with the interests 
of the Indian state which does business deals with Africa. Here unlike the 'Indian 
citizens', Prem extends loyalty to other 'humans' across national boundaries, over and 
above the interests of the Indian state. It is the sovereignty of people over that of the 
nation-state that is of greater importance. However, this transnational solidarity with 
`humans' is not underpinned by a feeling of participation in a global struggle against a 
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global enemy. Thus outsiders are thought to visit the valley in order to simply 'help' the 
people here: 
"These people take our grievances forward. Our government 
doesn't listen to us, when people come from outside it is a big 
shame for our government, so it has an effect on them. Our 
national representatives are making us suffer and doing injustice 
to us and people from outside are helping us" (Prem, 27/1/06). 
Thus far it is apparent that two different rationales for supporting trans-border 
connections could be found amongst both local and national citizens. For some these 
connections were instrumental to the local-national struggle reflecting transnational 
civil society perspectives on trans-border politics. For others these connections were 
based on evoking humanitarian concerns. The presence of moral universalism amongst 
local and national citizens suggests that such discourse is not necessarily sufficient for 
creating the deterritorialised self-representation of global citizenship. Importantly, 
neither categories of citizens articulated common political interests with subaltern 
movements abroad. 
Global Citizens 
For those who reject a solely national referent for political identity in favour for 
humanity and the world in general, the scale frame adopted by them explicitly "re-
present[s] their local grievance as part of a global struggle" (Kurtz, 2003, p895). Thus: 
"The NBA is fighting to achieve one thing in India and the 
whole world — there shouldn't be poverty anywhere, farmers 
should not suffer...not just farmers but any person" (Sharad, 
5/2/06). 
Or here again, 
"The NBA doesn't just talk about India it talks about 
development in general and the right of people to participate in 
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decision making. The Andolan also talks about alternatives — if 
we are opposing something we have to give an alternative to it" 
(Rohit, 23/1/06). 
Because the collective action frame of the movement is constructed in global terms, 
foreign activists are seen as participants in the same struggle as the NBA, rather than 
benevolent helpers. People from abroad come to support the movement because they 
too are victims of the same enemies that the NBA is challenging. In an era of 
globalisation the aggrieved are generally the poor, and the enemy — multinational 
corporations and governments colluding together to push forward anti-poor policies: 
"These days the governments and business people of the 
powerful countries get together and make policies that affect the 
whole world and they also exchange money. America gives 
billions to push forward certain policies. So these governments 
are getting together to displace poor people. So our [foreign 
movements and NBA] fight is against a common enemy. This is 
why I am not concerned with Indian citizenship I feel like a 
citizen of the world" (Karan, 1/2/06). 
When Karan goes on to reject a national political identity and proclaims himself to be a 
`citizen of the world' he does so through a "universalism that is more than faith or 
obligation" (Waterman, 1998, p231). He does so, on the basis of a politicised 
universalism that recognises connections between localities affected by the reality of 
global conditions. While becoming aware of the global system of oppression that is 
impacting on his life he perceives a sense of affiliation and common cause with other 
poor people who are being impacted in the same way not only within the nation but 
around the world. He therefore identifies global rather than national citizenship as being 
more relevant to his life experiences. In that Karan's global citizenship is a realist 
response to political circumstances it represents what O'Byrne (2003) describes as a 
`pragmatic' form of citizenship. Since a pragmatic global citizenship is predicated on 
identifying and emphasising the common political and economic interests of citizens 
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across nations, it supports the basis for the formation of counter-hegemonic alliances at 
the global level, paraphrasing Karan, to "fight against a common enemy". Whereas 
Karan constructs a global counter-hegemonic struggle by emphasising concrete enemies 
of the global poor, Rama does so by using a more abstract and embracing, but 
nevertheless realist notion of 'human', to explain the need for trans-border alliances: 
"I feel that those who understand us and support us, they come 
from outside also — England, America, Japan, London, 
Germany. So these people have nothing to do with us but they 
are still thinking of us. So why do they come? I think that we are 
Adivasis- the original people, so we are humans and they are 
humans and they think why should there be destruction in the 
name of humans" (Rama, 2/11/05). 
Even though Rama connects foreign support to the movement through a discourse of 
humanity, rather than a concrete global enemy, this is not in the sense of a passive 
sympathy for those who are suffering, which was evident in the discourse of national 
and local citizens. Rather, foreign people extend solidarity to Rama's struggle because 
they are both fighting a common and active battle against the abuse of humanity and 
human life by hegemonic forces. In this way those fighting for human dignity cannot 
absolve themselves from Rama's struggle because humanity transcends the nation-state 
and thus the fight to save it is a global, politicised, and thus counter-hegemonic struggle 
that Rama is engaged in along with fellow human beings. 
Through their engagement in a local movement with global significance, people of the 
valley are performing their global citizenship. That is, global citizenship is about 
participation in transformative global politics rather than simply a legal bondage of 
rights and duties in the manner in which national citizenship is formally defined 
(Kymlicka and Norman, 1995). Kantya views himself as a global citizen and believes 
that: 
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"If we are able to stop one dam somewhere then it will mean 
victory for the whole world. That is why we give and take 
support from other organisations across the world" (16/4/05). 
In corollary to Kantya, who sees himself as enacting his global citizenship through the 
movement, Bahadur (30/3/06) sees himself as an Indian rather than world citizen 
precisely because he does not view his struggle as actively global — "First and foremost 
I am a citizen of India...If I am able to bring some changes in my country only then can 
I think of doing something for the world". 
For some the adoption of a global political identity, does not lead to a rejection of 
national citizenship. Both are described as relevant to identity, though global affiliation 
derives from being part of a transnational political project and national affiliation from a 
more cultural sense: 
"I am an Indian citizen because I live here and eat its food. I 
need water in a mud pot and glass, I can't drink water from a 
plastic bottle. When foreigners take a bath they need soap. We 
use mud to clean ourselves....but now I see foreign movements 
coming here to visit us, so I feel I am a citizen of the world also. 
Now I feel like I have a voice abroad and I am part of what 
happens there" (Mohit, 8/2/06). 
Others outrightly reject Indian citizenship on the basis of the sovereignty of the 
individual. The nation-state is constructed as an arbitrary and unnecessary unit of 
division and thus the individual should have the liberty to relate to other people across 
borders without mediation of the state: 
"I think that India is a country, America and England are also 
countries. They are only countries aren't they, divided by water 
and some other boundary? My identity is determined by the 
right thought, whether it is in England, Japan, whatever country 
it is in the world, but the right thought, the right way of life, for 
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truth, that is important to me, that is my identity" (Rama, 
2/1 1 /05). 
By emphasising that his identity is constituted by the pursuit of a 'right and truthful way 
of life' (though he leaves this undefined) rather than from national affiliation, Rama 
implies that nationalism does not necessarily intersect with, and can detract from what 
is 'right'. A similar perspective is presented by Rohit, though he is more pointed in 
describing the manner in which the nation-state is an undesirable form of identification: 
"Whether we are citizens of India or abroad, we are all the same. 
It is only politicians that separate us saying that we are citizens 
of different places. The people who come from abroad are the 
same as us. The rich people and politicians have created this 
bondage of citizenship; they have created these boundaries so 
that they can grind the people. The poor are made to suffer". 
(Rohit, 23/1/06). 
Rohit perceives the nation-state to be an ideology created by capitalists and politicians 
to construct barriers between poor people across the world, though in actuality "we are 
all the same". By manufacturing differences of nationality those in power prevent the 
poor from uniting, and thus enable the perpetuation of their exploitation. 
In summary, crucial to the notion of global citizenship is the sense of involvement in a 
global struggle. This extends the basis of solidarity with foreign movements beyond a 
moral duty to help others, inherent in moral universalism, to an assertion of 
participation in a common struggle. Such a 'pragmatic' notion of global citizenship is 
facilitated and necessitated by the globalisation of political and economic structures. 
The common enemy identified by many global citizens is transnational capital and 
world governments that facilitate its flow, to the detriment of 'the poor'. In that national 
governments are identified as colluders in this process of exploitative economic 
globalisation, global citizens reject national allegiance. Instead they emphasise the 
sovereignty of the individual acting through global political collectivities. By locating 
their local grievances within global, systemic conditions, and forming trans-border 
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alliances on this basis, global citizens are performing their global citizenship by 
constructing and acting within a counter-hegemonic struggle at the global level. 
So far the forms of citizenship discussed are those typical of the modern era, but in the 
next section I will draw attention to a non-modern type of citizenship still characteristic 
of many Adivasis who are not aware of their inclusion in the Indian state. 
Non-Modern Citizenship — Vidivasis as those who struggle' 
As I have discussed earlier, many Adivasis who have been less directly involved in 
NBA protest events across the country have not developed a worldview based on a 
concept of the globe divided into nation-states. By extension, they are also not aware of 
their being part of the state of India. Accompanying this lack of awareness of the 
nation-state is an absence of cultural affiliation with the 'people of India'. Thus when I 
would ask whether they saw any differences between the 'white people' and other 
`brown' outsiders, such as myself, who come to visit the valley, they generally replied 
in the negative (fieldnotes, 30/10/05). While a modern identification with the nation 
state is absent, identity is expressed as Adivasis in opposition to puravasis who "are 
educated and wear full clothes", or as "hill people" in opposition to the bazaarias or 
market people (fieldnotes, 30/10/05). In this sense Adivasis subscribe to a non-modern 
form of citizenship which "attributes to the citizen primary membership and sense of 
allegiance to a non-territorialized (usually culturally defined) group" (O'Byrne, 2003, 
p3). However this is not to suggest that Adivasis are only bound by a reified and fixed 
sense of cultural identity. Instead it emerged through the course of my fieldwork that 
the meaning ascribed to `Adivasi' has been undergoing change in the process of the 
mobilisation, becoming more of a fluid, political identity. This has happened through 
the incorporation of experiences of social struggle in Adivasis' self-representations. 
Thus Adivasi identity has been re-constituted to refer to those who are 'struggling' 
against the sarkar' or government: 
"People who are fighting in andolans are Adivasi — they know 
they are Adivasi. But those who do not listen to the Andolan are 
not Adivasi" (Ahoryia, 30/10/05). 
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A corollary to this is that other 'poor people' who are not actively struggling against the 
government are not viewed as Adivasi: 
"They feed the government and they think that the sarkar is 
good. So they would not be considered Adivasi, they are 
sarkar's people (`sarkari')" (Ahoriya, 30/10/05). 
Such a politicised Adivasi identity, while certainly excluding some people, provides the 
basis to extend membership to others with whom, though no cultural affinity is shared, 
are instead bound by a sense of common struggle against the sarkar. Thus 'white' and 
`brown' people who are part of other organisations and express solidarity with them are 
referred to as Adivasi also. It must be noted, however, that even though Adivasis in the 
NBA seem to have developed a fluid, transnational form of identity, this is not 
reflective of identification with global citizenship. In the absence of a modernist 
awareness of the nation-state against which to juxtapose or supplement the global 
construct of `Adivasi as struggler', this remains a non-modern form of affiliation 
(though it is a space of contestation and may provide the basis for the emergence of 
modern notions of global citizenship). This is reflected in an absence of the modern 
discourse of humanity and justice to establish solidarity with other movements which I 
found amongst Nimaris and Adivasis that were familiar with the modernist notions of 
country and globe (as has already been discussed). 
CONCLUSION 
While the previous chapter illustrated the manner in which social movements develop 
through a process of collective learning, this chapter highlighted how the radical 
democratic space of social movements provides critical learning experiences that allow 
individual participants to challenge their oppression. In the first moment of resistance 
people were made aware of their rights as citizens, and thus the illegitimacy of the 
feudal control exercised over them by the state. This empowerment within the 
framework of a liberal democracy led to the second stage of resistance, when the state's 
continuing denial of their rights revalorised their position towards a more radical 
rejection of the state's authority. This was manifested in the symbolic 'reclamation of 
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eminent domain' as well as an emphasis towards social movements and political 
collectivites rather than the individual as the 'site' for citizenship. Finally, NBA's 
politics of multiple scales that involved contestation at the national and global levels, 
led to further pedagogical experiences that facilitated a scalar understanding of space 
amongst grassroots participants and the politicised framing of their grievances beyond 
the local scale. 
These various educational processes of the radicalisation of citizenship and construction 
of grievance scales were constitutive elements of the three expressions of modern 
citizenship found amongst grassroots participants, i.e. national, local and global 
citizenship. While all were critical of the government's failure to protect the interests of 
the poor in India, they differed regarding the extent to which they perceived their local 
grievances to be connected to the global hegemony, and consequently the basis they 
provided for extending support to foreign movements. Significantly global citizens 
explicitly framed their grievances in terms of a broader global struggle against 
capitalism, destructive dams or the destruction of humanity. The expression of 
solidarity with foreign movements was therefore counter-hegemonic in nature in that it 
was based on recognising common political interests against the hegemony. This was in 
contrast to national and local citizens, who while framing their struggle as one of 
national relevance, rationalised support to foreign movements through non-political 
considerations of moral duty or instrumental value. 
This account provides a reading of global citizenship that moves beyond moral 
universalism as the guiding principle, as espoused by some (Dower, 2003; Kung, 2002). 
Rather it supports a pragmatic form of global citizenship which is a politicised response 
to globalised conditions of modernity. This also suggests that as people actively and 
critically encounter global conditions through social struggle, they can learn to become 
global citizens, as did the global citizens of NBA. Yet the learning of global citizenship 
is not inevitable. The hegemonic discourse of nationalism that serves to undermine the 
realisation of trans-border commonalities and connections can act as a strong counter-
check against learning of global citizenship. This at least partly explains why most NBA 
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participants continue to articulate a strong sense of nationalistic affiliation, even though 
they are critical of the Indian state's actions. 
Apart from modern forms of citizenship, I also identified non-modern affiliations 
amongst Adivasis who are not aware of India, the nation. Here the identity of Adivasi 
has been re-worked to encompass all those engaged in struggle against the sarkar, 
regardless of cultural differences. While this represents a fluid and dynamic identity that 
transcends political borders, it is stressed that this does not represent a modern 
conceptualisation of global citizenship. This illuminates the embedded centrality of 
national citizenship against which constructions of global citizenship can be juxtaposed, 
and thus given political meaning. 
By providing an account of the politicisation of identities and emergence of global 
citizenship amongst grassroots participants of NBA, this chapter deepens the analysis of 
the role of Third World local movements in GCS. Not only can they collectively contest 
the role of supranational and national institutions in their oppression, and form global 
alliances in response, but through this politics they also hold the potential for the radical 
transformation of identities and consciousness and formation of global citizenship 
amongst local people. 
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Chapter 9 
(Performing) Global Citizenship at the Local Level 
INTRODUCTION 
So far I have examined how NBA was enacting radical global citizenship through its 
struggle against national and global forces of domination. Here however, I turn to 
exploring how movement participants are performing global citizenship at the local 
level — that is whether their increasing consciousness of the national and global nature 
of oppression is refracted back, leading to consciousness and action to transform 
oppressive social relations of gender, caste and class that are normalised and embedded 
within their own communities. The chapter therefore contributes towards understanding 
the extent to which social movements might provide a learning environment to facilitate 
reflexivity towards local social structures of oppression. 
The chapter primarily draws on data from villages in Nimar. This is because Nimar is 
more stratified than Adivasi society and hence provides a more conducive context for 
examining and following processes of social transformation at the community level. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first provides a descriptive and theoretical 
account of gender, caste and class relations in Nimar. The second part is an analysis of 
changes in reflexivity towards, and consent for these three dimensions of oppression 
amongst village participants of the movement. Attention is also paid to the movement 
processes that facilitated these changes. 
NIMARI SOCIETY: THREE DIMENSIONS OF OPPRESSION 
Nimari society is fractured by three main axis of oppression — gender, caste and class. 
Here I provide a brief description of the manner in which these have been traditionally 
manifested in the lives of people in Nimar, and rural India in general. 
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Patriarchy 
While women are generally recognised as part of the marginalised 'subalterns' 
(Chatterjee and Jeganathan, 2000), nowhere is this more apparent than in rural India 
(Grey, 2004; Seenarine, 2004). Hegemonic cultural ideologies of pativrata (devotion to 
husband who is considered akin to god), maryada (female honour emanating from her 
modesty), and sringar (female adornment — women as objects of beauty) ensure that not 
only are women treated as appendages to men but that such subordination is often 
conceded to by women themselves who view it as a parameter of their virtue (Bagwe, 
1995). 
Traditionally women in rural India, including Nimar maintain purdah, which literally 
translated means veil or curtain. This is the social practice of veiling and seclusion of 
women from the public arena and even within the house itself. The practice of purdah 
involves an intricate set of rules regarding mannerisms, clothing and body language —
all indications of women's subservience to male members of the community but also 
symbolic gestures of her modesty and dignity. For instance, married women are 
required to cover their heads, and in some instances their faces in the presence of 
husbands and male in-laws. 
While cultural practices of patriarchy severely restrict the interaction and participation 
of women in public life, they are solely responsible for domestic work, which in rural 
areas can be physically gruelling, involving cleaning out animal sheds and threshing 
and manually grinding grains, apart from cooking and cleaning for a large joint family. 
Apart from this, women, especially in lower caste families82, also lend their time and 
labour to their agricultural fields working alongside hired labour. While the 
contributions of women are crucial to the economic situation of the family, they 
themselves remain fmancially dependent on their husbands (Omvedt, 1993). 
82 Women in wealthy or upper caste families draw their dignity and prestige from not having to labour 
outside the house. 
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Caste 
Apart from patriarchy, the caste system is another important dimension of oppression in 
Nimar, and rural India in general. The caste system has ancient origins, with the earliest 
references to it in the Rig Veda, which is one of the oldest religious texts in the world, 
written between 1700-1100 BC. In this, a hymn describes the creation of the universe 
and humans from the sacrifice of a 'cosmic being' called Purusha. The gods divide 
Purusha into four parts — his mouth becoming the Brahmans (priests and men of 
learning); his two arms — the Kshatriyas (rulers and warriors); his thighs — the Vaishyas 
(traders and merchants); and his feet — the Shudras (the lower occupational groups) 
(Klass, 1980). This religious myth provides a justification for, as well as graphical 
representation of the hierarchical or stratified nature of the caste system, with the 
Brahmans as the most revered, and the Shudras occupying the lowest position. 
Sometimes a fifth category, falling outside the four varnas is also mentioned — that of 
untouchables or achhoot, within which Harijans and Adivasis are placed. Varnas are 
further divided into an innumerable number of castes, with castes within a varna also 
ordered in a hierarchy in relation to each other (Morton, 1980). 
Despite vigorous debate surrounding the origins and meaning of the caste system, there 
is general consensus that it is, in Max Weber's terms a 'closed status group' 
(Jayaraman, 1981), in that membership to various levels within the hierarchy is fixed 
and relatively impenetrable. Ensuring the 'closed' nature of this social system are 
various social practices such as endogamy that prohibit inter-caste marriage; 
occupational specialisation wherein particular occupations are reserved for particular 
castes; commensality that restricts interactions between castes in relation to eating and 
drinking activities; and finally hereditary membership to a caste (Klass, 1980). 
According to Dumont (1980) the hierarchy of castes is based on the principle of 
opposition between pure and impure. Thus the superiority of a caste derives from the 
purity of its occupation and eating habits. Castes engaging in 'polluting' activities such 
as eating meat, or jobs involving contact with animal and human refuse, excreta, and 
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cadavers, are considered the most impure and thus relegated to the lowest level in the 
caste hierarchy. These are generally referred to as the untouchables and are not only 
considered 'dirty' but evil and inauspicious. Whether occupational purity is itself a 
reason for the caste hierarchy, as Dumont suggests, or a means for culturally 
legitimising its existence is however debated (Mosse 1999). 
Though the original function of the caste system is contested (Klass, 1980; Dutt, 1931), 
it is clear that caste ideology has served to legitimise and entrench class stratifications 
(Jayaraman, 1981). Thus the caste ideology of occupational differentiation between 
castes has been used by high castes to prevent lower caste individuals from acquiring 
land. For instance, as recently as 2003, a Harijan family in Gujarat was forcibly 
prevented from cultivating land they had received from the government by upper caste 
farmers forcing them to return to wage labour (Dave, 2003). This economic subjugation 
is given ideological legitimisation through religious notions of karma and 
transmigration that place responsibility for the social position of the lower castes on 
transgressions they have committed in their previous life. At the same time the ideology 
of karma conditions lower castes to "uncomplainingly, willingly and obediently" fulfil 
their preordained duties towards upper castes in their current life as the only way of 
achieving redemption (Singh, 2005, p202). 
The caste hierarchy, however, must not be conflated with class structure. As Perez 
(2004) points out economic classes do not always correspond with caste positions. Thus 
within a particular region a 'dominant caste' that possess greatest economic strength 
may not necessarily be from the highest caste (Perez, 2004). For instance in Gujarat, the 
Patidars have secured a dominant political and economic status even though they are 
ritually below Brahmans and Kshatriyas. Hence, though the caste system strongly 
intersects class divisions it represents a form of oppression in itself. This necessitates a 
separate exploration of class stratifications as another form of oppression in Nimar, to 
which I now turn. 
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Class 
The economic landscape of rural India can be divided roughly into four classes — Rich, 
middle and poor farmers and agricultural labourers. While the rich farmers, defined as 
owning over 15 acres of land constitute 7% of the agricultural population, 30% of the 
population are poor farmers, cultivating between 1-5 acres of land. A large 44% percent 
of the rural population are constituted of agricultural labourers who either own less than 
1 acre of land or nothing at all (Dass and Deulkar, c2002). This class earns its livelihood 
mostly as casual labour, remaining unemployed if work is not available, while a 
minority work as attached labour, securing regular employment from a single employer. 
With the emergence of capitalist agriculture pushed forward by the Green Revolution 
such inequality in land-ownership is only increasing (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000). 
In Pipri, a Nimari village, which is the main subject of this chapter, middle farmers 
owning between 5-15 acres of land predominate. Most farmers employ agricultural 
labourers to work on the fields. Largely workers are employed on a causal basis though 
some have regular employment. While the per day wage rate stipulated by the 
government is 50 rupees, they are normally paid between 20-30 rupees. Their economic 
existence thus hovers a little above the poverty line83. Aside from satiating hunger, this 
income is not enough to afford education and full medical care. 
Farmers in Pipri are of various castes in the hierarchy — predominantly scheduled caste 
Yadays but also higher caste Kshatriyas. The interplay between caste and class is most 
evident here in the manner in which landless labourers in the village are predominantly 
Adivasi or Harijan untouchables. Economic relations between labourers and farmers are 
thus mediated by caste practices of purity-impurity or chooa-choot. However chooa-
choot is also practiced amongst farmers of different caste statuses regardless of 
83 The poverty line here is not measured by the popular international parameter of $1 a day (income of 
labourers in Pipri falls below this). It refers instead to the poverty line measure of India which records the 
"most basic calorie intake", in terms of satiation of hunger rather than nutrition. This measure does not 
take into account the other basic necessities (shelter, clothing, transport etc) that an individual spends his 
income on. As of 2005 the poverty line for rural areas stands at Rs.368 per person per month which is just 
about enough to purchase 650 grams of food grains a day (Guruswamy and Abraham, 2006). 
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economic standing. Having briefly explored how gender, caste and class oppression is 
manifested in Nimar the next section develops a framework for identifying 
transformative changes in the practice of these forms of oppression. This will aid 
subsequent analysis of movement participants' reflexive engagement and 
transformation of these practices. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING CHANGES IN TRADITIONAL 
STRUCTURES OF OPPRESSION 
In order to identify transformations in the practice of gender, caste and class oppression 
it is necessary to understand the ways in which they are manifested in everyday life. In 
rural India, these relations of domination and subordination are highly semioticised. 
That is, a complex system of cultural 'codes' or 'signs' are used to articulate and 
manifest authority and deference. Though the creation of symbols is a characteristic of 
all societies, Ranjit Guha (1983), an eminent Indian historian argues that semioticity in 
general and the semiotisation of power relations in particular is especially pertinent to 
feudal societies that are driven by tradition. While he characterises rural India of the 
colonial era as feudal, it appears that this characterisation is also applicable to the rural 
India of today, where caste, gender and class superiority continue to be expressed 
through cultural practices, though perhaps less rigorously than before. 'Signs' of 
hierarchy in rural India take a number of forms. Verbal speech contains derogatory and 
reverential versions for pronouns. Paralinguistic signs relating to distance, posture and 
sitting arrangements are loaded with power implications, as are ornaments and clothing. 
Some examples of these 'signs' will be seen later in the analysis. 
Given the significance of cultural practices in symbolising authority and deference, 
Guha (1983) theorises transformative action as the radical subversion of these practices 
— "Indeed the struggle for any significant change in existing power relations in the 
countryside often appears as a contest against those who are determined to retain their 
traditional monopoly of such status symbols and others who are keen on appropriating 
them — that is, as a cultural conflict." (p61). Transformations of these cultural practices 
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become even more significant given the manner in which they are anchored to religious 
idioms that make deference to authority not only natural but desirable, and therefore 
manufacture a Gramscian consent for people's own subordination. Critical reflection 
and action to change or remove these cultural signs of deference are thus viewed to be 
significant to the transformation of local oppression. Yet at the same time, in the 
absence of changes in broader economic and cultural structures of hegemony these can 
only represent intimations of change. This suggests a conception of social 
transformation as process rather than abrupt moment. It also suggests that active 
consciousness or reflexivity regarding these changes is a critical aspect of social 
change. Conversely, without reflexivity, changes in social practices are not indications 
of social transformation. Having developed this framework for interpreting changes in 
traditional practices of hegemony in Nimar, I now move on to exploring the 
pedagogical context that NBA provided to facilitate movement participants' critical 
engagement and transformation of these local practices. 
NBA AS A PEDAGOGICAL SPACE FOR LOCAL TRANSFORMATION 
As I have already argued, the struggle against SSP developed into a counter-hegemonic 
struggle against oppression operating at multiple scales. This section begins by 
illustrating how this struggle provided a facilitative space for movement participants to 
critically reflect and act upon traditional power structures at the local level. It also 
highlights the movement's limitations in facilitating this reflexivity, arising from the 
strategic consideration of maintaining unity amongst participants. 
Counter-Hegemonic Struggle and the Rupture of Traditional Power Structures 
The movement's contribution to facilitating the critical reflection of grassroots 
participants' regarding locally legitimised oppression lay primarily in interrupting and 
rupturing traditional power structures during mobilisations, as well as providing a 
discursive repertoire of human rights, justice and oppression that developed through the 
movement's wider struggle against the dam. As a movement for social justice, the 
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mobilisation of marginalised sections of Nimari society — women, lower castes and 
labourers — was ideologically relevant to the struggle. It was also instrumental to 
gaining support from national and international civil society, as well as for 
strengthening the movement's resistance against political opponents. Movement leaders 
thus made significant efforts to mobilise women and untouchable hill Adivasis along 
with higher caste men. However, though they were successful in this endeavour they 
were less able to organise labourers. 
Nevertheless, the joint participation of women, lower caste and higher caste men 
provided an opportunity to experience social interactions that departed from normal 
practices. Where women are concealed by purdah, the arrival of Medha Patekar — a 
female activist to lead mobilisations was itself viewed with scepticism. Male farmers 
wondered - "what will a women be able to achieve for us?" However as she organised 
impressive meetings with farmers and politicians "talk spread of how, even though she 
was a woman she seemed capable" (Nanak, 20/3/05). Medha Patekar was also able to 
use her charisma and remarkable social and political abilities to convince male farmers 
of the need to mobilise women from the villages. Prem Yadav describes one of the first 
instances of women participating in public protests: 
"When we went to Kevadia colony women did not go. Medha 
felt there should be women so she spoke to Dev Ram Bhai who 
used to be the sarpanch" here. He said ok we will bring women 
too. The next time Didi (Patekar) came the women also came to 
the temple. Before they never used to. The first woman to come 
was Geeta bai. Didi had come with a mike and she told Geeta 
bai to shout a slogan. At first she shied away but didi took away 
her veil and then Geeta bai shouted a slogan. She didn't come in 
front though. She shouted from behind the window in the temple 
84 
 A sarpanch is elected by village members to represent the village at the statutory institution of local 
self-government called the Gram Panchayat. The sarpach mediates between the village community and 
government officers. 
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— Koi nahi hatega, bandh nahi banega85 ! After that women 
started to participate in the movement." (Prem, 27/1/06). 
Women who previously had been restricted to the household entered the public domain. 
They often took centre stage in demonstrations, gheroing and questioning officials, 
addressing large rallies and making speeches, and often even bearing the brunt of brutal 
attacks by the police. Women have also been involved in the decision-making processes 
of the movement, though to a far lesser extent. For instance, Shanta bai is a member of a 
committee set up by NBA activists to act as a watchdog against corruption, and Geeta 
bai is a member of the Narmada Ghati committee — a group made up of village level 
activists in the Valley that deliberate over issues relating to the movement's 
functioning. Such participation of women is punctuated and encouraged by movement 
slogans — 'Hum Nimar ki nari hain, phut nahi, chingari hain' — 'We are the women of 
Nimar, we are flames not flowers', that evocatively reject women's identity as 
submissive 'flowers' and celebrate their new radical form as burning 'flames' of anger. 
The joint mobilisation of Adivasis and Nimari farmers also interrupted caste practices 
within the context of movement activities. The intervention of the leader of the 
movement was again crucial in achieving this. She encouraged people of all castes to 
travel together, sit next to each other, and share food and water during protest events. 
When satyagrahas (passive resistance) started in the hill villages of Adivasis facing 
submergence, many Nimaris of various castes joined them and stayed for months in 
their houses. This was a particularly significant departure from existing caste 
interactions given that Adivasis were considered to be dirty untouchables who were 
mystified as evil spirits, and so kept at arms length. Initially Nimaris therefore had been 
"scared" of going into the hills. Once there, however, these events provided an 
opportunity for learning each others language, exchanging opinions about the dam and 
its consequences and learning about each others culture, farming practices and lifestyles 
(fieldnotes, 3/12/05). This was an important gesture of solidarity and facilitated the 
formation of personal relationships between these social groups. The display of caste 
85 An NBA slogan - 'We will not move, the dam must not be built'. 
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unity was discursively articulated through protest slogans — "Larne wale ek hi jati!" —
Those who struggle are one caste; and "Hum sub ek hain! " - "We are all one". 
The rupture of traditional patriarchal and caste practices in the space of the movement 
and its replacement with more egalitarian modes of interaction provided an opportunity 
for Nimari people to enact and experience an alternative social reality to that within 
which they were normalised. It held the potential to falsify the supposed naturalness and 
inevitability of their traditional structures and thus enable people to question and 
challenge these. In essence the movement provided what Allman (2001) refers to as 
"prefigurative experiences of the type of social relations that would lie at the heart of a 
transformed society" (p163). Such active experiencing of alternatives is especially 
important for transforming consciousness, when consciousness is viewed from a 
Marxist perspective as being dialectically constructed from the material world. Thus 
drawing from this standpoint, Allman suggests that "authentic and lasting 
transformations in consciousness can occur only when alternative understandings and 
values are actually experienced "in-depth" — that is, when they are experienced 
sensually and subjectively as well as cognitively, or intellectually" (p170). Experiencing 
democratic social relations within the movement could therefore potentially enhance 
people's ability to engage in a more in-depth and critical reflection of their own 
discriminatory community practices. 
Apart from these alternative experiences, the movement's inclusive language of social 
justice and human rights also contributed to making the movement a facilitative space 
for transforming traditional practices of caste and patriarchy. While this discursive 
framework was used to condemn the Narmada people's marginalisation by national and 
global forces, it could also be deployed by movement participants to identify and reject 
discriminatory practices legitimised within their own communities. As Nanak bhai, a 
villager of Karmal notes: 
"The Andolan gave me a new way of thinking about my 
relationship with other castes. I started to think about the 
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equality of rights. I started to think that the religion of humanity 
is above all other religions. That's why I don't practice chooa-
choot anymore." (20/3/05). 
Inclusive discourses drawn upon to resist the oppressive development hegemony were 
therefore logically extended to counter oppressive traditional practices as well. This 
discursive framework was reinforced and circulated within the mass-base through 
movement slogans such as 'Narmada bachao, manav bachao' — 'Save Narmada, save 
humanity', and movement songs which sought to establish the integrity of all human 
life. A verse of one such song, sung during movement events goes: 
`I have faith in humanity 
I believe in honesty 
Equality is my thought 
Self-reliance my aspiration...' 86 
While the movement generated non-exclusionary discourses, one should not overlook 
the religious basis for equality and justice — encapsulated in the idea that 'we are all 
god's children' that already existed amongst local communities (though undermined to 
a large extent by caste ideology). This notwithstanding, I argue that the movement 
provided a pedagogical space that could potentially facilitate the reflexivity of 
collective actors towards local oppression by creating conditions both for experiencing 
and talking about egalitarian social relations. 
Counter-Hegemonic Struggle and the Maintenance of 'Community' 
At the same time, however, the degree to which NBA could actualise these facilitative 
conditions to promote reflexivity was restricted by the movement's need to maintain a 
coherent and unified challenge against the state and WB's development policies. 
86 Translated from Hindi. Song title: 'Kahan Ram Hai, Kya Rahim Hai' (Wherever Ram or Rahim), 
Lyrics by Medha Patekar. 
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Preventing internal divisions from detracting from this primary goal was therefore 
important for the movement. As Patekar notes in reference to class divisions: 
"We could have raised labour issues, but it wasn't possible 
along with the NBA movement - people would have got 
divided." (26/02/06). 
To the extent that the interruption of unequal power relations strengthened the 
movement's unity, leaders encouraged this during protest events, as described above. 
However they refrained from making deliberate and direct efforts to draw critical 
attention to issues of caste, gender, and class oppression that could fragment the wider 
struggle: 
"...upper-caste landlords were used to using derogatory 
language when referring to the Adivasis. It was a challenge 
keeping them together in the movement. We were very much 
aware of the fact that social inequality and economic inequality 
could not be immediately mitigated and dealt with. No 
organization can really take up and work towards resolving all 
the issues at a time, even though the framework can be broad 
and inclusive and comprehensive." (Patekar, 1993, p163). 
In the absence of organised and collective critical reflection, the movement's slogans of 
equality tended to promote a sense of 'community' that obfuscated underlying 
inequalities in the village. The discursive formation of 'community' can be seen in the 
way in which movement leaders justified the participation of marginalised people by 
evoking their traditional roles within the existing system rather than by challenging 
hierarchies. A 'community' framework thus enabled the mobilisation of marginalised 
sections of society without immediately threatening the power of dominant groups. 
A community approach is most evident in the mobilisation of women whose 
participation was encouraged by movement leaders on the basis that women must 
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protect their households from the threat of the dam as part of their traditional duties as 
caregivers of their children, husband and community. In this time of crisis, the ability to 
defend ones home displaced modesty as the touchstone of female honour 
(izaat/maryada). The foregrounding of the caregivers role as a mobilising identity is 
embodied in the slogan — `Mahila ki izaat hai kismein? - Ghar, Gaon bachane mein!' —
`where does a woman's honour lie? - In saving her house and village!'. Women of Pipri 
invariably echoed these notions of dignity and duty to protect in narratives of their 
mobilisation: 
"When Medha came she asked us 'who runs the household?' 
Women not men...The mother will worry about whether there is 
food in the house, not the father. It is the job of the woman to 
save the house and the village and not the man. She has no 
dignity without her house and village." (Geeta bai, 25/1/06). 
For Geeta bai, as for many other women, her participation in the Andolan emerged as 
an extension of her duty and identity as the nurturer of her family rather than her right 
as an individual to contest and protect herself against the state. The discourse upon 
which the mobilisation of women was achieved, thus reinforced rather than challenged 
the subordination of women to the interests of their husband and family. 
This is even more evident in the construction of women as 'shields' of the Andolan. As 
one male villager from Karmal explained: 
"Policemen are more scared of women than men. If women 
come out of their houses to fight then that brings the greatest 
disgrace on the government. Also, sometimes we have to use 
women in demonstrations because the police do not hit women 
as badly as men. So women are the shields of the Andolan." 
(Nanak Bhai, 20/3/05). 
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Women were seen as material and symbolic resources that could further the interests of 
the movement — material in that they acted as a 'shield' or physical barrier between 
male protesters and the police; and symbolic in that their presence as vulnerable 
sections of society further accentuated the image of state injustice and oppression. Such 
strategic use of women as resources again accepted and drew upon the traditional 
position of women in society. The rupture of purdah and mobilisation of women was 
therefore not accompanied by a critique of their subordination within Nimari society. 
By extending traditional gender roles to the mobilisation of women, movement leaders 
failed to encourage critical reflection on gender inequalities and hence, promoted a 
sense of a harmonious and equal 'community'. This construction of community 
facilitated the mobilisation of women and men against the oppressors of the movement, 
while at the same time discouraging gender consciousness and tensions that could 
divide and detract the movement from its primary goal. 
The construction and use of 'community' was visible not just in the mobilisation of 
women but all sections of society. In the case of labourers, it guided the manner in 
which NBA activists formed organisational strategies for their participation. Conceiving 
of the village as a community unit, activists liaised with village leaders — invariably 
powerful farmers, leaving them to mobilise the rest of the village. However unlike its 
success in mobilising women and lower castes, the notion of community failed to 
mobilise labourers. Though activists urged farmers to include labourers in mobilisations 
and to even finance their trips on rallies, such support from farmers was not 
forthcoming. At the same time activists did not seek to organise separate leadership and 
independent channels for labourers to access the movement. NBA leadership's 
treatment of the village as a community rather than class divided space meant that 
labourers who had to depend on reluctant farmers to include them, were ultimately left 
out of mobilisations87. However the importance of a 'community' approach still lay in 
denying class differences and thus preventing the aggravation of class antagonisms that 
could derail the movement's wider goals. 
87 Since participation in movement activities involves the loss of paid work time, labourers are 
constrained by financial imperatives as well. 
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In summary, the movement's counter-hegemonic struggle against the SSP, was 
potentially both facilitative and constraining of the movement's ability to emerge as a 
pedagogical space where village participants could critically reflect on power 
inequalities within the mass base. It facilitated this process in that it ruptured traditional 
hierarchical practices during protest events and gave rise to the discursive tools of social 
justice and human rights. The movement's counter-hegemonic struggle thus provided a 
space where movement participants could experience and talk about egalitarian social 
relations. The process of reflexivity that these conditions could facilitate however, were 
constrained by the movement's construction and maintenance of a unified 'community', 
for whom resistance against external oppressors was paramount. 
Thus though certain structural preconditions for reflexivity towards local oppression 
were created, movement leaders did not make collective efforts to develop this 
reflexivity. As we shall see below then, the extent to which the movement actually 
provided a pedagogical space for critical reflection and action on local oppression 
depended on individual participants' own cognitive engagements with the movement. 
REFLEXIVITY AND CONSENT AMONGST THE GRASSROOTS 
Here I examine the impact of the movement's facilitating and constraining conditions 
for transforming local oppression, on the consciousness of village participants. I 
examine the varying levels of consent, reflexivity and critical action to transform 
gender, caste and class hierarchies that participants exhibited on a "continuum"88 of 
domestication and radicalisation (Mayo, 1999 p6). I start by examining transformations 
in gender consciousness and practices. 
88 The conceptualisation of domestication and radicalisation as poles on a continuum points to the manner 
in which these are analytical categories that in real life are only identifiable as gradations, in a relative 
sense, from low to high levels of critical engagement towards social change. 
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Gender Consciousness and Practices 
The failure of movement leaders to encourage critical reflection regarding gender 
hierarchies in Nimar can be seen in the lack of reflexivity and resistance to male 
hegemony amongst women. Though women suggested that their position within the 
household had become 'better' because of the Andolan, they would refer to these 
changes in a very passive manner. Ganghor mai, an 80 year old veteran of the 
movement recounts: 
"Before the Andolan women would ask their husbands to get 
things for the house, but they would say it behind the wall. If a 
man asked for tea, and the milk was finished the woman would 
be too scared to say so, she would sneak out and borrow milk 
from the neighbour... Before, the daughter in law would not be 
allowed to speak in front of her father-in-law; neither would she 
sit on the bed in front of us. For many years I didn't talk to my 
husband in front of my in-laws. This has all lessened because of 
the Andolan" (Ganghor mai, 3/1/06). 
Ganghor mai presents a truncated before and after version of changes in gender 
practices in which her agency and consciousness are not visible. Changes seem only to 
"happen because of the movement" rather than through women's critical engagement, 
awareness, and active resistance to their subordination. Though women did refer to 
these changes as a "good thing", they were not articulated in a politicised manner that 
expressed the traditional position of women as "unjust" or oppressive in the same way 
in which the state's actions against the people of the Narmada valley were. 
Women even showed a degree of affinity towards practices of purdah that revealed 
Gramscian consent for patriarchy. Thus though purdah and maryada (female dignity), 
were seen as constraints that prevented men and women from "living together as one", I 
also noted very strong undercurrents of lament for an age of maryada now lost. With 
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great bitterness Rajkor talked of how the government had forced women out of their 
houses and stripped them of their dignity: 
"Before women used to have respect and dignity, they would 
stay inside the house. Now the government has dragged us out 
on to the streets. We feel so bad about it...The government has 
made us fight, otherwise we were never like this." (Rajkor, 
4/2/06). 
Rajkor's account of participation in the mobilisation is characterised by a sense of 
humiliation for being 'dragged' out on to the streets against her will, and in violation of 
her womanhood which she appears to define in terms of "staying inside the house". 
Instead of feeling empowered by participation in the movement she feels a sense of 
shame, indicating her deep internalisation and acceptance of patriarchal practices of 
purdah. 
Women also tried to offset changes in the practice of purdah brought on by their 
involvement in the Andolan by drawing my attention to the various aspects of purdah 
and maryada that they had managed to 'protect'. They proudly talked of how even 
though the "need of the hour" called for them to enter into the public they still retained 
a certain standard of dignity: 
"Before women had so much dignity (maryada) and respect that 
even if they stood on a box no one would cast their eyes on 
them. But then a woman has no dignity without her house and 
village. So we left our veils — we realised that the need of the 
hour is such...Even now though we still maintain a certain 
maryada. We still cover our hair with the dupatta, and we get off 
the motorbike when it enters the village and then we walk to the 
house" (Shanta bai, 28/1/06). 
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Evidently, women did not view maryada and purdah as wholly oppressive traditions. To 
the contrary they attached their self-worth to their ability to practice customs of 
deference to men, in a manner that suggested consent for their subordination. This 
consent was not simply based on resignation to their oppression as a "natural and 
inevitable" aspect of their existence but instead on "believ(ing) actively in the values 
that explain and justify their own subordination" (Scott, 1990, p72, italics added). 
However, for some women their active participation in the movement provided a 
catalyst for critically challenging their subordination as women in Nimari society. 
Dimple, the daughter of a barber, and Sapna whose father is a Patidar farmer, have both 
been active in the movement and were also members of a now defunct youth group 
within the NBA. Much to the frustration and dismay of family members, both refuse to 
wear jewellery and bindis — normally a crucial aspect of not simply beautification or 
sringar, but the female identity itself89. Confiding in me Dimple argued: 
"Why should I wear these things, there is more to me than this. I 
don't want to get married either. People treat girls as if they are 
only capable of being wives. All I want to do is work in the 
Andolan" (fieldnotes, 19/3/06). 
Dimple rejects the reification of her identity as 'wife' — a role which negates her worth 
as an individual with her own unique aspirations. Just like Dimple, Sapna too expressed 
disdain for marriage. Both these women consciously projected their resistance to 
traditional female roles through a rejection of the cultural symbols that objectify them 
as beautiful 'things'. Unlike the women discussed earlier, for whom changes in gender 
practices merely "happened", these women engaged in a politicised resistance to sringar 
as a cultural practice that symbolised male hegemony. While the mobilisation of women 
in the movement ruptured normal hegemonic practices of purdah it encouraged greater 
reflexivity amongst these women regarding their subordination in Nimari society. 
89 The fact that these aspects of beautification are fundamental to a women's identity was made 
imminently clear by the way villagers would often show exasperation at my lack of jewellery, exclaiming 
— 'how will people know you are a girl if you don't wear jewellery!'. 
277 
Caste Consciousness and Practices 
The movement, as an educative space, also led to variations in reflexivity and consent 
towards the caste system amongst movement participants. At the 'domesticated' end of 
the spectrum were people like Mohani and her husband who believed in the sanctity of 
the caste system and the need to preserve it. Mohani's consent for the hegemonic 
system of caste made her uneasy about the apparently improper interactions between 
various castes within the context of the movement. As she explained, caste rules are laid 
down by divine authority and must be respected by all. Mohani therefore viewed the 
caste system as not only natural but righteous and thus showed no reflexivity regarding 
its nature as a system of power. On her part, when she went on rallies she would try to 
maintain her distance from the Adivasi untouchables to the extent it was possible. 
However practical conditions made this difficult — "if you are asked to sit on a vehicle 
with other people you can't refuse because these arrangements have been made by 
somebody else. Once you're back at home you can do things according to your own 
rules." (fieldnotes, 19/4/06). For the sake of movement goals, Mohani tolerated 
transgressions of caste practices in the space of the movement, but continued to view 
these as morally wrong, and thus restored such practices in her everyday interactions. 
Others rationalised and accepted the need to abandon caste practices within the 
movement in order to create a semblance of unity as instrumental to strengthening the 
movement against adversaries: 
"In rallies everybody sits together and eats. There is no chooa-
chhoot. Andolan means organisation, strength. Adivasis are 
supporting us and we all have to fight together so there is no 
place for chooa-chhoot. We have to fight as one, if we fight 
together as a clenched fist then we are stronger. If we become 
divided then it is easy for them to crush us individually." 
(Sharad Yadav, 5/2/06). 
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Beyond this political necessity however caste practices of many people remained 
unchanged, with a strict divide maintained between what was practiced in the context of 
the movement ("There we are all one") and what was done at home ("When we are in 
the village we have to accept chhooa-chhoot and recognise that they are Adivasis"). For 
these individuals unity in the movement was more a matter of surface display than the 
"lived compassion and commitment" that according to Allman (2001) manifests "deep 
transformation" (p170). Importantly however the failure to engage in such 
transformation was not simply reflective of a hegemonic need to retain power. Instead 
the caste system itself exercised power over these individuals as an immutable truth that 
"we have to accept" (Shagun, 3/3/06). 
A greater degree of reflexivity regarding the fallacy of the caste system was shown 
amongst those who rejected the system as a "myth". Here Mohit, a Yadav farmer 
describes his realisation of this: 
"I went to the Adivasi villages and stayed with them and ate 
their food. In the beginning I felt that we shouldn't be doing 
this. But we all became one and started considering Adivasis as 
our brothers, I mean what's wrong with them, they are not bad. 
In fact they have fought harder in the struggle than the Nimaris, 
they have shown real courage. Chhooa-chhoot are old customs, 
it is all a myth, there is no substance in all this." (Mohit, 8/2/06). 
The caste ideology propagated a magical and sinister quality to social relations, within 
which Adivasis were considered to be particularly 'bad'. It also legitimised their 
dehumanisation as 'hill monkeys'. According to Freire (1993), both mystification and 
dehumanisation are a function of an oppressive system that also serves to reinforce the 
system, in this case the system of caste. These subjective processes however were 
contradicted by the personal and direct contact that the movement facilitated between 
Mohit and Adivasis, through which he realised that Adivasis are clearly not evil or 
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incapable. Mohit was thus able to reject caste practices as socially constructed 
"customs" based on "myth" rather than divine word. However his rejection of caste 
practices as myth also shows his naivety regarding the hegemonic function of the caste 
system for legitimising oppression. Though his rejection of caste hierarchies was 
significant in a context where they are considered absolute, this was not reflective of a 
fully formed critical consciousness. 
Others did show some recognition of the oppressive dimensions of caste. This 
recognition was manifested in the feeling of a contradiction between the wider struggle 
involving the formation of hegemonic alliances with Adivasis on the one hand, and the 
continuing dehumanisation of Adivasis through caste practices on the other hand. The 
recognition of this contradiction led to the need to bridge it. Amongst higher caste 
farmers such as Namdev however this bridging was achieved by converting caste 
practices of power into a neutral issue of hygiene, rather than challenging these 
practices. The recognition of oppression was thus paradoxically revealed in efforts to 
conceal oppression: 
"After joining the Andolan, wherever we went we saw poor 
people from other organisations showing us solidarity. They 
were all poor people — the gas affected in Bhopal or workers 
from factories. The sufferers were never businessmen or people 
with money, they were always farmers and the poor people. This 
made us feel that poor people are hard workers and we have to 
fight together. Before we used to give Adivasis their wages and 
say 'get lost you Adivasi scoundrel'. Now if I am in the hills I 
eat their food and drink their water also. But if they are too dirty 
we keep them away. If they drink alcohol and eat meat we stay 
away from them — we would stay away from you if you did that 
too." (Namdev, 5/2/06). 
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By attributing a quality of 'dirtiness' to alcohol and meat — the 'things' that Adivasis are 
regularly in contact with, rather than the people themselves, Namdev is able to present 
his avoidance of these people as a neutral concern for hygiene. That is, he seeks to 
sanitise the caste/power connotations of purity-impurity with the discourse of 
cleanliness. He reinforces this argument by pointing out that he would even avoid a 
high caste Brahmin such as me if I consumed these substances. The gaps and weakness 
in this apolitical presentation of caste relations however were brought starkly to light 
through my observations in the village which suggested that Namdev's concern for 
cleanliness was not applied uniformly across castes. Yadays including himself, accepted 
invitations to marriage feasts from the higher caste Rajput family even though they 
traditionally eat meat and drink alcohol and serve this in marriage feasts. When I asked 
him about this he replied: 
"Yes they do make meat but they keep it separate...but we can't 
be concerned with that, how can we worry about that. Even if 
they do mix our food with theirs, it is his house, he can do what 
he likes." 
In the hands of a higher caste Rajput, polluting substances seemed to cause less offence 
to Namdev. That a Rajput can do as he pleases within the space of his own home, seems 
to be a strong enough justification for Namdev to accept the presence of alcohol and 
meat in a Rajput banquet even though these substances will pollute his own food too. 
Adivasis, on the other hand, are not allowed similar space to enjoy meat and alcohol 
without causing offence. It appears that these people carry the pollution of these 
commodities continuously, and must therefore be kept at a distance at all times. Such 
substances, therefore, are not treated as polluting in an absolute sense. Instead the 
degree of their pollution is a function of who handles them. Thus, concerns for the 
`dirtiness' of Adivasis who consume polluting substances, appears to be based on caste 
discrimination. 
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Namdev's explanation of these skewed social relations through a discourse of hygiene 
divested of power implications is significant. In a paradoxical manner it reveals his 
greater reflexivity regarding the injustice of caste practices at the local level. While 
through the movement, Namdev had formed political and social relationships with 
Adivasis who he discovered to be good "hard working" people, this conflicted with his 
continuing discrimination of Adivasis at the level of everyday interactions. This 
presented a contradiction to him between the wider struggle for social justice, of which 
he was a part, and his local practices, which more visibly than before appeared unjust to 
him. The translation of these practices into a depoliticised discourse of hygiene can thus 
be read as his attempt to reconcile this contradiction. 
Amongst some people — albeit a small number — the wider struggle for justice led to the 
need to transform oppressive caste practices at the local level. The 'prefigurative' 
experiences of egalitarian social relations provided by the movement were important in 
facilitating the critical rejection of caste practices. As Geeta bai, the wife of a Yadav 
farmer recounts: 
"We used to keep Adivasis at a distance before. But when we 
started going on rallies we would have to eat together. We 
would travel in the same truck and sleep together. In this way 
we slowly started to get over chooa-choot. Now we are equals 
because we are fighting for the same goal. I don't even ask 
people what their caste is, it doesn't matter to me anymore." 
(25/1/06). 
The enactment of oneness with Adivasis by eating, sleeping and travelling together 
provided a context for understanding Adivasis as equals in a common struggle. 
Discriminatory caste practices that contradicted this equality were therefore rejected. 
The fact that the rejection of caste practices was a critical and conscious process can be 
seen from the manner in which she made efforts to transform caste relations beyond the 
context of the movement. Thus, of her own accord, Geeta confronted higher caste 
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Rajput women in the village about their refusal to eat or drink at Yadav households 
(fieldnotes, 23/2/06). While previously Geeta would have accepted her inferiority as a 
divine truth, she now not only experienced it as an affront but was taking action against 
it. 
Karan bhai, a Rajput farmer was also engaged in a reflexive transformation of everyday 
caste interactions despite the frictions it created with disapproving family members. 
When I visited his house my status as a superior caste Brahmin meant that I was 
willingly welcomed into the sanctified space of the kitchen by his family members. 
However as I enquired into caste relations in the village, they told me of how mortified 
they were that Karan also invited inferior caste Yadays to the kitchen. Indeed, his 
dismayed mother-in-law added that the Rajputs from other villages would stop eating at 
their place if it became known that their kitchen had been defiled by a Yaday. Karan's 
politicised engagement with caste practices was based on recognising these as 
oppressive and thus as dialectically related to the wider struggle: 
"See the Andolan is not just restricted to the Sardar Sarovar. It is 
about rights, human rights, social responsibility, humanity. Our 
struggle is not just about stopping the dam it is about all these 
issues too. That is why we are supporting the slum dweller 
movement in Bombay and that is also why there shouldn't be 
chooa choot. I consider everyone to be equal now." (Karan, 
1/2/06). 
The discursive repertoire of human rights and social justice emerging from the 
movement's counter-hegemonic struggle against SSP enabled him to reflect on caste 
practices as unjust. His efforts to transform caste practices were thus an extension of his 
struggle against the oppressive national and global forces responsible for SSP. In this 
sense his critical engagement with caste practices was part of his global struggle and he 
was therefore performing global citizenship at the local level through his actions against 
caste hierarchies in his community. Karan's enactment of global struggle at the local 
283 
level might be viewed as part of a "revolutionary social transformation" which Allman 
(2001) argues is essentially a "struggle to transform simultaneously not just the socio-
economic and political conditions of our existence but also ourselves" (p168, italics 
added). 
Class Consciousness and Practices 
So far we have seen that for some people the counter-hegemonic struggle against SSP 
provided a facilitative context for reflexivity and action to challenge gender and caste 
hierarchies within their villages. In contrast to this, a critical awareness of the 
oppressiveness underlying class relations seemed to be virtually absent. The endeavour 
of movement leaders to maintain a unified struggle by treating the mass base as a 
harmonious community can be implicated in reinforcing this. By obfuscating 
inequalities between farmers and labourers, the notion of community legitimised the 
hegemonic position of farmers and therefore did not encourage reflexivity regarding 
their role in the oppression of labourers. 
As mentioned earlier, labourers were not active participants in the movement largely 
because of the movement's community approach, which left the mobilisation of this 
group to the heads of the village — invariably farmers — who failed to involve workers in 
the movement. However even though they were not included in mobilisations, at the 
behest of their employers, they refrained from taking cash compensation offered by the 
government for many years. From around the early 1990s however workers across 
Nimari villages began to accept compensation90. This was a serious drawback for the 
movement because their acceptance of cash compensation reduced official statistics of 
the uncompensated and thus weakened the movement's resistance to the dam. Though 
this was not a collectively organised decision there were a number of common reasons 
that led to the mass withdrawal of workers from the movement. Apart from their 
inability to access and participate in the Andolan, workers began to feel that cash 
" Labourers have not been fairly compensated however. There have been significant irregularities in the 
distribution of cash compensation, with many families and individuals not being recognised by the 
government for compensation. 
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compensation — worth more than ten times their annual income — would enable them to 
escape the exploitation they faced as labourers, and that therefore their "situation will 
improve after taking compensation" as one worker told me (fieldnotes, 7/2/06). In any 
case they were not convinced that the movement's demand for land compensation 
would benefit them in the same manner that it would benefit land-owning Nimari and 
hill Adivasi farmers91. The acceptance of compensation by workers is suggestive of 
their incipient consciousness of the different class positions and interests of workers and 
farmers. 
Farmers on the other hand articulated a discourse of brotherhood and common purpose 
that completely negated class divisions: 
"Farmers and labourers are brothers. Neither can survive 
without the other. We have to look after the interests of one 
another. If the government builds dams and factories where will 
the farmers cultivate? And if the farmers don't have their land 
then the labourers will also starve. ..." (Geeta bai, 25/1/06). 
Apart from 'brotherhood', suggesting a relationship of equality between labourers and 
farmers, a more paternalistic discourse also commonly used by farmers, alluded to 
labourers' subordinate position, though still negating their exploitation. As one farmer 
told me: 
"We take care of the labourers; we feed and nourish them 
[paalan-paushan]. We give them their wages, clothes, and food" 
(Namdev, 5/2/06). 
91 It must be reminded that the hill Adivasis are sustained by subsistence-based agriculture and thus have 
no direct economic relationship with the Nimari farmers. However, historically Adivasis from the hills 
have migrated in times of need to find seasonal or even permanent employment in Nimar as agricultural 
labourers. 
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Both the discourse of brotherhood and paalan-paushan portrayed the village as a 
harmonious 'community' of interdependence and downplayed relations of exploitation 
and oppression. It thus served to normalise oppressive economic relations, allowing 
farmers to "feel, and appear, virtuous" (Foley, 1999, p7)92. 
The hegemonic discourse of farmer-labourer equality allowed farmers to maintain 
congruity between their struggle for human rights and justice at the national and global 
level, and their economic relations with labourers at the local level. Even when the 
impoverishment of labourers was acknowledged farmers constructed this as the joint 
oppression of labourers and farmers by the state: 
"The government doesn't give farmers the right price for his 
produce. So we are always in debt. If we got better prices we 
would be able to feed labourers more as well. We are both at the 
hands of these forces." (Bahadur, 30/3/06). 
By absolving themselves of responsibility for the exploitation of labourers, farmers 
could maintain their own position as victims of injustice against the state. The negation 
of farmers' exploitation of labourers and the foregrounding of their own oppression 
provided the basis for farmers to view themselves as agents of social transformation. 
Thus according to one farmer: 
"One day there will be farmers rule. No one will be corrupt, if 
we go to hospital no one will demand money...if farmers have 
land then mazdoors will get good work and they will get justice 
too." (Sharad, 5/2/06). 
92 Foley describes how such paternalistic discourse was also prevalent amongst plantation owners in the 
fifteenth and nineteenth century who built their wealth on the backs of African slaves. "A paternalistic 
ideology assumed that owners were responsible for the material and spiritual welfare of slaves. The 
ideology required owners to look after slaves; it also allowed owners to feel, and appear, virtuous." 
(Foley, 1999, p7). 
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From the perspective of the 'benevolent' farmers, the withdrawal of labourers from the 
movement was thus viewed as an illegitimate betrayal. It did not emerge from the 
economic marginalisation of labourers or from the failure of the movement to address 
their class interests. It was instead evidence of labourers' weak personal character: 
"...they got greedy for money and so they moved away from us. 
I feel like they betrayed us and the movement." (Namdev, 
5/2/06). 
The hegemonic discourse of farmer-labour unity was effective in depoliticising their 
relationship with workers and therefore also allowed farmers to maintain a separation 
between the wider political struggle of the NBA and the apolitical 'community' at the 
local level. It allowed farmers to continue their legitimate struggle for justice while 
remaining unreflexive regarding their exploitation of labourers. 
To summarise, most village participants displayed various levels of a domesticated 
consciousness in that they generally expressed varying degrees of consent for gender 
and caste, but most strongly for class oppression in their communities. Nevertheless, a 
small minority appeared to be emerging in the process of social struggle, as critical 
actors against marginalising gender and caste practices at the local level. 
CONCLUSION 
The movement's counter-hegemonic struggle at the national and global scale was thus 
ambivalently related to local transformation. Though it provided facilitative conditions 
for reflexivity and action on local forms of gender, caste and class oppression it also 
constrained these processes. As a struggle for social justice, the need to critically 
question local oppression was ideologically relevant to the movement, however, 
movement leaders did not actively encourage such collective reflection because this 
could divide and destabilise the struggle against the dam. As such, the connection and 
extension of the wider struggle to the transformation of local forms of oppression 
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depended on how individuals responded to the ambivalent educative context created by 
the movement. Thus for a few grassroots participants, the experience of more 
egalitarian social relations within the space of the movement and its discursive 
construction as a struggle for human rights and social justice provided the foundations 
for developing reflexivity regarding the oppressive nature of local practices. At the 
same time however, the uncritical discourse of 'community' that was encouraged by 
movement leaders served to keep concealed unequal social relations and to obfuscate 
contradictions between the wider struggle and oppressive local practices. Within this 
context it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority of participants displayed 
varying levels of consent for gender, caste, and class oppression in their localities, 
especially considering that such oppression is deeply normalised through cultural, 
everyday practices of tradition and religion. 
Thus, while social movements perform global citizenship through their resistance to 
global and national capitalism and defence of human rights, this may not be fully 
related to transformation of oppressive structures within their own communities. Their 
ability to be agents of global transformation is circumscribed by exploitative social 
structures which they themselves are a part of and that they must critically engage with 
in order to realise their transformative potential. Though the process of struggle can 
create social conditions that are potentially transformative, it is clear that the 
politicisation of consciousness and the learning involved in this is difficult and uneven. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws to a conclusion the main threads of the research undertaken here, 
which sought to probe the nature and processes of grassroots resistances to oppressive 
aspects of globalisation, and the role of these movements in the transformative space of 
global civil society. In concluding this thesis, the chapter firstly reflects back on the 
research questions in light of empirical findings emerging from the ethnographic case 
study of the Save the Narmada Movement. Secondly, it highlights significant empirical 
and theoretical contributions made by the study to the field of global civil society, and 
radical informal learning in social movements, and finally, it considers future areas of 
investigation that can potentially build on these contributions. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The ethnographic investigation of NBA was informed by the central consideration to 
explore the forms and extent to which local social movements that transnationalise their 
grievances are engaged in the construction of global citizenship (p22-23). In doing so 
the study has examined how far assertions of the parochialism of grassroots movements 
is correct — an assertion which has served to justify the paradoxical empirical 
invisibility of these movements within the field of GCS, which is conceptualised as 
involving the direct democratic participation and empowerment of these actors (Chapter 
1, 2). Adopting a Gramscian lens to understanding global citizenship as a politicised 
identity of resistance, it has been argued that NBA did indeed perform and articulate 
global citizenship at the collective level through the central process of extending it's 
local struggle for compensation of the displaced to a national and global struggle 
against 'destructive development' and globalisation. This process emerged from the 
movement's engagement with a Gramscian dialectic between structures (material) and 
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subjective reality (consciousness), visible in the way in which the various 
political/practical and cognitive/subjective dimensions of global citizenship that the 
thesis was interested in examining, interrelated to constitute and construct the 
movement's participation in, and emergence towards global citizenship. 
Firstly, in terms of political practices (political praxis), NBA's global citizenship was 
evident in its targeted protest against the supranational structure — the WB — which 
along with the Indian state was held directly accountable to the people of the Narmada 
Valley. This began to displace the notion of accountability as solely pertaining to 
citizenship of the nation-state. Secondly, the subjective dimensions of NBA's global 
citizenship were revealed in its cognitive praxis which consisted of counter-hegemonic 
discourses against destructive development, neo-colonialism and globalisation. These 
discourses extended beyond a defence of local, place-specific interests and formed the 
basis for an extended transnational solidarity with other oppressed groups. These 
globalised discourses were more than strategic rhetoric to gain support of powerful 
INGOs — they represented NBA's symbolic resistance against global forces of 
capitalism and thus even after WB withdrew, provided the ideological impetus for many 
more solidarity efforts such as CAWBADIA, and the Declaration of Curtiba at the 
global level and NAPM at the national level, which can be seen to represent nascent 
formations of GCS as a progressive 'war of position'. Together these elements of 
NBA's political and cognitive praxis provided the basis for its self-identification as a 
`global struggle' for social justice and human rights. Finally, this global struggle was 
consciously though nevertheless ambiguously constructed in a dialectical relationship 
with the need to challenge structures of oppression relating to caste, class and gender 
within local communities. Engaging in local transformation was thus another dimension 
through which global citizenship was performed. Below I will elaborate on these 
various components of global citizenship, but here it is necessary to reinforce the point 
that these dimensions didn't simply happen independently of each other. Instead, they 
were, actively and self-reflexively connected together by movement leaders in order to 
articulate NBA's collective identity. Further, they were not pre-formed, but arrived at 
through a gradual process of learning in social struggle. This self-reflexive connection 
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of various dimensions of social struggle was also visible to varying degrees amongst 
grassroots participants, and for some informed their self-identification as global 
citizens. 
The extension of the movement to the global scale did not, however, override national 
politics, citizenship and affiliation. Whereas orthodox globalisation accounts suggest 
that power and resistance is bifurcating to the global and local levels, NBA's politics 
was defined by a simultaneous globalisation and nationalisation of local issues. This 
was based on an awareness of the government's active role in promoting SSP in 
"collusion" with the WB in order to facilitate national, and more broadly transnational, 
capitalist interests. That the Indian government was an active agent in this development 
project, is clearly evident from its tenacious pursuit of the project even after the WB 
withdrew. Recognising the national-global power matrix, NBA thus contested the 
government's cost-benefit analysis and in the process expressed concern for the nation's 
prosperity and well-being. Apparently the globalisation of resistance does not 
necessarily represent a concomitant withdrawal from the state as some advocates of 
globalisation might suggest. 
Through the case study of NBA, the central proposition developed by the thesis is that 
global citizenship in grassroots movements is formed when these movements develop a 
critical awareness of the globally-organised structures of power implicated in their 
subjugation. Further, possibilities for the formation of this critical consciousness arise in 
the process of political engagement with these structures, a process which reflects the 
Gramscian/Marxist dialectic between consciousness and material reality. 
Thus the number of ways in which NBA performed its global citizenship (most 
powerfully, perhaps, through the formation of ideological, horizontal alliances with 
other social movements of the oppressed within and beyond India) were facilitated and 
necessitated by the critical realisation of the wider systemic forces that were responsible 
for the displacement of the Narmada people. This essentially involved unlearning the 
discourses that were used by these powers (the WB and Indian state) to legitimise and 
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entrench their hegemonic positions and subvert resistance. Thus it involved unlearning 
the hegemonic discourse of 'development for all' and 'political sovereignty' that were 
used to conceal their class positions and trans-border connections respectively. This 
process of learning itself arose from experiences gained from NBA's political praxis 
with these institutions that revealed their systemic failure to respond to the legitimate 
concerns of the movement, and thus in contradiction to their hegemonic discourses, 
their mutual class interests also. NBA's development of a systemic critique was 
facilitated by the ideological inputs of civil society organisations (NGOs and support 
groups) especially at the national level, with which NBA formed strategic, vertical 
linkages. However the main contribution of these national and international 
organisations was in bridging informational and geographical gaps between the 
movement and political institutions, and thus in facilitating NBA's political praxis, and 
subsequent experiential learning in relation to these structures. 
It is not simply the collective practices of local movements that indicate their 
development as global actors. In fact, the radical democratic spaces provided by such 
movements can enable deeper levels of engagement with the global, seen in the 
politicised self-transformation of grassroots participants' identities and subjective 
notions of citizenship. Transformation of the individual emerges from a process similar 
to the manner in which a movement's collective identity evolves, through a process of 
learning from empowering experiences of collective action and resistance against agents 
of power. This process of learning is at the same time mediated and facilitated by the 
practices and discourses of resistance emerging from the collective context of the social 
movement. Thus amongst grassroots participants of NBA, the process of collective 
organisation and action subverted the sense of passivity and lack of control that was 
experienced under their historical subservience to the `sarkar'. Movement events such 
as demonstrations, gherao-ing and questioning officials, and police confrontations 
provided critical learning experiences in which participants developed a more potent 
sense of agency as citizens, and also came to understand the state's violations of their 
rights as an injustice. The movement's politics of multiple scales that united project 
affected people from the three states and also created linkages with other struggles in 
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India and abroad, further contributed to local people's appraisal of the exploitative 
nature of the state and of forces beyond it. 
This politicisation of consciousness is related to people's subjective articulations of 
identity and citizenship, and may thus be viewed as products of the process of learning 
in social struggle. Though many village participants of NBA continued to express 
primary allegiance to the state, some rejected this political identity for regional 
affiliation to the people of the Narmada Valley, and still others expressed a global 
citizenship. These divergent expressions of citizenship though underlined by a common 
commitment to resistance against injustice differed in terms of how they constructed 
and negotiated between this commitment, national loyalty and global struggle. 
Significantly global citizenship was distinguished by a politicised awareness of the 
global nature of local exploitation and thus by an active expression of common, 
counter-hegemonic struggle with other oppressed groups around the world. National 
and regional citizens in contrast had a less developed sense of the global dimensions of 
their struggle. Though they did express support for foreign movements this was based 
either on instrumental concerns or on a 'moral universalist' duty to help fellow humans. 
Clearly these strategic and moral reasons did not seem to be a sufficient basis for the 
formation of global citizenship. 
As NBA's case study therefore indicates, the ideological reconstruction of a local 
movement's collective identity as global, and the articulation of global citizenship 
amongst individual participants, is a counter-hegemonic response to structures of power 
that are globally-organised. Further, such politicisation of identity is learnt through 
pedagogical experiences arising from political encounters with the concrete structures 
through which globalisation manifests and impacts on local conditions. 
However, the rearticulation of local movements as global, counter-hegemonic struggles 
provides a paradoxical and ambiguous context for critique and transformation of 
internal axes of oppression of gender, caste and class that is embedded within 
movement communities. While local transformation becomes ideologically relevant to a 
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wider struggle against social injustice and inequality, at a strategic level it can also 
fragment the wider struggle against external forces of oppression. Amongst the 
leadership of NBA this paradox led them to discourage exclusionary social practices in 
the context of the movement, while at the same time promote an undiscerning discourse 
of 'village community' that ignored divisions and exploitation within the village. The 
imperatives of social struggle can therefore lead to an ambivalent educational context 
for grassroots participants to dialectically relate struggle against global and national 
structures of oppression to critical praxis at the local level. Though the leadership 
provided "abbreviated experiences" (Allman, 2007, p2'72) of liberated social 
interactions that are consistent with an ideological struggle for social justice, the 
discourse of village community simultaneously prevented critical reflection on local 
practices of oppression that could destabilise the wider movement. The ambivalent 
educational context created by the struggle for social justice was visible in the various 
levels of domestication and critical reflection on traditional social practices that was 
displayed amongst grassroots participants of NBA. Evidently, while local movements 
may wage a battle against global agents of capitalism, performing global citizenship at 
the local level proves to be more difficult. 
Finally, the contribution of international NGOs in the Narmada campaign supports 
theorisations of GCS advocates of the role of these organisations in filling the 
`democratic deficit'. INGOs in this case established the accountability of supranational 
institutions to local people by bridging the informational and geographical divide 
between them. However while INGOs perform this function, the experience of the 
international Narmada campaign suggests that this is not necessarily accompanied by 
the articulation of global identities and citizenship that is hoped for by GCS theorists. 
Indeed from their positions of power over local communities, it appears that INGOs are 
more prone to galvanise support for local people on a moral appeal to national citizens 
in the West to use their privileged position to help suffering people. In corollary, they 
are less likely to construct a common struggle that emphasises the interdependence and 
equal partnership of global citizens in the North and South. 
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The empirical and theoretical analysis developed here of NBA's political and cognitive 
processes of resistance has a number of implications for studies in global civil society 
and learning in social movements. Below I turn to highlighting these contributions. 
THEORETICAL AND EMPRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
Firstly, by showing how the formation of global identities and discourses in this local 
social movement arose from an internal, creative process of engaging with and 
ascribing meaning to transnational and domestic structures of opportunity and 
constraint, I have challenged prevailing accounts of local-global alliances that present 
the globalisation of local movements as a more mechanical process of the local 
appropriation of global visions and discourses articulated by international NGOs. Thus, 
the transnationalisation of local movements is not always characterised by the 
disempowering narratives presented by critics of global civil society where local 
grievances are superseded by global discourses to secure the support of powerful 
INGOs. Neither is it necessarily typified by depictions suggested by GCS enthusiasts of 
ethically-conscious INGOs guiding parochial movements towards broader political 
objectives. Instead the globalisation of the local movement in this case is based on an 
emergent understanding of the dialectic between local oppression and global forces, 
learnt through the process of struggle. The NBA thus consciously perceived and 
performed its global citizenship through its local struggle against the dam. Contrary to 
the accounts above which imply a dichotomisation of local and global politics this 
analysis suggests an imbrication of the local and global. 
Secondly, the thesis makes an important empirical contribution to the field of 
transnational contention where research on the subjective processes of identity 
formation has been scant. In the absence of empirical analysis relating to the meanings 
that transnational actors ascribe to their political activity, debate between global and 
transnational civil society theorists regarding the extent to which transnational politics 
represents a qualitative shift away from state-centric social organisation has remained 
unresolved. My analysis suggests no easy yes or no answer to this debate. Above I have 
delineated the global discourses and identities constructed by the movement and shared 
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by 'global citizens' in the NBA villages — elements that are indicative of an emergent 
global civil society. However at the same time the endurance of national framings and 
expressions of duty and citizenship to the state not only within the local struggle but 
also in the international campaign of NGOs, cohere with a transnational civil society 
thesis. It appears that these two theoretical positions are not exclusive of one another. 
As national development becomes further intertwined with global funding and decision-
making processes and power is negotiated between the state and trans-border agents, 
conditions have emerged that necessitate civil society actors to articulate political 
identities, visions and alliances across national and global levels simultaneously. 
Further, in the case of the NBA transnational and global processes appear to be 
symbiotically related. While transnational contention started as a strategic initiative to 
protect local interests as TCS theory argues, the movement experiences that emerged 
from this led to the evolution of a more normative global politics against neo-
imperialism, characterising GCS. 
Thirdly, it has been demonstrated that global citizenship is not necessarily an elite 
identity or practices tied to the cosmopolitan experience of global travel, diaspora, 
multiculturalism, or cyber space. It is also relevant to rural communities in third world 
contexts that though physically bound to place, develop global imaginations in the 
course of struggle. As they unravel the global forces impinging on their daily lives and 
construct global linkages and solidarities of resistance they may come to replace local 
or national affiliations with articulations of global citizenship. While in the Western 
milieus referred to above global citizenship is a socio-cultural identity, in the context of 
the Narmada villages it signifies a political identity of contestation against the 
exclusionary and undemocratic processes of globalisation. 
Related to this, the analysis presented here sides with 'pragmatic' versions of global 
citizenship that view it as a response to political conditions of globalisation, over those 
based on moral universalism. While 'national citizens', both in the movement villages 
and international NGO campaign, based transnational support on a moral duty towards 
fellow humans, it was 'global citizens' that constructed transnational solidarity on a 
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political commitment to forming a common global struggle — a struggle that has become 
possible and necessary in the context of globalisation. It thus appears that global 
citizenship cannot be sustained on the basis of ahistorical ideological assertions of 
moral universalism. Instead it is a politicised identity with real and experiential basis in 
the globalised conditions of late modernity. 
Fourthly, by emphasising the emergent, processual and dynamic nature of social 
movements this study follows Foley in suggesting that movements engage in and are 
sites for informal political learning. In particular it supports a Gramscian-Freirean view 
of learning defined by a constant dialectical interaction between action and reflection, 
strategy and meaning-creation, through which movement's develop a deeper 
understanding of the systemic forces they are struggling against. This conscientisation is 
embedded in the movement's collective identity and can even have implications for 
movement participant's subjective identifications. While in the case of NBA the 
learning process led to the emergence of globalised citizenship, the thesis suggests that 
political learning is a central constituent of an emergent global civil society. Contrary to 
federalist theories of global citizenship, the institutionalisation of global structures of 
governance is not a vital precursor to the formation of politicised global identities. It is 
critical engagement with the local-global dialectic facilitated by conditions of 
globalisation that lies at the crux of the globalisation of transformative politics, action 
and citizenship. However the process of conscientisation does not follow a uniform, 
unilinear trajectory from domestication to liberation. Contradictions between global 
resistance and local consent for caste, class and patriarchy suggest that this learning is 
difficult, complex and uneven. 
Analysis and interpretation of transformation within social movements as learning 
processes has a number of advantages. It puts social movements at the centre of 
investigation by seeking to understand how they engage with their environment and the 
internal processes through which a movement's collective identity emerges. This 
provides a more agency-oriented alternative to accounts that have presented the 
collective identity of transnationalised movement's like the NBA as a fragmented 
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amalgam of acquired global discourses superimposed over conflicting local interests. 
Also, while critical learning is understood to be constituted by the dialectic between 
political and personal transformation, a focus on learning processes, allows global 
resistance and local transformation to be understood as equally relevant levels in 
investigating the articulation of global citizenship and global civil society. 
Further, the process of learning in political praxis through which NBA's struggle 
against neo-colonialism/globalisation evolved, provides valuable lessons for forming a 
political project of resistance against globalisation. It suggests that a postmodern retreat 
into civil society associations and cultural resistance may not be enough for the 
formation of politicised consciousness and development of a sense of agency. In that 
normative framings and radical critique slowly evolved from strategic action, it appears 
that ability of social movements to act upon structures of power by making them 
concrete and identifiable is critical to the emergence of globalised resistance and global 
citizenship. Thus conceptualisations of globalisation in the academia as nebulous and 
amorphous do nothing to facilitate the critical praxis of social movements (Cox, 1992). 
Scholars need to support movements on the ground by devoting more attention to 
uncovering the concrete nodes of power that lie behind the oppressive and undemocratic 
processes of globalisation. However, as a dialectical theory of consciousness and 
material reality suggests, mere knowledge of these structures is insufficient —
movements will then need to engage with these structures in order to radically 
transform their consciousness and relationship to them, and hence to test their own 
capacities to challenge the power of these institutions. 
Fifthly, the pursuit of the dialectic between global and local/personal, i.e. global 
solidarity and resistance back down to local transformation of oppressive traditional 
social practices, has provided a more comprehensive account of the workings of GCS 
that tend otherwise to be limited to analysing resistance against external oppressors. It 
has revealed that emancipatory struggles against national-global injustices can occur 
amidst enduring local oppression of caste, class and gender at the local level. This 
highlights the difficulty of achieving a complete local-global reflexivity. Often local 
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structures of oppression are held in place through cultural ideas and practices that 
inhibit reflection and action against oppression at the local level, even as collective 
actors proclaim a global struggle for justice and human rights. 
Thus, in contrast to the postmodern depiction of the local as an untarnished force for 
social emancipation against 'global' forces of domination (Esteva and Prakash, 1998), I 
emphasise the contradictory and contested nature of civil society. Rigorous political 
effort towards transformation will require an examination and engagement with the 
divisive and exclusionary forces that are embedded within civil society. This 'contested' 
nature of civil society problematises the tendency of some radical educators to view this 
sphere as an autonomous political space for emancipatory learning, while juxtaposing it 
against schools as an 'ideological state apparatus' that is necessarily constrained and co-
opted. Nevertheless, it does appear that through the course of social struggle, 
movements develop discursive and experiential opportunities to facilitate the 
beginnings of a dialectical deconstruction and transformation of existing hegemonic 
structures at the local level. 
Finally, the argument that political action against supranational institutions is not in 
itself a sufficient condition for the formation of global citizenship and that critical 
consciousness is also required, has implications for establishing the descriptive 
parameters of GCS. While it has been shown that INGOs in the much celebrated 
campaign against the WB, continued to evoke national sentiments and identities to draw 
support from the Western public, it appears that theorists need to move beyond surface 
descriptions of GCS that highlight the increasing trans-border networks of INGOs or the 
increasing institutionalisation of human rights. Instead examinations of the global 
consciousness, identities and visions of those engaged in trans-border contestation are 
required to develop more robust and deeper indicators of GCS. It has been shown that 
grassroots movements are spaces where these deeper processes of global citizenship and 
GCS can occur. Indeed they facilitate critical reflection and provide a sense of agency 
to tackle oppressive aspects of globalisation amongst some of the most vulnerable and 
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marginalised communities in the world and in so doing actively construct the 
transformative project of GCS. 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has made a start in investigating global processes at the local level. In order 
to better understand the generalities and specificities of these findings to geographical, 
cultural and political contexts more research is needed on movements in various regions 
and countries mobilising around a diversity of issues. 
I have shown that the nature of learning experiences was a critical determinant of the 
kind of discourses and identities that emerged within NBA. While NBA's transnational 
action was initially based on a strategic, vertical alliance with powerful international 
NGOs it would be interesting to explore whether horizontal political linkages between 
local movements in various countries might create different learning experiences and 
thus divergent forms of identity and discourses of global politics. Given that global 
citizens in this case study based their support for other oppressed groups on a sense of 
common political struggle, would there be greater prevalence of globalised discourses 
and identities in a horizontal alliance that is based on action against a common enemy? 
And what place would national forms of affiliation have within this coalition? 
While I have concentrated here on a local movement that formed global alliances, the 
thesis also suggests that the formation of global identities in this case was at least 
partially founded on the process of contesting against the state and forming alliances 
with other national movements. It would thus be worth studying how far local 
movements that remain limited to the national level are involved in the creation of 
global processes. 
Transnational civil society theorists have suggested that global alliances are generally 
transient and instrumental politics driven by overarching national or local interests. My 
findings have suggested that this misses the normative, radical dimensions of global 
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politics. Yet I have also noted the endurance of national loyalties and frameworks for 
collective action. While, turning the transnational civil society thesis on its head, I 
wonder whether these state-centric articulations could be strategic political efforts to 
defend globally oriented political values. Intimations of this possibility were made by 
some activists in India during my fieldtrip: 
"For the sake of the decentralisation of the people's power we 
think that the Indian nation-state has to go. But I think there are 
limitations to decentralisation. In the day of globalisation the 
state is working for the agents of the corporates, but we are 
playing into the hands of the corporates if we are destroying our 
own state. The WB wants the state to be done away with, so 
they can directly deal with the people of this nation. The 
organisation will certainly have to reshape our relations with the 
state, but there is also a peril in completely removing the state. I 
think our job is to make the state do things for the people." 
(Sanjay Sangvai, 6/5/06). 
The debate regarding the usefulness of the state revolves around a central concern for 
the protection and enhancement of people's power. Though the state is recognised as an 
inimical force in this wider global objective, the need for the state seems to be based on 
an assessment of its strategic value in protecting people from oppressive global forces. 
These views could be tentative indicators of the changing position and significance of 
the nation-state as a political formation worth defending and respecting in its own right 
to an instrumental medium for accomplishing global political objectives inherent in the 
idea of "people's power". Again more research is required to explore this hypothesis. 
Due to constraints of time and money this study relied on historical narratives of 
movement participants. In the absence of these constraints however, longitudinal 
research on social movements as they arise and develop would be another fruitful 
methodology for exploring the issues of process and transformation investigated here. 
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Further, longitudinal research could be conducted on how, and to what extent, the 
identities and political learning that has emerged within the context of the movement 
are carried forward and used in other contexts. 
In conclusion, it is certainly the case that there is a need for caution in generalising 
implications from a case study of one of the multitude of grassroots movements that 
exist across the world. Nevertheless, in illustrating the transformative potential of NBA 
the thesis has made a small, but important contribution towards challenging the 
perceived localism of grassroots movements and therefore in recognising elements of 
global agency in the practices of these actors. This is critical in an era of globalisation 
where the marginalisation and exploitation of local communities in the South is 
exacerbated by the formation of trans-border connections between dominant powers 
who conceal their class positions while promising 'development for all'. In this scenario 
it is when movements critically engage with political structures at the national and 
global level, and in this process come to experience, learn and understand their systemic 
positions, that there is a real possibility of their emergence as transformative agents, 
who perform global citizenship through their local struggle, and find common cause 
with others struggling for social change across the world. It is in learning these 
connections and performing these counter-hegemonic alliances that globally-organised 
structures of oppression may be defeated, and the transformative power of GCS 
realised. While further research needs to examine the generalisability of this thesis for 
understanding how grassroots movements learn to constitute global citizenship, it also 
needs to proceed in the spirit of forwarding this transformative project. It is hoped that 
in time this will correct the 'paradoxical' marginalisation of grassroots movements 
within the transformative field of GCS 
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APPENDIX: DATA ANALYSIS 
This appendix provides greater detail regarding the process of data analysis. In the 
thesis I have worked with two types of data sets — one relating to the narratives of 
movement participants (section A), and the second relating to the movement as a whole, 
i.e. its collective identity (section B). While analysis of interviews and observations was 
required for both these data sets, analysis of documents was unique to the second. Here 
I provide 1 example each of how the unique data analysis issues arising from the two 
data sets were tackled. In relation to the narratives of movement participants I illustrate 
how analytical constructs were arrived at through a process of searching for themes and 
identifying commonalities and differences between themes in the data. In relation to the 
collective identity data set I illustrate how the actions of the movement were interpreted 
through a process of triangulation and comparison of texts and actions at a particular 
time and across time. 
Section A: 
Analysing narratives of movement participants: An example - Global citizenship 
as a politicised identity 
To illustrate the data analysis procedure for the narratives of movement participants I 
take the example of how the construct of global citizenship as a politicised 
identification with global struggle was developed. Below I elaborate on the various 
steps involved. 
Step 1: Based on my research questions interview transcripts were categorised in terms 
of various forms of self-identification of citizenship by the interviewees. Three different 
types of citizenship were identified: national (12 people), local (3 people) and global (6 
people). 
346 
Step 2: Transcripts were then coded with particular attention paid to the various reasons 
given by interviewees for their subjective expressions of citizenship. 
Step 3: Closer attention was given to the various ways in which global citizens 
expressed their citizenship to establish the extent of commonalities or divergences 
amongst these narratives. 
Step 4: A common theme of the construction of a political relationship between local 
and global movements emerged within the transcripts of global citizens. NBA was 
viewed to be in common struggle with other foreign movements. Based on this, the 
preliminary construct of global citizenship as a politicised identification with global 
struggle was developed (selection and categorisation of interview extracts in relation to 
this is shown in Table 1). 
Step 5: In order to confirm this, the transcripts of national and local citizens were 
revisited, to more closely examine the ways in which these interviewees described and 
justified their relationship with trans-border movements. While these transcripts 
revealed a favourable attitude towards developing alliances with such movements the 
reasons given for this were either strategic, or based on the moral universalistic 
argument that suffering people should be helped. In contrast to global citizens, these 
interviewees did not view NBA and foreign movements as part of a common struggle 
(coding of interview extracts presented in Table 2). 
Step 6: Based on establishing commonalities within narratives of global citizens and 
differences against the narratives of national and regional citizens, the construct of 
global citizenship as a politicised identification with global struggle was confirmed. 
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Table 1: Examples of interview extracts of 'global citizens' expressing a common 
(political) struggle with foreign movements or people 
Extract from interview Comments 
Rama (adivasi) The common global struggle 
Int: I feel that those who understand us and support us, they come constructed here is the struggle 
from outside also — England, America, Japan, London, Germany. So against the oppression of humans 
these people have nothing to do with us but they are still thinking of 
us. So why do they come? I think that we are adivasis- the original 
people, so we are humans and they are humans and they think 
why should there be destruction in the name of humans. People 
by governments. 
Indian citizenship is not embraced 
hear in the newspapers that all is running well but some people come — identity is based on a more 
and see whether this is true or false. They come to see if the global, inclusive construct of the 
government is genuine. When they come here and see the oppression 'right thought', which drawing 
of the government for themselves some of these people come and from the above section might be 
stay to fight with us. based on fighting against 
NS: Do you feel you are part of India? Do you feel like you are oppression of humans. — identity is 
citizen of India? therefore global and politicised. 
Int: I think that India is a country, America and England are also 
countries. They are only countries aren't they, divided by water and 
some other boundary? My identity is determined by the right thought, 
whether it is in England, Japan, whatever country it is in the world, 
but the right thought, the right way of life, for truth, that is important 
to me, that is my identity. 
Kantya (advasi) 
NS: Where would you say you are a citizen of — India, Indian citizenship is accepted by 
your village, where? birth — it is not a matter of choice. 
Beyond this, he sees himself as a 
Int: I was born in India so I would have to say I am a world citizen because he views 
citizen of India. But there is more than that. Before I himself as connected to people 
only used to think about my fanning, may family that's across the world through his local 
it. Now I have started to think about other things also. struggle against the dam — a 
If we are able to stop one dam somewhere then it struggle which has global political 
will mean victory for the whole world. That is why implications. 
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we give and take support from other organisations 
across the world. We are fighting together. So my life 
is connected to these people also. That's why you could 
say I am a citizen of the world. 
Rohit (Nimari) Here again NBA is constructed as 
NS: What is the importance of NBA to your people? a global struggle for democratic 
Int: The Andolan is not only about one dam, it is about the whole involvement of people in 
process of development. People sitting in the government decide development. It is more than a 
what will happen to people here. It is the people who should decide national movement. 
the direction of development. This is what NBA talks about, it Along with this global 
doesn't just talk about India it talks about development in 
general and the right of people to participate in decision making. 
construction of the struggle, 
national citizenship is rejected as a 
The andolan also talks about alternatives — if we are opposing 'bondage' that is created by the 
something we have to give an alternative to it. rich to divide and oppress the 
NS: Can I ask you if you feel like you are citizen of India? poor. The rejection of national 
Int: Whether we are citizens of India or abroad, we are all the same. It citizenship and identification with 
is only politicians that separate us saying that we are citizens of the global poor is therefore a 
different places. The people who come from abroad are the same as 
us. The rich people and politicians have created this bondage of 
citizenship; they have created these boundaries so that they can grind 
the people. The poor are made to suffer. 
politicised inclusive identity. 
Karan (Nimari) 
Int: These days the governments of the powerful countries get Karan identifies powerful 
together and make policies that affect the whole world and they also governments as a common enemy 
exchange money. America gives billions to push forward certain of poor people. His identity as a 
policies. So these governments are getting together to displace world citizen is based on a 
poor people. So our fight is with a common enemy. This is why I common struggle with oppressed 
am not concerned with Indian citizenship I feel like a citizen of the people against this common 
world" enemy and thus his world 
citizenship is a politicised global 
identity. 
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Table 2: Examples of interview extracts from national citizens: Expressing 
support for foreign movements on an instrumental or moral bases in contrast to 
political basis. 
Extracts from interviews Comments 
Ganga 
"We should support foreign movements because they come here and 
help us. If we don't support them then they won't help us". 
These extracts reveal an 
Ram Singh instrumental basis for supporting 
"Foreigners come and spread news about us. This strengthens our foreign movements. Support is 
struggle so we should also help them." extended because they are viewed 
as benefiting the local struggle. No 
Dev Ram common political goals are 
"We should help foreign movements when we can. Of course it is not 
possible to go there but we can support them from here. Medha goes 
sometimes to help them. It is very important to give them support 
because they help us so much. They put pressure on our 
government." 
suggested. 
Narendra Here support for other movements 
"When I see other people suffering I feel pity for them. I know how I is extended out of a sense of moral 
am suffering. If I can help them in anyway I would." duty or pity. No sense of a 
common political struggle with 
Bahadur these movements is expressed. 
"Giving support to others is a good thing. If people gain strength 
from us then I am happy about that." 
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Section B: 
Analysing the collective identity of the movement: An example — Interpreting the 
meaning of NBA's demand for withdrawal of the World Bank 
Analysis of the collective identity of the movement partly involved analysing the 
political actions of the movement. Deciphering the meanings of these actions involved 
triangulating actions with the wider discourses and other actions of the movement in 
that particular time period. By doing this it was possible to see that though a particular 
action appeared to remain constant across time the meaning behind that action often 
changed. Understanding these changes made it possible to decipher the changing 
meaning of the movement itself. 
For example the demand for withdrawal of the World Bank from the project was a 
political action that remained constant for many years, but the reasons surrounding this 
demand changed in the course of the movement. While initially this was related more to 
a strategic attempt to stop the dam, in the later years it also became significant as a 
counter-hegemonic resistance against neo-colonialism. Below I show the process of 
triangulation of actions and discourses involved in understanding the changing 
significance of the demand for the withdrawal of the WB from the project. 
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